

Black Allies in a Predominantly White Social Movement

Fabio Rojas

Department of Sociology
Indiana University, Bloomington
frojas@indiana.edu

Michael T. Heaney

School of Social and Political Sciences
University of Glasgow
michaeltheaney@gmail.com

Muna Adem

Department of Sociology
Indiana University, Bloomington
munaadem@iu.edu

July 31, 2020

Abstract. Contemporary scholarship on allyship in social movements often assumes that allies are members of privileged groups that seek to advance the causes of marginalized groups. We argue that a more complete understanding of allyship is made possible by also examining marginalized groups acting as allies to the causes championed predominantly by privileged groups. As a case in point, we examine the involvement of Black activists in the antiwar movement in the United States after 9/11. Black activists were less likely to be involved in the antiwar movement than were White activists, despite the fact that public opinion surveys showed that African Americans were more likely than Whites to oppose American involvement in the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan. Drawing on surveys of antiwar street protesters conducted from 2007 to 2010, we present evidence that a propensity to choose a posture of allyship offers a better explanation for the pattern of participation by Black activists than explanations rooted in marginalization or lack of common interest. This conclusion holds for Black activists (narrowly defined) but must be modified when thinking persons of color (broadly defined) and racially/ethnically intersectional activists, who were less likely to embrace allyship and more likely to be marginalized.

The concept of *allyship* is increasingly important to the theory and practice of social movements (Clark 2019; Fingerhut and Hardy 2020; Grzaka, Adler, and Blazer 2015; Messner, Greenberg, and Peretz 2015). The prevailing definition of an *ally* is an actor that advocates for a group of which it is *not a member* in order to *advance the values or interests* of a group of which it *is* a member (Droogendyk et al. 2016; Louis et al. 2019; Myers 2008). For example, a Christian group acts as an ally to Muslim immigrants when it advocates in favor of the Muslim group's desired refugee status because of the belief that Christian values require helping the needy. Many scholars who write in this area assume that allies must be members of *privileged* groups who seek to help members of *marginalized* groups (see, *inter alia*, Casey et al. 2017; Forbes and Ueno 2020; Grzanka, Alder, and Blazer 2015; Ji and Fujimoto 2013; Jones and Brewster 2017; Montgomery and Stewart 2012; Ostrove and Brown 2018; Russell 2011; Russell and Bohan 2016; Russo 2014). They use examples such as Whites who join in the causes of African Americans, men who support women's activism, and straight people who help to fight for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and more (LGBTQ+) rights (Demerath, Marwell, and Aiken 1971; Fetner and Kush 2008; McAdam 1988; Messner, Greenberg, and Peretz 2015; Rothschild 1979; Stotzer 2009). Some studies have analyzed cases in which members of one marginalized group work to help members of another marginalized group, such as when lesbians act as allies to gay men (Brooks and Edwards 2009; Brown and Ostrove 2013). Still, the notion that allyship is *received* by marginalized groups is firmly implanted in the extant literature.

We argue that the concept of allyship should be applied more regularly to cases in which members of a marginalized group join forces with members of a privileged group to advance a cause championed predominantly by the privileged group. In doing so, we contribute to scholarship on allyship by deepening the understanding of the complex ways that marginalized

groups approach allyship. We point to three reasons why members of marginalized groups may choose to act as allies to members of privileged groups rather than as core participants in a movement. First, members of marginalized groups may wish to support a cause but feel uncomfortable in the midst of privileged groups due to the common practices of those groups, leading some members of marginalized groups to prefer to limit their interactions with the privileged groups (Dawson 2013; Eichstedt 2001; Lichterman 1995). Second, members of marginalized groups may already have extensive commitments to causes prioritized by their other preexisting group memberships (Corrigall-Brown 2012; Fisher 2019, p. 51), thus limiting their time available to work on the cause of the privileged group. Third, members of the marginalized group may have developed notions of allyship from working with privileged allies in movements for marginalized groups (Brown and Ostrove 2013; Forbes and Ueno 2020; Kohn 2015; Messner, Greenberg, and Peretz 2015). These reasons may contribute to decisions by members of marginalized groups to assume the posture of allies when they are working on causes championed predominantly by privileged groups.

This article focuses on the case of involvement by Black allies in the antiwar movement in the United States after 9/11, which was a predominantly White social movement. The beneficiaries of this movement were not only White people; potential beneficiaries included all taxpayers in the United States, members of the armed forces and their families, and people living in the Middle East who might be casualties of American military action. Nonetheless, the movement was mobilized in such a way that participation in the movement was likely to require interaction with majorities of White activists. These circumstances may have led many Black activists to hold the view that this was not really *their* movement.

The case of the antiwar movement after 9/11 is interesting because African Americans answering opinion polls registered 20- to 30-percent higher opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than did Whites (Dawson 2013, p. 10), yet Black participation in the antiwar movement was at much lower levels than that of Whites (Heaney and Rojas 2015, pp. 167-171). The puzzle of missing African American antiwar mobilization is deepened by considering that major antiwar demonstrations took place in cities with proportionately large Black populations, such as New York, Chicago, and Washington, DC. Thus, the fact Black activists experienced the antiwar movement differently than did White activists requires an explanation.

Focusing on African Americans in the antiwar movement – as opposed to other racial and ethnic groups – is warranted because of the exceptional history of Black-White relations in the United States. Other non-White groups have certainly suffered from the negative effects of systemic racism in the United States (Feagin and Cobas 2014; Chou and Feagin 2015). Native Americans have been the victims of genocide over many centuries (Lindsay 2012). Still, African Americans have experienced racism in distinctive ways at hands of the White majority (Dawson 1994). These experiences include the legacy of slavery, racial segregation, subjugation by authoritarian governments in the South, structural poverty, indiscriminate murder by police officers, and many other negative outcomes from severe discrimination (Gabrielson, Sagara, and Jones 2014; Mickey 2015; Wilson 1987). This history contributes to uniquely problematic relations between Blacks and Whites. Understanding these relationships specifically is thus a worthy subject of scholarly inquiry.

We consider three explanations for the racialized pattern of participation inside the antiwar movement after 9/11: *allyship*, *marginalization*, and *lack of common interests*. First, it is possible that African-American activists tended to choose to be involved in the movement

primarily as *allies* rather than as core activists because that role was preferred by them. Second, it is possible that African-American activists wished to be core activists in the movement but they were *marginalized* by other movement activists, which tended to keep them on the periphery of the movement. Third, it is possible that African Americans were less likely than Whites to see themselves as having *common interests* with the movement and, thus, limited their participation.

In order to evaluate the veracity of these three explanations, we draw upon surveys of 6,342 antiwar activists at demonstrations around the United States during the four-year period from 2007 to 2010. We examine movement involvement by these activists by contact with movement organizations and the reasons for their participation. The pattern in our findings is more consistent with the *allyship* explanation than with the *marginalization* and *lack of common interest* explanations for participation. We discuss how the pertinence of these explanations varies when considering the multiracial identity, “person of color”, and intersectional racial / ethnic identities.

Our findings do not imply that African Americans were never marginalized by the antiwar movement. Nor do they imply that African Americans always shared common interests with the antiwar movement. Indeed, there may have been many cases of race-based marginalization within the movement and many Black activists may have been uninterested in the movement. Rather, our findings support the conclusion that allyship provides a better explanation for why Black activists tended to participate differently than White activists than does marginalization or lack of common interests – even if there is variance in specific cases.

These findings make several important contributions to knowledge. First and foremost, they broaden our understanding of allyship in social movements. They show that marginalized

groups not only *receive* allyship from privileged groups, but marginalized groups *give* allyship to privileged groups under some conditions. This finding helps to decipher the underpinnings of diverse coalitions and how disparate groups interact in a multi-movement environment (McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Heaney and Rojas 2014). Second, these results help to reveal the limits of the antiwar movement after 9/11 and the causes for its inability to build and sustain a broad coalition against wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the analysis offers insights on the interaction of Blacks and Whites in a dynamic advocacy context. These insights may help to make sense of evolving race relations, such as those related to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement (Boyles 2019; Jackson, Bailey and Welles 2020; Ray, Brown, Fraistat, and Summers 2017; Williamson, Trump, and Einstein 2018), especially recent racially diverse protests calling for justice in the murder of George Floyd (Harmon and Tavernise 2020; McAdam 2020).

Allyship in Social Movements

Scholars of social movements have long been attentive to the special role that allies play in advocating for a cause. Some of the early work on this issue, for example, exposed the importance of White allies in the movement for African-American civil rights, especially the freedom riders (Brown 2002; Demerath, Marwell, and Aiken 1971; McAdam 1988; Rothschild 1979). The nature of this attention began to change, however, along with greater interest in how individuals navigate collective identities within the context of social movements (Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). In particular, Myers (2008) brought to light considerable differences in the ways that allies and beneficiaries navigate their place within movements.

Being an ally is often a fraught position to occupy within a social movement. By definition, an ally is not a direct beneficiary of the work of the movement; sometimes an ally is viewed as being part of the opposing group. As a result, the presence of allies in movement activities often raises suspicion among beneficiary activists (Eichstedt 2001). Indeed, the presence of allies can be disruptive to the goals of a social movement, such as when straight allies unconsciously promote heteronormativity within LGBTQ+ groups (Lapointe 2012; Mathers, Sumerau, and Ueno 2018; Montgomery and Stewart 2012). These problems potentially can be overcome, but it requires ongoing work on the part of the ally (Myers 2008). Allies regularly need to explain their presence in the movement (e.g., Why does a straight person care about LGBTQ+ rights?) and act in ways that beneficiaries find acceptable.

Recent research has demonstrated that beneficiary activists often form opinions about how allies should conduct themselves within beneficiaries' advocacy spaces. Brown and Ostove (2013) studied what people of color expect from their White allies. They found that respondents answering open-ended questions articulated eight major themes about their expectations for allies, such as sharing similar experiences, expressing non-judgmental attitudes, and proposing possible actions to address problems. They also found that perceptions of allies cluster around two dimensions: informed action and affirmation. Forbes and Ueno (2020) argue that queer activists vary considerably in their expectations for straight allies, with some activists preferring that allies emphasize the normalcy of queerness, some preferring allies to be politically affirming, and some embracing a combination of these two approaches. Messner, Greenberg, and Peretz (2015) describe how male allies in the anti-violence against women movement are expected to mentor young men toward accountability in their interactions with women. Thus,

multiple scholars document cases in which beneficiary activists think about what roles allies should play within their movements.

Many scholars see the role of allies as being limited to people who are privileged within the broader society. For example, Forbes and Ueno (2020, p. 159) define “allies” specifically as “members of a privileged identity group who advocate for the rights of a marginalized group” (see, *inter alia*, Casey et al. 2017; Grzanka, Alder, and Blazer 2015; Ji and Fujimoto 2013; Jones and Brewster 2017; Montgomery and Stewart 2012; Ostrove and Brown 2018; Russell 2011; Russell and Bohan 2016; Russo 2014). This perspective helps to highlight problems that may be associated with the presence of allies in a movement. Montgomery and Stewart (2012) point to the ways in which allies are often unaware of their privilege, which can be a barrier to advancing activist goals. While we recognize the usefulness of this perspective, we think that it overconstrains the concept of allyship. Instead, we argue that members of marginalized identity groups may sometimes find it to be to their advantage to present themselves as allies in movements that are dominated by members of privileged identity groups. Indeed, the experience of having been the recipient of allyship by privileged groups may be critical to an activist’s decision to become an ally.

We posit that awareness by beneficiary activists about the role of allies in their movement is likely to inform how those activists approach their own involvement in other movements for which they are not a beneficiary. For example, if a Black activist participates as an ally in the LGBTQ+ rights movement, their participation is likely informed by how they think about allies to pro-Black movements. As a result, choosing to act as an ally in movements for which they are not a beneficiary is likely to be a salient option for activists who are familiar with allyship from their other activism. Of course, just because an activist *could* act as an ally – or because they

could *imagine* themselves acting as an ally – does not necessarily mean that they *will* act as an ally. We envision allyship as one of several postures an activist may assume under these conditions.

Bringing activists together across movement boundaries can produce great value (Heaney and Rojas 2014; Van Dyke 2003; Vasi 2011; Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018). However, it can be very difficult to do so. As Lichterman (2005, p. 248) highlights, the “diverse customs of group life” create challenges in interactions among allied groups. Groups vary in their traditions, such as whether they encourage activists to speak individually for themselves or whether they try to forge a group consensus that is conveyed with one voice (Lichterman 1995, p. 522). They may also vary in their taken-for-granted organizational habits that correspond to differences in the race, class, or other characteristics of members (Lichterman 1995, p. 528). These cultural differences may introduce social costs to individuals who seek to be core participants in movements with which they are not accustomed to working. To avoid these costs, some activists may opt to assume a posture as an ally as opposed to a core activist.

Some activists may seek to be movement allies but find that they are not welcomed or genuinely included. At times, they may be nominally included but find that their interests are ignored or deprioritized. These outcomes are part of complex, evolving patterns of marginalization through which “a group’s stigmatized identity works to constrain the opportunities and rights afforded community members, helping to solidify their secondary status” (Cohen 1999, p. 38; see also Frymer 1999; Tyson 2016). As Strolovitch (2007) has demonstrated, this marginalization may occur even within advocacy organizations that exist for the expressed purpose of addressing the structural disadvantages of race, class, and gender. People with multiple, intersecting, disadvantaged identities may be particularly subject to

marginalization within movements. These tendencies have been demonstrated, for example, in research on how Black women were relegated to behind-the-scenes roles in the Million Man March (Smooth and Tucker 1999) and how women who participated in the Pittston coal strike were marginalized due to their gender and class (Beckwith 2014). On the other hand, research has identified ways that movements have sought to intentionally address problems of intersectionality and achieved some degree of success (Fisher, Jasny, and Dow 2018; Heaney 2019; Terriquez 2015; Tormos 2017).

Still other activists find themselves disinterested, or having only peripheral interests, in the agenda of the movement. Despite the best efforts of leaders to unify disparate interests, political actors may fail to embrace a common agenda (McAdam and Boudet 2012; Schwarz and Thompson 1990). Coalition formation is occasionally achieved but, more often, is overwhelmed by obstacles (Staggenborg 1986). Under these conditions, activists may choose not to work together.

African Americans and the Antiwar Movement after 9/11

Organized opposition to war has been a part of American politics since the Revolutionary Era (Halsted Van Tyne 1902) and has been manifested during every notable military conflict that the country has entered (Brick and Phelps 2015; Heaney and Rojas 2015; Hofstadter 1969; Mann 2010). In this respect, the antiwar movement after 9/11 was unremarkable. Coalitions began to form in opposition to war in the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Gillham and Edwards 2011; Heaney and Rojas 2008). Activists organized in anticipation that President George W. Bush would use these events as a justification to exert military force. The antiwar movement was robust through the remainder of the Bush presidency and then declined

precipitously once he was replaced by Barack Obama, who had been elected President in part on an antiwar platform (Heaney and Rojas 2015).

Despite the overwhelmingly White nature of peace activism – with events typically composed of more than 75 percent White activists (Heaney and Rojas 2015, pp. 258, 263) – the racial politics of antiwar movements has mostly escaped scholarly attention. A notable exception is Westheider (2008) who observed that Vietnam antiwar activism tended to be segregated on the basis of race. Heaney and Rojas (2015, p. 168) reported that African Americans made up between 6 and 10 percent of participants in the antiwar movement between 2004 and 2010, during which time African Americans were roughly 13 percent of the national population. They also noted that there were few Black organizations in the movement devoted to mobilizing for antiwar advocacy. One organization, Black Voices for Peace, had ceased to function by 2004, just a year after the US invasion of Iraq. A second organization – the Black is Back Coalition for Social Justice, Peace, and Reparations – was not formed until 2009, by which time much of the rest of the antiwar movement had already shifted into abeyance.

Relatively low participation by Black activists in the antiwar movement is surprising due to how the war affected African-American communities and how they responded to the war. Data from the Congressional Research Service (Debruyne 2018) show that approximately 10 percent of all US military casualties of the Iraq War were African Americans. Surveys of members of the armed services showed that the rate of disapproval of the Iraq War by Black soldiers was more than double that of White soldiers – 50 percent to 20 percent (Rohall and Ender 2007). At the same time, survey evidence demonstrated that Blacks and Whites attributed similar levels of importance to the Iraq War as a public policy issue. For example, polling during the war indicated that Blacks were somewhat more likely than Whites to say that the war was an

“extremely important” issue – 59 percent to 50 percent (Roper Center 2006). Similarly, one might expect more Black participation in the antiwar movement because the movement was closely allied with the Democratic Party – especially in the early years of the Iraq War (Heaney and Rojas 2015). Given the strong Democratic dispositions of African-American voters (Bobo 2017), alignment among Democrats, African Americans, and the antiwar movement would be expected.

The relative disengagement of African Americans from White-dominated social movements is not atypical. In her recent study of participation in progressive mobilizations during the presidency of Donald Trump, Fisher (2019, p. 45) found that Washington, DC-located events such as the Women’s March, the March for Science, the People’s Climate March, the March for Our Lives, and Families Belong Together had less than 10 percent Black participation (though some events, such as the March for Racial Justice, were as high as 18 percent Black). Black activists were also uncommon participants in conservative movements, such as the Tea Party (Heaney 2018, p. 45; Heaney and Rojas 2015, p. 209), as it was often the case that anti-Black racial resentment was at the heart of what attracted supporters to these movements (Parker and Barreto 2013). Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the antiwar movement is not the *only* example of a social movement without high levels of Black participation. We claim only that it is a good example of their low engagement.

Hypotheses

This article considers three subtly different explanations for why Black activists had different experiences in the antiwar movement than did White activists. First, the allyship explanation is that Black activists wanted to participate in the movement but often preferred to play a supporting role in it rather than a primary role. Second, the marginalization explanation is that

Black activists wanted to be core activists in the movement but their participation was often discouraged by the organizing structures of the movement. Third, the lack of common interest explanation is that Black activists were often not that interested in being involved in the movement. They showed up occasionally, but it was of generally low importance to them.

Whether an activist was contacted by antiwar movement organizations, as well as how activists explained the reasons for their participation in the antiwar movement, helps to decide which explanation best fits the antiwar case. Contact by a movement organization reveals a relationship between the activists and the organization, reflecting a willingness on the part of both to work together. An activist's reasons for participation indicate why they are spending their time in the movement; that is, what they hope to give to it and receive from it. Organizational contact and reasons for participation thus provide the bases for a series of hypotheses that reflect the three explanations.

Organizational Contact. If Black activists were allies to the movement, then we would expect them to have been contacted at a rate no different than White activists. They expressed an interest in being contacted and the movement responded by contacting them. If Black activists were marginalized by the movement, then we would expect them to have been contacted at lower rates than White activists. They expressed a desire to be in the movement but it did not reciprocate. If Black activists did not have a common interest with the movement, then they neither expressed an interest in being contacted nor received contact. Thus, Black activists would have had lower rates of contact than did White activists.

Reasons for Participation. If Black activists were allies to the movement, then we would expect them to have been motivated more by the desire to help the movement than was the case for White activists. That is, they were motivated less by the cause proper (i.e., stop the war) than

to be helpful to the movement itself (i.e., to be good allies). Allies should not have been any different from core participants in their opposition to the Republican Party since the party was a threat to all activists on the Left, no matter their cause. If Black activists wished to be core participants but were marginalized by the movement, then we would expect no difference between Black activists and White activists in their support for the movement, opposition to war, or opposition to the Republican Party. If Black activists did not have a common interest with the movement, then we would expect them to have been less likely than White activists to seek to support the movement, oppose war, and oppose the Republican Party.

The desire of Black activists to be allies to the antiwar movement may have depended, in part, on their prior experience in pro-Black movements. Thus, we expect Black activists were more likely to state a motivation to support the movement (i.e., to be an ally) if they were also members of pro-Black organizations, which we would have expected to have enhanced their sensitivity to the concept of allyship. Work in pro-Black organization likely exposed them to contact with White allies or at least led them to take positions on the role of White allies in the organization (Brown 2002; Chappel 1994; Haines 1984; Sale 1973). In contrast, if Black activists sought to be core activists but were marginalized by the movement, then there should have been no difference in the stated desire to support the movement by Black activists as a function of their membership in pro-Black organizations. Likewise, if Black activists lacked a common interest with the antiwar movement, then their status in pro-Black movements should have been unrelated to their motivation to support the movement.

Summary of hypotheses. The hypotheses in this research are summarized in Table 1. Allyship would be characterized by Black activists being more likely to be motivated by a desire to help the movement, less likely to express a stop-the-war motivation, and no different than

White activists with respect to organizational contact and opposition to the Republican Party. Also, allies would be more likely to be motivated to help the antiwar movement if they were members of pro-Black organizations.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Marginalization would be characterized by Black activists being less likely than White activists to be contacted by movement organizations but no different from White activists in their motivation to help the movement, their opposition to war, or their opposition to the Republican Party. There would be no differences between members of pro-Black organizations and nonmembers in the motivation to help the movement.

Lack of common interest would be characterized by Black activists being less likely than White activists to be contacted by movement organizations, to express an interest in supporting the movement, to seek to stop the war, and to oppose the Republican Party. There would be no differences between members of pro-Black organizations and nonmembers in the motivation to help the movement.

Research Design

We assessed the posture of Black activists in the antiwar movement after 9/11 by conducting surveys of participants during all the major antiwar protest campaigns in United States from 2007 to 2010. We conducted surveys at protests at 37 distinct events held on 16 separate weekends (4 in 2007, 3 in 2008, 6 in 2009, and 3 in 2010). On many occasions, surveys were conducted in one location, such as when major protests were held in Washington, DC or outside the Democratic or Republican National Convention. On other occasions, surveys took place in multiple cities simultaneously. Surveys were fielded 12 times in Washington, DC; 7 times in

New York, NY; 7 times in Chicago, IL; 6 times in San Francisco, CA; 2 times in Los Angeles, CA; 1 time in Boston, MA; 1 time in Denver, CO; and 1 time in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN. We acknowledge that the exclusively urban nature of the sample is a limitation of the study, though many participants did travel from rural and suburban areas to the urban sites of the protests. In total, we obtained 6,342 surveys, with 435 (about 7 percent) of respondents self-identifying as Black / African American. The overall response rate was approximately 81 percent.

We arrived at each event with a team of 3 to 10 surveyors, depending on its anticipated size. Surveyors began by surrounding the perimeter of the event. They were instructed to look into the crowd, select an anchor for the purpose of counting, and then contact the fifth person to the right of the anchor. Inviting every fifth person continued until three surveys were accepted, after which a new anchor was selected and the counting process repeated. This approach is discussed in some depth by Fisher et al. (2019). Prior research has shown that these field approximations of random samples can produce reliable estimates of protest crowds by enforcing the sampling of random participants and not only “approachable peers” (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011; Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars 2016).

Respondents were asked to self-administer the two-page paper surveys using a pen and clipboard. Surveyors occasionally administered surveys verbally for respondents with visual impairments. Surveys were available in English and Spanish, though the Spanish option was seldom selected.

The following survey questions were used to construct the key variables of the study:

Race / Ethnicity: What is your race / ethnicity? Circle as many as apply: White / Caucasian; Black / African American; Latino / Hispanic; Asian; Other.

Organizational Contact: Were you contacted to attend today's event by any particular organization? YES / NO. If "YES," which organization? (list as many as contacted you).

Reasons for Participation: What are the most important reasons you came to this event? We hand-coded the responses to this variable into four categories: (1) Help the Movement; (2) Stop the War; (3) Oppose the Republican Party; and (4) Other.

Organizational Membership. Are you a member of any civic, community, labor, or political organizations? (Circle ONE) YES / NO. If "YES," which organizations are you a member of? (list as many as you can). We coded responses into two variables: (1) How many pro-Black organizations were they members of? and (2) How many non-pro-Black organizations were they members of? An organization was coded as pro-Black if it mentioned supporting Blacks, African Americans, or persons of color in their name, mission statement, or "about us" statement on their web page. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was classified as a pro-Black organization using this approach. We also added a variable for the number of *Non-Pro-Black Organization Memberships* by counting the number of organizations they were members of that did not meet the criteria to be a pro-Black organization. For example, Peace Action was classified as a non-pro-Black organization using this approach. Note that we are not claiming that Peace Action was *anti-Black*, only that being *pro-Black* was not explicitly stated as part of its organizational purpose.

Other questions on the survey collected information on age, gender, educational attainment, income, city of residence, party membership, ideology, and other topics. The wording for these questions is provided in Appendix A.

We estimated two sets of statistical models. The first set of models examined the dependent variable for *Organization Contact*, which is whether the respondent was contacted by

an organization that encouraged them to attend the event. We included independent variables for race / ethnicity, age, gender, educational attainment is college degree, income in thousands of dollars, log of distance traveled (from city of residence), party membership, a measure of political ideology on a seven-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, a dummy variable for respondents that wrote in an ideology to the left of extremely liberal (e.g., anarchist), and the number of months since January 2007.

Model 1.1 is a probit regression. The goal of this model is to determine if Black activists were different from White activists in whether they were contacted by an organization, other variables held constant. Model 1.2 is a propensity-score matching model (D'Orazio, Di Zio, and Scanu 2006) using the same independent variables as Model 1.1. The goal of this model is to determine if Black activists were different from White activists while taking account of the fact that we were less likely to observe Black activists than White activists. This approach compares an observed Black activist to a weighted-equivalent non-Black activist to estimate the effect of being Black. We report the average treatment effect (ATE) for this model.

The second set of models examined the dependent variables for *Help the Movement*, *Stop the War*, and *Oppose the Republican Party*. Model 2.1 consists of three equations for these dependent variables as a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) (Zellner 1963). The SUR approach is appropriate because all three variables are derived from the same survey question about *Reasons for Participation* and, thus, share a common error variance. For example, a person who writes that they are motivated to stop the war may be less likely to write that they are motivated to help the movement. Thus, by estimating these equations together we take advantage of the knowledge that they are related to one another.

Model 2.1. combines three probit regressions with the same independent variables as Model 1.1. The SUR are estimated using the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) approach developed by Roodman (2011). Models 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are propensity-score matching models to derive the ATE for each of the reasons for participation. Model 2.5 tests the idea that *Reasons for Participation* also depend on the number of *Pro-Black Organization Memberships* that an activist held. Adding the number of *Non-Pro-Black Organization Memberships* allows us to distinguish between the activist's interaction with advocacy organizations generally and their association specifically with pro-Black organizations. Model 2.5 is the same as Model 2.1 with the addition of those two variables.

Both sets of models weighted observations to account for variations in response rate by event, estimated gender, and estimated race / ethnicity. Data were stratified by event. Missing values were imputed using 100 multiple imputations (King et al. 2001).

Statistical Results

Somewhat more than one-third of survey respondents indicated that they were contacted directly by an organization that encouraged them to attend the event at which we observed them. Most of these contacts were a result of an email, although some organizational contacts used more traditional methods – such as canvassing or phone calls – while other came through then-emergent social media technologies, such as Facebook or Twitter. Individuals not contacted by organizations usually learned about events through mass media or word of mouth. In some cases, respondents reported having stumbled upon events.

The distribution of organizational contacts is broken down by race / ethnicity in Figure 1. White activists (40 percent) were somewhat more likely to be contacted by an organization to an

attend an event than were Black activists (32 percent) or activists reporting another race / ethnicity (34 percent). However, this difference is not large. A multivariate analysis is needed to determine if these differences are properly attributed to race / ethnicity or were closely associated with other factors, such as age or gender.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

When asked what was the most important reason that they attended the event that we observed them at, approximately two-thirds of respondents answered with some version of stating a desire to end the war. It is certainly not surprising that opposing war should be the most common reason for participating in an antiwar demonstration. More than 15 percent stated a desire to help the movement and less than 10 percent sought to oppose the Republican Party. This question was open ended, so respondents were welcome to give as many reasons as they liked, or to state reasons other than the three we are focusing on. These answers reflect the issues that were most likely to come to the “top of the head” of respondents (Zaller 1992). If they had been further prompted, many respondents likely would have given additional reasons for their presence. Thus, the answers reported here reflect only the *most salient* reasons for participation and not *all* reasons for participation.

Figure 2 disaggregates reasons for participation by race / ethnicity. This graph displays some differences between Black activists and White activists in their reasons for participation. Black activists (20 percent) were somewhat more likely than White activists (15 percent) to explicitly state a motivation to help the movement. In contrast, White activists (70 percent) were somewhat more likely than Black activists (57 percent) to explicitly state a motivation to stop the war. Whether these differences are properly attributed to race / ethnicity – or are associated with

some other factor such as gender or age – is evaluated with the multivariate analysis reported below.

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Irrespective of the multivariate analysis, the descriptive statistics reported here demonstrate that there are not massive differences between Black activists and White activists for participation in the antiwar movement after 9/11. Black and White activists both received contacts from the movement and both groups sought to stop the war and support the movement. Yet the differences that we observed are large enough to help account for some of the varied experiences of these groups in their antiwar participation.

The results of our probit analysis of whether respondents were contacted by the antiwar movement are reported in Table 2. They indicate no statistically significant differences between Black and White activists in the likelihood of being encouraged to attend by an organization. A finding of a negative, statistically significant relationship would have been consistent with the marginalization and lack of common interest explanations for Black participation. Instead, the findings show that any variations in organizational contact may be associated with other significant factors, such as age, gender, educational attainment, distance traveled, party membership, ideology, and the timing of the survey. Although our focus is on Black and White activists, it is also worth mentioning that coefficients on Latinx, Asian, and Other racial / ethnic categories were not statistically significant. Generally speaking, racial disparities in organizational contacts are not present in these data.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

We were mindful of the possibility that the results could be driven by the fact that we observed proportionately fewer Black activists than non-Black activists. The propensity-score

matching analysis in Model 1.2 shows that when the Black activists we observed are compared to non-Black activists who are weighted to be equivalent with respect to non-racial variables (e.g., age, gender), there is still no statistically significant difference between the groups, as indicated by the ATE. This analysis thus increases our confidence in the finding that antiwar activists did not diverge in their likelihood of being contacted because of race / ethnicity.

The results of the SUR analysis of reasons for participation are depicted in Table 3. The coefficients for Black activists should be the focus of attention. We find that Black activists were significantly more likely than White activists (which is the base racial category) to explicitly state their purpose for participation as helping the movement than was the case for White activists. Conversely, White activists were more likely to explicitly state their purpose for participation as stopping the war. There was no statistically significant difference between the groups in their stated desire to oppose the Republican Party. This pattern of results is consistent with the allyship explanation rather than marginalization or lack of common interest explanations for participation.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Although not the focus of our attention, numerous other variables proved to be significantly associated with reasons for participation. Younger activists were more likely to state their motivation in terms of helping the movement while older activists concentrated more on stopping the war and opposing the Republican Party. Women were more likely than men and transgendered persons to express passivist intentions, though gender did not differentiate activists with respect to the other reasons. Holding a college degree was associated with wanting to help the movement but not with other reasons. Democratic Party membership was coupled with seeking to stop the war and the Republicans but not with helping the movement.

Conservative-leaning activists (which in effect means more moderate activists, given the strong liberal bent in these data) tended toward stopping war as a motivation, rather than opposing the Republicans or helping the movement. Finally, there were negative time trends for an articulated desire to stop the war and the Republicans, but the desire to help the movement did not become significantly more or less likely over the four years of the survey.

Despite our focus on Black and White activists, it is worth noting that the racial / ethnic differences in the reasons for protest given by Black and White respondents are not reflected in the answers of other groups. There are no statistically significant differences between White respondents and Latinx, Asian, and Other respondents. This lack of significance cannot be attributed only to small samples. For example, 440 respondents self-identified as Latinx / Hispanic, which was 5 more respondents than identified as Black / African American. Thus, sample size alone cannot be an explanation for why there are significant differences for Blacks but not Latinx respondents. The sample does contain fewer self-identified Asian respondents (277, which is approximately 4 percent), though we observed members of this group nearly in proportion to their estimated size in the 2000 Census (United States Census Bureau 2020).

The relationships between the equations in Model 2.1 are reflected in the arctangent of ρ parameters reported in the bottom of Table 3. The significant, negative coefficients on these three parameters establishes that there are trade-offs among the reasons for participation. For example, a respondent that stressed stopping the war was less likely to also state that they were there to help the movement, though the research design did not preclude them from doing so. Moreover, the fact that these coefficients are all statistically significant provides evidence that it was proper to estimate these equations as a system rather than as separate equations.

As was the case for Model 1.1, we were concerned about the possibility that our results in Model 2.1 are an artifact of the lower likelihood with which we observed Black activists compared to non-Black activists. Therefore, we repeat the propensity-score matching analysis in Table 4, which shows no significant differences from the SUR modeling with respect to the ATEs. This exercise increases our confidence that the results are not owed to underrepresentation of Black activists in our data.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

We were further interested in whether there was a connection between the involvement of activists in pro-Black organizations and their motivations for participation. The results in Table 5 address this question. The findings indicate that membership in pro-Black organizations is positively and significantly associated with stating a motivation to help the movement and significantly negatively associated with stating a desire to stop the war. These findings are consistent with the allyship argument.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

We added a variable for non-pro-Black organizational membership to Model 2.5. If we had not included this variable then we would not have been able to ascertain if the effect of membership in pro-Black organizations was due to the nature of those organizations (i.e., their being pro-Black) or simply to the presence of the activist in *any* organization. We find that membership in non-pro-Black organizations is associated both with wanting to support the movement and to stop the war. This result suggests that there is something about being a member of organizations generally that correlates with articulating more reasons for movement participation. This effect could run in different directions. It is possible that persons with more complex reasons for being involved in social movements join more organizations. Alternatively,

activists may learn reasons why they ought to help movements in advocacy organizations. Of course, some combination of these effects could also hold true. Either way, the presence of this variable solidifies our conclusion that pro-Black membership is specifically related to reasons for participation.

Finally, we observe that the coefficient on Black race / ethnicity loses its significance in the help-the-movement equation in Model 2.5. The reason for this change is that being a Black activist is correlated with being a member of a pro-Black organization. However, there is no significant change in the coefficient on Black race / ethnicity in the equation for stop the war.

Overall, the pattern of results is more consistent with an allyship explanation for participation than a marginalization or lack-of-common interest explanation. The fact that the coefficient on Black race / ethnicity in the contact equation is not statistically significant implies that there was neither a systematic tendency for the antiwar movement to ignore Black activists (the marginalization explanation) nor a tendency for Black activities to ignore the movement (the lack of common interest explanation).

We find that Black activists were more likely than White activists to explain their participation in terms of helping the movement, while the reverse was true with respect to stopping the war. There were no differences between White and Black activists in their motivations to oppose the Republican Party. Also consistent with the allyship explanation, being a member of a pro-Black organization was positively associated with wanting to support the movement and negatively associated with a focus on stopping the war. In contrast, if Black activists tended to be marginalized within the movement, then we would have expected them to have had motivations that were no different than White activists. If they had lacked a common interest with the movement, then we would have expected negative coefficients on Black race /

ethnicity in each of the three regression equations. Neither of these scenarios were borne out in the data.

Rethinking Racial / Ethnic Categories

Some readers may be skeptical of our focus on Black and White activists. They might argue that there is a solidarity among activists of all colors – forged through a collective battle against White supremacy (Bonilla-Silva 2001) – that requires that we consider persons of color as a broad, multiracial group (Lee and Bean 2004). To address these concerns, we tabulated *Person of Color*, which applies to about 21 percent of the respondents. We re-estimated Models 1.1 and 2.1, instead using *Person of Color* as the focal racial / ethnic variable and White as the base category. These estimates are reported in Table 6 as Model 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

The estimates for Model 3.1 show that when persons of color were aggregated into one category, there was no difference between persons of color and White activists in their likelihood of being contacted. The estimates for Model 3.2 indicate that like Black activists, persons of color were less likely than White activists to express a goal of ending the war. However, unlike Black activists, persons of color did not show a significant tendency toward seeking to help the movement. Like Black activists, persons of color were no different than Whites in their anti-Republican motivations.

These results demonstrate that it does matter whether all persons of color are aggregated together or broken into separate racial / ethnic categories. In particular, there is less evidence favoring the allyship explanation when persons of color are aggregated, due to lack of significance of the persons-of-color variable in the help-the-movement equation in Model 3.2.

This finding suggests that an allyship posture may have been more favored by Black activists than by other persons of color in this instance.

On the other hand, other readers may have the opposite concern: they may think that it is important to consider greater variation in racial and ethnic categories. In particular, they may be interested in the consequences of some respondents holding more than one non-White racial or ethnic identity. Such individuals might be especially vulnerable to intersectional marginalization (Cohen 1999; Frymer 1999; Strolovitch 2007; Tyson 2016). To consider this possibility, we created a variable for *Intersectional Identity*, taking the value of 1 if a respondent self-identified with more than one non-White racial or ethnic category, 0 otherwise. About 5 percent of respondents have intersectional identities using this definition. We re-estimated Models 1.1 and 2.1, adding the *Intersectional Identity* variable to the models. To compensate for increased problems with multicollinearity resulting from adding this variable, we removed the variable for Other race / ethnicity. These estimates are reported in Table 7 as Model 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

The estimates for Model 4.1 demonstrate a significant, negative effect of *Intersectional Identity*. This outcome means that persons who self-identified with more than one racial / ethnic category were less likely to be contacted to participate in antiwar demonstrations than were those who did not self-identify in this way, consistent with the expectations of intersectional marginalization theory. The estimates for Model 4.2 show no significant differences for activists with intersectional identities with respect to motivation to help the movement and stop the Republican Party. However, like Black activists, intersectionally identified activists were less likely to express an interest in stopping the war. These observations are less consistent with the

allyship explanation and more consistent with the marginalization and lack of common interest explanations.

Discussion

This investigation was initiated as a result of the observation that African Americans were generally more opposed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than were Whites, but Black activists were less likely to participate in the antiwar movement than were White activists. The juxtaposition of these facts gave us the puzzle of why Black activists experienced the antiwar movement differently than did White activists. The data analysis reported by this study presents allyship by Black activists as an explanation for this pattern.

Many Black activists clearly faced a dilemma if they were opponents of war during the Bush and Obama administrations. Being active in the movement meant engaging with large majorities of White activists. For some of these activists, this participation would mean joining with groups that did things differently than they were accustomed to doing them – or perhaps than they preferred to do them. These differences varied from mundane to serious matters – such as when to hold marches, how to make decisions in meetings, what slogans to emphasize, and what to demand of the government. Other activists viewed this situation more bitterly, seeing working with White organizations as engagement with oppressive groups.

Allyship presented an appealing option under these circumstances. By participating in the posture of an ally, Black activists could stand up for their antiwar principles while not becoming too entwined with the work of White activists. Individual activists crafted their own approaches to allyship. Some allied activists preferred to attend rallies while not being active in the planning process. Others supported the antiwar movement in small ways while keeping their focus on

participation in pro-Black organizations. Importantly, these approaches allowed activists to express their antiwar beliefs while staying embedded in their primary activist networks.

We are not arguing that all Black antiwar activists took an allied posture. Some Black activists were core participants in the antiwar movement. For example, Michael McPhearson is an African-American man who has spent more than a decade as one of the key leaders of United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and Veterans for Peace (VFP), two of the most prominent organizations in the movement. Other Black activists may have been pushed out by marginalization or decided that the antiwar cause did not interest them to the same extent as causes such as police reform. Still, it is clear that allyship fits the overall pattern of evidence for Black activists to a much greater extent than either marginalization or lack of common interest.

While our conclusions are unambiguous when we focus on self-identified Black / African-American activists, they become more fluid when we recognize variations in definitions of racial / ethnic categories. Broadening the analysis to persons of color – rather than only Black activists – leads to weaker support for the allyship explanation. The finding that persons of color more broadly were not as inclined to position themselves as allies to the antiwar movement as were Black activists (more narrowly conceived) may have resulted, in part, from the deep historical differences among these groups and their relationships to the White majority in the United States.

Activists who self-identified with more than one non-White racial / ethnic category – that we refer to as intersectionally identified activists – follow a pattern of participation that is more consistent (though not perfectly matched) with marginalization. This finding is in tune with intersectionality theory, though it only scratches the surface for what intersectionality theories would predict about movement participation in this case. A more complete intersectional

analysis would explore the intersections of race / ethnicity with gender, class, sexuality, ability, age, geography, language, and other dimensions of difference and disadvantage on movement participation (Collins 2000; Crenshaw 1989; Dhamoon 2011; Hancock 2007). We leave such analyses to future research.

Conclusion

The progression of scholarly research on allyship in social movements has moved consistently in the direction of appreciating greater agency on the part of activists in accepting and deploying allyship. Our contribution to this discussion further pushes in the direction of understanding how activists exert agency over their allyship. We argue that activists may decide whether or not to view themselves as allies in a movement regardless of their privileged or marginalized status. This perspective should be understood as congruent with the analysis of Myers (2008), who argued that allies are subject to a perpetual process of explaining themselves as allies and situating themselves within a movement. We view this process not only as one of explaining *how* they are allies, but also *whether* they are allies or something else. Activists possess the agency to change this status over time – choosing to move closer to the movement or further away from it.

Consider our case of Black activists in the antiwar movement after 9/11. Imagine a Black activist showing up for their first antiwar demonstration, encountering a sea of mostly White activists. The activist could have viewed the situation in any number of ways. One, they could have seen themselves as fitting into this group of peace-loving people and seeking to become more involved, perhaps finding an organization or group to join within the movement. Two, they could have been troubled by the Whiteness of the event – as Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2017) documented as the reaction of some Black activists at the Women’s March in 2017 – and chosen

to involve themselves only in a limited way in the future. Three, they could have seen the event as pointless and decided to go home. There were, of course, many other possibilities – and they were likely shaped by the activist’s experiences, networks, and political views. Our fundamental point here is that whether the activist steps toward becoming a core activist, an ally, a dropout, or something else is in their own hands. Their status as an ally is not only determined by their race or their social group but also by their own views of the movement.

As grassroots organizers aspire to build coalitions for social causes, they are keen to be attentive to the personal dynamics of allyship described here. If coalitions are to grow and become forceful political actors, they must find ways to incorporate the myriad differences that diverse groups of people bring with them. Helping people to think creatively about their own allyship may be one of the valuable things that movement leaders can do to expand their coalitions.

The failure of the antiwar movement after 9/11 to create enough viable spaces for their natural allies may have been one of the causes of its ineffectiveness in opposing war. For example, our analysis demonstrates that many African Americans did come to the antiwar movement as allies. But we also see that they came in much lower numbers than they might have. Imagine how the antiwar movement could have been stronger if the Black populations of New York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, and many other places turned out in proportions reflecting their views on the war. Yet, in order for this to have happened, grassroots organizers would have needed stronger connections in Black communities, and institutions such as churches, to help people feel welcome at what is otherwise a largely White affair.

It is surely an understatement to say that the racial and ethnic dynamics of social movement mobilization is a delicate matter. Nonetheless, there is hopeful news for organizers at hand. Even if African Americans were underrepresented within the antiwar movement after 9/11, Black activists did participate in the movement as allies and core participants. The movement was not racially segregated. The recent, racially diverse protests against the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police show even greater promise for Black and White activists to collaborate under contentious circumstances.

Future research could do more to shed light on the nature of allyship. Rather than treat a single movement as the focus of analysis, it could be valuable to shift focus to activists as they move across movement boundaries. How does an activist's experience with allyship in one movement affect their approach to allyship in another movement? Do different movements vary in how they incorporate the work of allies? How do these differences affect the kinds of coalitions that they build? Research that addresses these and related questions could serve to expand the theory and practice of allyship in social movements and social movement studies.

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Table 1. Distinguishing among Allyship, Marginalization, and Lack of Common Interest

	<i>Allyship</i>	<i>Marginalization</i>	<i>Lack of Common Interest</i>
<i>Organizational Contact</i>	Black activists no different than White activists	Black activists less likely to be contacted than White activists	Black activists less likely to be contacted than White activists
<i>Reasons for Participation</i>			
Help the Movement	Black activists more likely to express this motivation than White activists Activists in pro-Black organizations more likely to express this motivation than activists not in pro-Black organizations	Black activists no different than White activists Activists in pro-Black organizations no different than activists not in pro-Black organizations	Black activists less likely to express this motivation than White activists Activists in pro-Black organizations no different than activists not in pro-Black organizations
Stop the War	Black activists less likely to express this motivation than White activists	Black activists no different than White activists	Black activists less likely to express this motivation than White activists
Oppose the Republican Party	Black activists no different than White activists	Black activists no different than White activists	Black activists less likely to express this motivation than White activists

Table 2. Models of Organizational Contact

Variable	Model 1.1 <i>Organizational Contact</i>	Model 1.2 <i>Organizational Contact (ATE)</i>	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Percent Imputed
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>				
Black / African American	--0.083 (0.070)	0.056 (0.031)	0.068 (0.253)	1.4%
Latinx / Hispanic	--0.044 (0.068)		0.071 (0.256)	1.4%
Asian / Pacific Islander	0.065 (0.085)		0.044 (0.205)	1.4%
Other	--0.000 (0.079)		0.051 (0.220)	1.4%
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.011 * (0.001)		39.826 (18.154)	0.7%
<i>Sex / Gender is Female / Woman</i>	0.103 * (0.034)		0.510 (0.500)	0.8%
<i>Educational Attainment is College Degree</i>	0.053 * (0.040)		0.634 (0.482)	3.5%
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	--0.000 (0.001)		24.723 (20.634)	7.7%
<i>log Distance Traveled from City of Residence</i>	0.034 * (0.009)		3.584 (2.068)	2.9%
<i>Party Membership</i>				
Democratic	0.012 (0.038)		0.372 (0.483)	0.8%
Third Party	0.352 * (0.048)		0.155 (0.362)	0.8%
<i>Political Ideology (1=Extremely Liberal to 7=Extremely Conservative)</i>	--0.101 * (0.021)		1.686 (1.078)	41.4%
<i>Political Ideology is left of Extremely Liberal</i>	0.007 * (0.066)		0.124 (0.330)	40.1%
<i>Time in Months since January 2007</i>	0.007 * (0.001)		20.052 (13.511)	0.0%
<i>Constant</i>	--0.995 * (0.079)			
Sample Size	6,254	6,254		
Imputations	100	100		
F Statistic (df = 14, 5995)	23.67 *			

Note: * p ≤ 0.05.

Table 3. Models of Reasons for Participation

Variable	Model 2.1			Mean (Std. Dev.)	Percent Imputed
	<i>Help the Movement</i>	<i>Stop the War</i>	<i>Oppose the Republican Party</i>		
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>					
Black / African American	0.165 * (0.076)	--0.266 * (0.068)	--0.018 (0.011)	0.069 (0.253)	1.4%
Latinx / Hispanic	--0.031 (0.080)	0.046 (0.069)	--0.130 (0.120)	0.070 (0.254)	1.4%
Asian / Pacific Islander	--0.011 (0.104)	0.079 (0.087)	--0.046 (0.146)	0.042 (0.202)	1.4%
Other	0.060 (0.087)	--0.087 (0.076)	0.078 (0.116)	0.051 (0.221)	1.4%
<i>Age in Years</i>	--0.007 * (0.001)	0.010 * (0.001)	0.008 * (0.001)	40.129 (18.181)	0.7%
<i>Sex / Gender is Female / Woman</i>	--0.013 (0.040)	0.172 * (0.035)	--0.008 (0.052)	0.511 (0.500)	0.8%
<i>Educational Attainment is College Degree</i>	0.131 * (0.047)	--0.047 (0.041)	--0.046 (0.061)	0.637 (0.481)	3.3%
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	--0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)	24.843 (20.710)	7.4%
<i>log Distance Traveled from City of Residence</i>	--0.015 (0.010)	--0.015 (0.009)	0.015 (0.013)	3.577 (2.062)	2.7%
<i>Party Membership</i>					
Democratic	--0.066 (0.046)	0.097 * (0.040)	0.157 * (0.058)	0.375 (0.484)	0.7%
Third Party	0.052 (0.056)	0.066 (0.050)	0.103 (0.080)	0.157 (0.363)	0.7%
<i>Political Ideology (1=Extremely Liberal to 7=Extremely Conservative)</i>	--0.041 (0.025)	--0.061 * (0.019)	0.011 (0.029)	1.672 (1.064)	41.6%
<i>Political Ideology is left of Extremely Liberal</i>	--0.124 (0.073)	--0.049 (0.068)	--0.028 (0.121)	0.125 (0.331)	41.3%
<i>Time in Months since January 2007</i>	0.003 (0.002)	--0.004 * (0.001)	--0.037 * (0.002)	19.956 (13.531)	0.0%
<i>Constant</i>	--0.731 * (0.093)	0.268 * (0.080)	--1.386 * (0.119)		
<i>Arctan (ρ₁₂)</i>		--0.194 * (0.026)			
<i>Arctan (ρ₁₃)</i>		--0.181 * (0.043)			
<i>Arctan (ρ₂₃)</i>		--0.128 * (0.033)			
Sample Size		6,113			
Imputations		100			

Note: * p ≤ 0.05.

**Table 4. Matching Analysis of Reasons for Participation –
Average Treatment Effect (ATE)**

Variable	Model 2.2 <i>Help the Movement</i>	Model 2.3 <i>Stop the War</i>	Model 2.4 <i>Oppose the Republican Party</i>
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>			
Black / African American	0.078 * (0.029)	--0.117 * (0.033)	--0.008 (0.021)
Sample Size	6,113	6,113	6,113
Imputations	100	100	100

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 5. Models of Reasons for Participation moderated by Pro-Black Organization

Variable	Model 2.5			Mean (Std. Dev.)	Percent Imputed
	<i>Help the Movement</i>	<i>Stop the War</i>	<i>Oppose the Republican Party</i>		
<i>Pro-Black Organization Memberships</i>	0.437 * (0.130)	--0.352 * (0.139)	--0.674 (0.430)	0.017 (0.140)	4.9%
<i>Non-Pro-Black Organization Memberships</i>	0.041 * (0.019)	0.056 * (0.018)	--0.012 (0.116)	0.925 (1.105)	4.9%
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>				Same as Table 3 ↓	
Black / African American	0.110 (0.080)	--0.200 * (0.071)	0.011 (0.116)		
Latinx / Hispanic	--0.021 (0.080)	0.052 (0.069)	--0.136 (0.119)		
Asian / Pacific Islander	--0.005 (0.105)	0.082 (0.087)	--0.041 (0.146)		
Other	0.056 (0.087)	--0.091 (0.076)	0.085 (0.116)		
<i>Age in Years</i>	--0.007 * (0.001)	0.010 * (0.001)	0.008 * (0.002)		
<i>Sex / Gender is Female / Woman</i>	--0.015 (0.040)	--0.166 * (0.035)	--0.008 (0.052)		
<i>Educational Attainment is College Degree</i>	0.122 * (0.048)	--0.054 (0.041)	--0.044 (0.061)		
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	--0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)		
<i>log Distance Traveled from City of Residence</i>	--0.018 (0.010)	--0.015 (0.009)	0.015 (0.013)		
<i>Party Membership</i>					
Democratic	--0.068 (0.046)	0.094 * (0.040)	0.155 * (0.058)		
Third Party	0.019 (0.057)	0.056 (0.051)	0.120 (0.080)		
<i>Political Ideology (1=Extremely Liberal to 7=Extremely Conservative)</i>	--0.040 (0.026)	--0.063 (0.020)	0.010 (0.030)		
<i>Political Ideology is left of Extremely Liberal</i>	0.117 (0.073)	--0.058 (0.068)	--0.041 (0.122)		
<i>Time in Months since January 2007</i>	0.001 (0.002)	--0.004 * (0.001)	--0.037 * (0.002)		
<i>Constant</i>	--0.730 * (0.095)	0.256 * (0.081)	--1.386 * (0.120)		

Table 5 Continued on Next Page

Table 5. Continued

<i>Arctan</i> (ρ_{12})	--0.298 * (0.026)	
<i>Arctan</i> (ρ_{13})	--0.179 * (0.043)	
<i>Arctan</i> (ρ_{23})	--0.129 * (0.033)	
Sample Size	6,113	
Imputations	100	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 6. Statistical Analysis Using Person of Color Variable

Variable	Model 3.1	Model 3.2		
	<i>Organizational Contact</i>	<i>Help the Movement</i>	<i>Stop the War</i>	<i>Oppose the Republican Party</i>
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>				
Person of Color	--0.082 (0.044)	--0.021 (0.053)	--0.212 * (0.046)	--0.117 (0.077)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.011 * (0.001)	--0.007 * (0.001)	0.009 * (0.001)	0.008 * (0.002)
<i>Sex / Gender is Female / Woman</i>	0.103 * (0.034)	--0.017 (0.040)	0.173 * (0.035)	--0.009 (0.052)
<i>Educational Attainment is College Degree</i>	0.057 (0.039)	0.124 * (0.047)	--0.046 (0.041)	--0.048 (0.061)
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	--0.000 (0.001)	--0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)
<i>log Distance Traveled from City of Residence</i>	0.033 * (0.008)	--0.017 (0.010)	--0.018 * (0.009)	0.013 (0.013)
<i>Party Membership</i>				
Democratic	0.008 (0.038)	--0.066 (0.046)	0.090 * (0.040)	0.151 * (0.058)
Third Party	0.348 * (0.048)	0.054 (0.056)	0.061 (0.050)	0.106 (0.080)
<i>Political Ideology (1=Extremely Liberal to 7=Extremely Conservative)</i>	--0.101 * (0.201)	--0.037 (0.025)	--0.061 * (0.019)	0.019 (0.031)
<i>Political Ideology is left of Extremely Liberal</i>	0.005 (0.064)	0.124 (0.073)	-0.063 (0.065)	--0.037 (0.112)
<i>Time in Months since January 2007</i>	0.007 * (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	--0.004 * (0.001)	--0.037 * (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	--0.974 * (0.077)	--0.709 * (0.093)	0.320 * (0.079)	--1.372 * (0.122)
<i>Arctan (ρ₁₂)</i>			--0.301 * (0.026)	
<i>Arctan (ρ₁₃)</i>			--0.183 * (0.043)	
<i>Arctan (ρ₂₃)</i>			--0.139 * (0.033)	
Sample Size	6,254		6,113	
Imputations	100		100	


Note: * p ≤ 0.05.

Table 7. Statistical Analysis Using Intersectional Identity Variable

Variable	Model 4.1	Model 4.2		
	<i>Organizational Contact</i>	<i>Help the Movement</i>	<i>Stop the War</i>	<i>Oppose the Republican Party</i>
<i>Race / Ethnicity</i>				
Intersectional Identity	--0.307 * (0.092)	0.137 (0.205)	--0.951 * (0.199)	--0.556 (0.427)
Black / African American	--0.059 (0.070)	0.152 (0.078)	--0.174 * (0.072)	0.006 (0.116)
Latinx / Hispanic	--0.023 (0.068)	--0.041 (0.080)	0.122 (0.072)	--0.108 (0.121)
Asian / Pacific Islander	0.091 (0.086)	-0.214 (0.103)	0.164 (0.089)	--0.018 (0.148)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.012 * (0.001)	--0.007 * (0.001)	0.010 * (0.001)	0.008 * (0.002)
<i>Sex / Gender is Female / Woman</i>	0.103 * (0.034)	--0.013 (0.040)	0.166 * (0.035)	--0.006 (0.052)
<i>Educational Attainment is College Degree</i>	0.054 (0.040)	0.131 * (0.048)	--0.049 (0.041)	--0.047 (0.061)
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	--0.000 (0.001)	--0.002 (0.001)	--0.000 (0.001)	0.003 * (0.001)
<i>log Distance Traveled from City of Residence</i>	0.034 * (0.008)	--0.015 (0.010)	--0.014 (0.009)	0.015 (0.013)
<i>Party Membership</i>				
Democratic	0.007 (0.038)	--0.066 (0.046)	0.095 * (0.040)	0.151 * (0.058)
Third Party	0.348 * (0.048)	0.052 (0.056)	0.072 (0.050)	0.107 (0.079)
<i>Political Ideology (1=Extremely Liberal to 7=Extremely Conservative)</i>	--0.101 * (0.022)	--0.039 (0.024)	--0.065 * (0.019)	0.011 (0.029)
<i>Political Ideology is left of Extremely Liberal</i>	0.007 (0.064)	0.125 (0.071)	--0.058 (0.068)	--0.050 (0.123)
<i>Time in Months since January 2007</i>	0.007 * (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	--0.004 * (0.001)	--0.037 * (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	--0.980 * (0.079)	--0.730 * (0.093)	0.269 * (0.080)	--1.381 * (0.117)
<i>Arctan (r₁₂)</i>			--0.295 * (0.026)	
<i>Arctan (r₁₃)</i>			--0.180 * (0.043)	
<i>Arctan (r₂₃)</i>			--0.127 * (0.034)	
Sample Size	6,254		6,113	
Imputations	100		100	


Note: * $p \leq 0.05$.

Figure 1. Organizational Contact of Blacks, Whites, and Others



Note: N=6,254.

Figure 2. Reasons for Participation by Blacks, Whites, and Others



Note: N=6,113.

Appendix A. Surveys Questions for Independent Variables

Age in Years. What is your age?

Sex / Gender is Female / Woman. Circle your sex: MALE, FEMALE.

Educational Attainment is College Degree. Could you please tell us the highest level of formal education you have completed? (Please check ONE). Less than high school diploma; High school diploma; Some college; Associate's degree or technical degree; College degree; Some graduate education; Graduate or professional degree.

Income in Thousands of Dollars. Could you please tell us your level of annual income? \$0 to \$15,000 per year; \$15,001 to \$30,000 per year; \$30,001 to \$45,000 per year; \$45,001 to \$60,000 per year; \$60,001 to \$75,000 per year; \$75,001 or MORE per year.

Distance Traveled from City of Residence. What is your ZIP code? (If you don't live in the U.S., please tell us your city and nation.)

Party Membership. Do you consider yourself to be a member of a political party? (circle one) YES, NO. If "YES," which political party are you a member of? Examples: Republican Party / Democratic Party / Green Party / Reform Party / Socialist Party.

Political Ideology. How would you identify your POLITICAL ATTITUDES on the continuum from extremely liberal to extremely conservative? Please check ONE: Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate, middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative; Don't know.