

Multiple Political Identities and Mobilisation into the Scottish Independence Movement

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Abstract: This study examines interactions among multiple political identities in the process of mobilising supporters into the Scottish independence movement in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. It considers individuals' self-identifications as British, Scottish, and European in their decisions on how to become involved or not in the independence movement. Analysis is based on a comparison of original survey data from independence demonstrations in Aberdeen, Perth, Glasgow, and Edinburgh with publicly available survey data from the British Election Study. Data analysis that compares respondents in the Scottish population with independence supporters observed at rallies demonstrates that Scottish and British identities interfere with one another, while Scottish and European identities complement one another under some conditions but not others. Statistical models control for gender, race, age, education, and income. Models of mobilisation at multiple levels provide leverage on understanding the endogenous relationship between political identities and participation in this nationalist movement.

Keywords: Social movements, political identity, nationalism, Scotland, United Kingdom, Europe, Brexit, independence.

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Political identities are commitments and connections that individuals share with larger political communities, real or imagined. People often hold multiple, overlapping political identities.¹ For example, they may identify simultaneously with a nation, a political party, and a social cause. These identities vary in *strength*, which is the degree to which an individual holds them.² An identity may become relevant in some situations but not others, and may have different meanings to different people.³ Building, strengthening, and activating political identities are crucial tasks for any campaign to mobilise a social movement.⁴

The complex interrelations of multiple political identities yield a variety of possible effects on social movement mobilisation. For example, when a person's favored political party takes a contrary stand on an issue for which that person is an activist, an internal struggle over conflicting identities may ensue. Mobilisation may be impeded by this conflict, but the degree of impediment may depend on the context.⁵ Alternatively, overlapping identities may increase commitment to a cause, such as when backlash or reverse mobilisation effects are triggered.⁶ The same interacting identities may sometimes promote mobilisation and, at other times, undercut it.⁷ The multiplicity of these dynamics requires that models of social movement mobilisation are attentive not only to the direct effects of identities on mobilisation but also to how identities interact with one another.

The fact that identity building and mobilisation processes take place in tandem complicates the nature of cause and effect between them. Movement leaders attempt to activate existing identities when mobilising supporters. Once mobilisation is achieved, however, identities may be subsequently reshaped and strengthened. For example, people who have

¹ McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Burke and Stets 2009, p. 212.

² Huddy 2001.

³ Gould 1995.

⁴ Melucci 1989; Tarrow 2011, p. 151.

⁵ Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014.

⁶ Morisi 2018.

⁷ Heaney and Rojas 2015.

intersectional feminist identities may choose to demonstrate as part of the Women's March. The process of participating in the Women's March – experiencing solidarity and listening to speeches – may strengthen a person's intersectional feminist identity.⁸ This dynamic reflects bidirectional causation: identity causes mobilisation, which then causes identity.⁹ Any study of mobilisation that neglects this endogeneity issue may incorrectly identify the relationship between identity and mobilisation.

The mobilisation of nationalist movements is deeply affected by the dynamics described here.¹⁰ Potential movement participants may hold a mix of subnational, national, and (possibly) supranational identities.¹¹ A challenge for nationalist movements is to harness those identities for the nationalist cause. That may involve arguing that subnational identities should be elevated to national status, amplifying the salience of national identities, or invoking the protection of supranational institutions to shelter a new national project. Identity competition may pose a barrier to these efforts. For example, strongly held, existing national identities may weigh against elevating current subnational identities. Or, supranational identities may effectively discourage further development of nationalism. Nationalist leaders and opponents in places such as Catalonia, Flanders, Hong Kong, Scotland, Puerto Rico, Quebec, and Wales are likely to be well acquainted with these processes.

The nationalist movement for independence in Scotland, which is subject to tensions among subnational, national, and supranational identities, is a case in point.¹² Scotland is a country within the United Kingdom (UK) that has its own parliament with quasi-federal devolved powers. A popular referendum on independence from the UK in 2014 failed to pass the threshold in favor of full independence for Scotland. However, backing for Scottish

⁸ Fisher, Dow, and Ray 2017; Heaney 2019.

⁹ Brewer 1999; Burke and Stets 2009; Eagan 2019; Klandermans 2002, 2014; Simon and Klandermans 2001.

¹⁰ Elias 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, pp. 227-263; Meetei 2017.

¹¹ Schatz 2000; Simon, Kulla, and Zobel 1995; Surova 2018.

¹² Hepburn and McLoughlin 2011; Whigham 2019; Zwet 2015.

independence increased after a UK-wide referendum in 2016 on European Union (EU) membership verified a sizable difference between Scotland and the rest of the UK in attitudes toward the EU.¹³ A majority in Scotland had voted to remain in the EU, while the overall majority in the UK had voted to leave the EU (i.e., “Brexit”).¹⁴

Scottish independence movement leaders have used the Brexit vote, in part, to make the case that Scotland should become independent from the UK in order to remain in (or rejoin) the EU.¹⁵ These circumstances have helped to stimulate interactions among Scottish, British, and European identities, with Scottish and European identities potentially conducive to endorsing independence and British identities potentially pointing toward rejecting it. Thus, understanding these interactions is critical to making sense of where the independence movement succeeds and fails to mobilise support.

This study explores the relationship between multiple political identities and social movement mobilisation by examining the contemporary national independence movement in Scotland. It focuses on the question of how interactions among Scottish, British, and European identities are associated with mobilisation into the movement. It leverages data on multiple levels of mobilisation – support for the cause, participation in a demonstration, and membership in an independence advocacy organisation (i.e., the dependent variables of the study) – in order to gain purchase on the endogeneity problem that is inherent in assessing the relationship between political identity and mobilisation. Data are drawn from the British Election Study (BES) and a new survey administered only to people attending Scottish independence demonstrations.

This study contributes to what is known about political identity, social movements, nationalism, and Scottish politics. First, it advances the theory of how interacting identities

¹³ McEwen 2016.

¹⁴ Henderson 2018.

¹⁵ Scottish National Party 2019, p. 10.

affect social movement mobilisation. It does so by drawing upon a social-identity perspective to explain how identity interference, identity complementarity, and identity independence are all relevant within a unified framework. Second, it demonstrates a new approach to the identity-mobilisation endogeneity problem by drawing data from multiple levels of mobilisation to set expected bounds on endogenous effects. Third, it provides new evidence on the presence – and absence – of interaction effects among Scottish, British, and European identities in the mobilisation process. It shows consistent identity interference between Scottish and British identities. Evidence in favor of identity complementarity between Scottish and European identities, as well as interference between British and European identities, is uneven over levels of mobilisation. The research adds to knowledge about the consequences of the European identity by detailing how it is being used to push Scotland away from the UK.

Theorising Interacting Identities

Scholars have long been attentive to the consequences of multiple identities for politics and society more broadly. Among the first important studies on this topic was by German social psychologist Georg Simmel, who speculated that individuals with multiple group affiliations could be threatened “with psychological tension or even a schizophrenic break”.¹⁶ American political scientist David Truman characterised the problem as one of “overlapping affiliations” that created management problems for political organisations, such as labour unions.¹⁷ These issues were often treated with a fairly broad brush until social psychologists began to focus more specifically on questions of *social identity*. Along these lines, Polish social psychologist Henri Tajfel laid the foundation for micro-macro analysis of social identity by defining it as “that *part* of an individual’s self-concept which derives from [their] knowledge of [their] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that

¹⁶ Simmel 1955, p. 141.

¹⁷ Truman 1951, pp. 156-187.

membership".¹⁸ This statement provides a rationale for linking the individual's psychology to the group memberships highlighted by Simmel, Truman, and others.

William Gamson, Bert Kladermans, Sheldon Stryker, and many other social movement scholars have turned to the social psychology of social identity to amplify the relevance of multiple identities for understanding social movements.¹⁹ Stryker emphasised that simultaneously held identities may compete within an individual's psyche in motivating their behaviour because different aspects of a person's life affect one another, though this trade-off is not necessarily zero-sum in nature.²⁰ These identity dynamics may be *transsituational* in the sense that identity conflicts in one domain of life may readily spill over to other parts of life.²¹ For example, identity conflicts brought about by economic competition may have relevance in political debates. To the extent that social movements are based on identities, they are likely to stoke rivalries between different groups that compete over those identities.²²

While a considerable volume of scholarship has pointed to the relevance of multiple identities to social movements, relatively less attention has been given to explaining how identities interact. An exception to this lacuna is research on the topic of *dual identity*. According to Kladermans, a dual identity exists when an individual identifies simultaneously with a superordinate and subordinate entity.²³ For example, a dual identity exists when an individual identifies both with a nation (such as Germany) and a region (such as Bavaria), while holding the national identity as dominant over the regional identity. Research in this area has shown, for example, that holding dual identities may encourage individuals to pursue political change in Germany²⁴ and the United States.²⁵ Yet, other research has revealed negative

¹⁸ Tajfel 1981, pp. 255, emphasis in original.

¹⁹ Gamson 1992; Kladermans 1997; Stryker 2000.

²⁰ Stryker 2000, pp. 21, 29, 35.

²¹ Stryker 2000, p. 34.

²² Stryker 2000, p. 30.

²³ Kladermans 2014, p. 4.

²⁴ Simon and Grabow 2010.

²⁵ Glasford and Dovidio 2011.

effects on mobilisation in Germany and the Netherlands.²⁶ Some research has suggested that the conflicting direction of these effects may be attributed to different relationships among identities in varied national contexts.²⁷

Although research on dual identities has undoubtedly made valuable contributions to the study of social movement mobilisation, it collectively leaves certain questions unanswered. Importantly, what happens when identities are held simultaneously but there is not a clear superordinate-subordinate hierarchy? For example, what happens when the German identity prevails in some contexts but the Bavarian identity prevails in other contexts? Does the magnitude of the differential between the identities' strength matter? For example, if a person thinks of themselves as just a little more German than Bavarian, do they act differently than if they are a great deal more German than Bavarian? Do levels of identity strength factor in? For example, does it matter whether a person views themselves as weak in terms of their German and Bavarian identities in comparison to a person that views themselves as strong on both their Bavarian and German identities? Such questions could possibly be examined by exploring several relational states between the identities, rather than only viewing identities dichotomously as dual or non-dual.

Social movement analyses of *identity conflict* tend to raise similar concerns as do studies of dual identities in social movements. Studies have usually treated identity conflict as dichotomous – that is, it either is or is not present – rather than as something that changes in increments.²⁸ For example, Michael Heaney and Fabio Rojas argued that Democratic and antiwar identities are either compatible or in conflict with one another conditional on the status of the Democratic Party in the government of the United States.²⁹ But such an analysis neglects myriad variations that are possible for relationships between identities as a function of their

²⁶ Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014.

²⁷ Fleischmann and Phalet 2016.

²⁸ Fleischmann and Phalet 2016.

²⁹ Heaney and Rojas 2015.

relative strength. For example, conflict may be mild, perhaps involving disagreement over the succession party leaders. Or, the conflicts may extend to core issues of the party, such as the share of the public budget that should be spent on military expenditures.

A potentially fruitful approach to this issue is found in research on the social psychology of occupations by Isis Settles, her colleagues, and other psychologists.³⁰ Settles observed that “the combination of identities are not always easy to negotiate”.³¹ In response, Settles and her colleagues proposed that *identity interference* occurs “when the expectations and norms associated with one identity interfere with the enactment of another identity”.³² Interference between the identities may occur because the standards set by one identity are inconsistent with the standards set by another identity.³³ In contrast to the concept of identity conflict, identity interference occurs in degrees. It depends on the importance of the identities to the individual. This concept is similar to, but more precise than, what political scientists sometimes refer to as *cross pressures*.³⁴

If an identity is central to an individual, then it is likely to interfere with the other identities that the individual holds.³⁵ For example, if a person is both a Catholic and a member of a socially liberal political party, they may tolerate the clash between the Catholic Church’s opposition to abortion and their party’s support of abortion. However, as the person becomes increasingly committed to Catholicism – rising toward becoming a lay leader or a priest – or they acquire responsibility or status in the party as a precinct captain or candidate for office – the intensity of the interference is amplified. Under these conditions, it may become more difficult for the person to perform their role as a Catholic lay leader or a Green Party candidate for parliament. The individual may internalise the tension associated with this interference, perhaps

³⁰ Settles 2004, 2006; Karelaia and Guillén 2014.

³¹ Settles 2004, p. 487.

³² Settles, Jellison, and Pratt-Hyatt 2009, p. 856.

³³ Burke and Stets, p. 184.

³⁴ Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, pp. xxi–xxi.

³⁵ Settles 2004.

experiencing a rise in stress or poor performance in one or both identities.³⁶ Or, they may lean toward giving in to the interference by neglecting or abandoning one identity in favour of the other.

As is the case with identity conflict, it is also possible to extend the concept of dual identity into a continuous framework. Rather than thinking of identities dichotomously as if they are in alignment or not, it may be valuable to recognise that identities vary in their consistency with one another. We define *identity complementarity* as the degree to which identities reinforce each other as they become closer to – or further apart from – one another in strength.³⁷ They do this by bringing situationally relevant meanings to bear on a person's self-understanding of political events.³⁸ For example, as a person develops a stronger self-identification as ethnically Chinese that may tend to stabilise their political support for the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, a political party that espouses Chinese nationalism. It may do this by helping the person to understand and interpret decisions and actions of the Federation in the midst of a complex political reality. In this situation, the strengthening Chinese identity may help to verify a person's identification with the Federation.³⁹

We imagine that complementarity may vary nonlinearly over the possible identity space. For example, weak to modest identification with a labour union may help to reinforce an individual's support for the Labour Party. However, as the individual's identification with the labour union increases further, then it is possible for it to provide less reinforcement for the Labour Party identity – perhaps as the active union member comes to see the party as compromising too much for the good of the labour cause. It is even possible to imagine complementarity shifting to interference at some point.

³⁶ Settles 2004.

³⁷ See Burke and Stets 2009, p. 191.

³⁸ Burke and Stets 2009, p. 176, 180.

³⁹ Burke and Stets 2009, p. 189.

Despite these examples, it would be a mistake to assume that identities always interact with one another in some way. For example, it is possible for a person to identify occupationally as a speech-language pathologist – an identity that may be coupled with political activism on medical regulation and education funding – but this identity does not interact with their religious self-identification as a Protestant. That is, we might expect there to be no effect on their educational activism even if they were to change their religious identity, perhaps shifting from Protestant to Jewish. Of course, if the city council passed an ordinance banning the provision of speech-language services to Jewish students, an interaction could emerge. With this example, it is clear that identities are not necessarily inherently interacting, but their interaction may be stimulated as a result of politics.⁴⁰ In recognising this condition, we define *identity independence* as a state under which identities neither undermine nor reinforce each other within an individual's psyche in a specified context.

In summary, we theorise three possibilities for interaction among an individual's political identities. First, identities may exhibit interference with each other if holding one identity makes it more difficult for an individual to perform the roles associated with their other identities. Second, identities may exhibit complementarity if one identity supports or reinforces a person's ability to perform the roles associated with their other identities. Third, identities exhibit independence if an identity held by a person neither undercuts nor supports the performance of their other identities. We believe that it is possible for these interactions to be either linear or nonlinear, for the interactions to move from one condition to another (e.g., from interference to complementarity), and to shift in relevance from context to context. In the next section, we apply this perspective to state hypotheses for the case of Scottish independence.

⁴⁰ Klandermans 2014.

Mobilising the Scottish Independence Movement

The Acts of Union 1707, agreed to by the parliaments of both England and Scotland, brought together these independent countries into a united kingdom on the isle of Great Britain. During the more than 300 years since these Acts, the union has created a mostly stable and peaceful relationship between the countries. Still, throughout this time, some Scots have harboured nationalist aspirations, hoping that Scotland would one day be an independent nation again. For at least the past century, these aspirations have manifested partly as formal organisations, such as the Scots National League, the Scottish Home Rule Association, the National Party of Scotland, and the Scottish National Party (SNP).⁴¹

At times, the movement for Scottish independence has won concessions from the UK government. A referendum in 1997 led to the creation of a Scottish Parliament at Holyrood and devolution of some powers from the national government, thus further decentralising the quasi-federal system of government in the UK. In a show of strength by the independence movement, the SNP has led the Scottish parliament since 2007, alternating between minority and majority government.⁴² While the referendum held on Scottish independence in 2014 did not meet the threshold to recommend independence, the movement continued to organise vigorously in the aftermath of that loss.

The narrow victory in the UK overall by supporters of Brexit in 2016 opened a new chapter in the struggle for an independent Scotland. Even though Scotland had voted decisively in favor of remaining in the EU in the Brexit referendum, it would ultimately be forced to leave the EU along with the rest of the UK. These events may have emboldened the independence movement for a number of reasons. First, the referendum result helped to clarify the stark differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK on the European question. Scotland opposed Brexit by a margin of 62 percent remain to 38 percent leave, which was the

⁴¹ Lynch 2013, p. 7.

⁴² Johns and Mitchell 2016.

strongest pro-EU margin of any country in the UK.⁴³ Some advocates have used this outcome to make the case that Scotland continues to be outvoted and overridden by England in the UK policymaking process, which they maintain denies them adequate representation. At the very minimum, this outcome makes clear that Brexit could serve as a powerful wedge issue in any new referendum campaign.

Second, Brexit was more than just a matter of policy, it was a matter of membership in a political community (i.e., the EU). Many advocates in Scotland have objected to being removed from a significant political community without their consent, claiming that it is a testament to the unequal status of Scotland in the UK. Advocates have used this denial of consent on such an important issue to fan the flames of nationalism.

Third, Brexit serves as a sort of “proof of concept” for Scottish independence. Prior to Brexit, the notion of Scottish independence might be viewed as a somewhat fanciful aspiration, unlikely to ever come to fruition. Yet Brexit was viewed in much the same way, until it was stunningly achieved. If Brexit was an achievable goal, then Scottish independence might be viewed by its supporters as more feasible, thus diminishing the perception of some of the risks that might otherwise be associated with the independence option.⁴⁴

Together, these factors likely contributed to the resurgence of independence mobilisation in Scotland. Since 2016, independence supporters have marched regularly in the streets of all the major cities across the country seeking a new referendum on independence. While the Scottish government supported this demand and called for a new referendum in 2020, the British government curtly rejected this request.⁴⁵ This stalemate between levels of government is likely to exacerbate feelings of injustice held by independence supporters. In

⁴³ BBC 2016.

⁴⁴ Morisi 2018.

⁴⁵ Gov.uk 2020.

light of these developments, it is especially pertinent to investigate independence mobilisations as a vital expression of democratic and nationalist sentiments in Scotland.

A critical aim of this article is to understand the role of interacting political identities in promoting – or limiting – mobilisation of the independence movement in Scotland. This effort builds on an existing literature on the independence movement that documents the involvement of women’s organisations in the independence campaign⁴⁶, the use of social media⁴⁷, and youth involvement in the movement⁴⁸ – as well as studies linking the independence cause to Scotland’s elections⁴⁹, party politics⁵⁰, and public opinion⁵¹. This article is distinguished from these prior studies in its focus on broad grassroots efforts of the movement across multiple levels of mobilisation.

Prior research has shown that holding either Scottish or British identities affects an individual’s willingness to support Scottish independence. Feelings of Scottishness have been shown to be associated with being pro-independence, while feelings of Britishness have been shown to be associated with opposing independence.⁵² Considering these prior results, we expect Scottish and British identities to interfere with one another in the mobilisation process. It is important to clarify that this does not necessarily mean that Scottish and British identities cannot be held at the same time. Indeed, a person may view themselves as both a good British subject and committed to being Scottish. They could well see themselves in terms of a dual Scottish-British identity. However, in line with the example in the previous section on German and Bavarian identities, our approach permits a variety of identity configurations. For example, British identities may be dominant for some respondents, while Scottish identities are dominant

⁴⁶ McAngus and Rummery 2018.

⁴⁷ Langer, Comerford, and McNulty 2019.

⁴⁸ Breeze, Gorringe, Jamieson, and Rosie 2017.

⁴⁹ Carman, Johns, and Mitchell 2014.

⁵⁰ Johns and Mitchell 2016; Pattie and Johnston 2017; McAnulla and Crines 2017; Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012.

⁵¹ Colombo 2018; Greene, Spoon, and Williams 2018.

⁵² Johns and Mitchell 2016, p. 57; Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012, p. 104; Pattie and Johnson 2017.

for others. British and Scottish identities may be close to one another in strength, or they may be far apart. In this way, our approach does not insist on a dichotomous or hierarchical view of identity.

The issue of Scottish independence – and the political environment that emerges from the repeated calls for referendums – makes it more difficult for an individual to internally reconcile the British and Scottish identity standards. Contributing to the cause of Scottish independence is difficult to reconcile with being a good British subject. Likewise, the independence movement likely puts emotional pressure on people who consider themselves to be true Scots. Being attentive to the independence debate is likely to stir conflicted feelings within the individual. Thus, we expect interference between Scottish and British identities.

European political identities are relevant as well to mobilising the independence movement. However, how these identities weigh in is less clear than is the case for Scottish and British identities. The idea of Europe as a transnational state or quasi-state entity is much newer idea than the idea of Scotland or the UK as nations. People tend not to be sure of what it means to be European and have trouble thinking about political identity outside the context of the traditional nation-state.⁵³ These limitations are present not only in the UK but in most European nations. However, Ryszard Piasecki and Jan Woroniecki conjecture that feelings of Europeanness could be shaped by political leaders.⁵⁴ They argue that the prevalent weakness of European identities stems from the lack of explanation of this identity by national leaders. Concomitantly, they imagine European identities as something that could be strengthened as part of a political project.

Building upon Piasecki and Woroniecki's argument, we see the potential for interactions between Europeanness and Scottish-British identities in the midst of the independence debate. When considering the possibility of interactions between British and European identities, it

⁵³ Bruter 2004; Debeljak 2003; Hudson 2000.

⁵⁴ Piasecki and Woroniecki 2016.

should be acknowledged that anti-European elements of the Brexit campaign were taken as personal attacks by some people, particularly those from immigrant backgrounds. It is not surprising, then, that research has shown that Brexit has unsettled the sense of belonging on the part of people with strong European identities.⁵⁵ In contrast, the rhetoric of the independence movement has consistently had a pro-European posture in recent years.⁵⁶ This stance has been coupled with a stronger tendency for Scots to embrace European identities than has been the case in the rest of the UK.⁵⁷ As was the case with British and Scottish identities, we imagine a variety of alignments of European identities with British or Scottish identities. For some people, Scottish or British identities may prevail, while European identities may prevail for other people, with an assortment of strength combinations. In light of these considerations, we expect interference between European and British identities, as well as complementarity between European and Scottish identities.

In summary, we state three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Scottish and British identities interact negatively in the mobilisation of the Scottish independence movement.*

Hypothesis 2: *British and European identities interact negatively in the mobilisation of the Scottish independence movement.*

Hypothesis 3: *European and Scottish identities interact positively in the mobilisation of the Scottish independence movement.*

The relationship among these hypotheses is illustrated in Figure 1. In stating them, we emphasise that we expect these tendencies to hold specifically in the context of the debate over independence. We certainly do not expect them to hold in all contexts and for all time. Rather,


⁵⁵ Ranta and Nancheva 2019.

⁵⁶ McAnulla and Crines 2017.

⁵⁷ McCrone 2019.

we see them as the likely behavioural proclivities induced by the political projects undertaken by the Scottish and British governments, as well as the independence movement itself.

Figure 1. Hypothesised Identity Interactions



Research Design

Testing our hypotheses requires information on both supporters and nonsupporters of the independence movement. At the same time, it is valuable to have information not only about passive support for the movement – the willingness to verbally state support for the movement – but also active support – actual participation in independence events and concrete contributions to movement organisations. This information is essential to modeling organising into a social movement. Thus, this study combines the use of publicly available data with original data on the independence movement collected specifically for the project at hand.

First, the study accesses data available as a result of the BES, which is conducted periodically for all Great Britain.⁵⁸ Conveniently, it contains a substantial sample from Scotland, as well as questions about a possible future referendum on Scottish independence. All questions from the BES are reported in Online Appendix A. We used Wave 16 of the BES,

⁵⁸ *British Election Study 2019, Wave 16.*

conducted from May to June 2019, including responses from 2068 randomly sampled residents of Scotland.

Second, an original sample of active Scottish independence supporters was collected at all five major independence rallies held in Scotland on weekend days between 17 August and 2 November 2019. Surveys were collected in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (two rallies) that were separately sponsored by three different organisations: All Under One Banner (three rallies), Hope Over Fear, and *The National* newspaper. The survey questions were drawn from the BES so that the two samples could be compared directly. Respondents were selected randomly from the crowd using the anchor-sampling counting technique developed by Heaney and Rojas⁵⁹, consistent with prevailing standards for sampling protesters.⁶⁰ Estimates were made of the gender and race of nonrespondents to construct survey weights. In total, 1690 people were randomly sampled at these events, 1362 of which agreed to take the survey, giving us an overall response rate of 81 percent. This rate is about typical of similar surveys conducted on site at protests.⁶¹

We conducted separate surveys of pro-union counter-protesters at these events. However, the pro-union movement was not very active during the period in question. As a result, we only obtained responses from 36 counter-protesters, which was not enough to carry out a meaningful statistical analysis of the hypotheses stated in this article for that group.

It is important to establish that the surveys conducted at the independence rallies fairly represent the people that gave active support to the independence movement. To do so, we mapped the people who voted in favor of the Scottish independence referendum in 2014⁶² against the people who we surveyed at demonstrations in 2019, according to the council that they lived in. The results are reported in Figure 2. Since the two maps have different

⁵⁹ Heaney and Rojas 2015.

⁶⁰ Fisher, Andrews, Caren, Chenoweth, Heaney, Leung, Perkins, and Pressman 2019.


⁶¹ Fisher et al. 2019.

⁶² BBC 2014.

Figure 2. Numbers of Supporters for Scottish Independence by Council Area

2014 Independence Referendum

2019 Movement Survey



Council Codes

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1 Aberdeen City | 12 Edinburgh, City of | 23 Orkney Islands |
| 2 Aberdeenshire | 13 Eilean Siar | 24 Perth & Kinross |
| 3 Angus | 14 Falkirk | 25 Renfrewshire |
| 4 Argyll & Bute | 15 Fife | 26 Scottish Borders |
| 5 Clackmannanshire | 16 Glasgow City | 27 Shetland Islands |
| 6 Dumfries & Galloway | 17 Highland | 28 South Ayrshire |
| 7 Dundee City | 18 Inverclyde | 29 South Lanarkshire |
| 8 East Ayrshire | 19 Midlothian | 30 Stirling |
| 9 East Dunbartonshire | 20 Moray | 31 West Dunbartonshire |
| 10 East Lothian | 21 North Ayrshire | 32 West Lothian |
| 11 East Renfrewshire | 22 North Lanarkshire | |

Key for Numbers of Supporters



Note: These maps are not adjusted for population. They are raw numbers of supporters.

dependent variables (number of votes versus number of demonstrators), we are not looking for an exact match between the levels in the two maps but, instead, the correlation between levels of support. We find a high correlation of 0.847, $p \leq 0.05$. Thus, our survey reasonably (though not perfectly) represents independence supporters in the general population on the dimension of residential location. This outcome reflects the willingness of supporters to travel to demonstrations, as well as the relatively small size of Scotland.


As discussed above, potential endogeneity effects between identification and movement participation must be addressed. On a certain level, endogeneity effects are inescapable in this study because all residents of Scotland are exposed to some degree to the debate over independence. Interactions among their Scottish, British, and European identities may be stimulated, for example, by the public statements of leaders of the SNP or the Conservative Party. Our burden is to account for these interactions the best we can in interpreting our results. The fact that we collected data from two samples with three different dependent variables is useful because it allows us to consider different types of endogeneity effects that may push our coefficients in different directions. Following Charles Manski's recommendation to create endogeneity bounds⁶³, we illustrate the nature of these effects in Figure 3.

First, there may be endogeneity effects in the general population. However, the direction of these effects is not clear because they come from competing political forces. We illustrate this point in Figure 3, Example 1. It notes that identity interactions for both independence supporters and opponents are influenced by discourses in the general population. Since these effects may be either positive or negative, we do not have a clear expected direction for bias as a result of endogeneity in this example. Thus, there is an unknown relationship between the absolute value of the true coefficient and the absolute value of the observed coefficient such that $|\beta_{11}| \gtrsim |\beta_{12}|$.


⁶³ Manski 1995.

Figure 3. Illustration of Hypothesised True Effects versus Endogenous Effects


Example 1. Independence Supporters versus Opponents in General Population with the Expectation that $|\beta_{11}| \gtrsim |\beta_{12}|$



Example 2. Independence Supporters at Demonstrations versus Independence Supporters in General Population with the Expectation that $|\beta_{22}| > |\beta_{21}|$.



Example 3. Members of Independence Organisations at Demonstrations versus Nonmembers of Independence Organisations at Demonstrations with the Expectation that $|\beta_{32}| < |\beta_{31}|$.



Second, we have a clear expectation for positive endogeneity bias when we compare independence supporters in the general population with independence supporters observed at rallies. Katerina Vrablikova and Richard Traunmüller explained that this design is an example of a case-control design that has the advantage of situating the behavior of activists in comparison with the general public.⁶⁴ We expect supporters in the general population to experience fewer endogenous pressures in comparison with those observed at demonstrations. At these rallies, our respondents observe flags, listen to movement music and political speeches, and experience social exchanges with fellow independence supporters. These conditions may prime interactions among political identities, as illustrated in Figure 3, Example 2. If supporters observed at rallies experience greater identity priming than supporters in the general population, then the absolute value of the observed coefficient would be greater than the absolute value of the true coefficient such that $|\beta_{22}| > |\beta_{21}|$. This expectation means that we would have reduced confidence if these coefficients exhibited statistical significance. However, if the coefficients were not significant, we would have increased confidence in that null finding, since it would mean that the finding was nonsignificant even though there was a bias in favor if it being significant.

Third, we have a clear expectation for attenuation (i.e., negative endogeneity bias) when we compare independence supporters who were members of independence organisations with those who were not independence organisation members, as is illustrated in Figure 3, Example 3. We expect that both groups experienced positive stimulation of their identity interactions when attending the event at which we observed them. However, since we expect independence organisation members to have higher preexisting identity interactions than nonmembers, the full effect of bias on the members was more likely to be censored (i.e., a greater “ceiling” effect). This expectation is consistent with the prior research that compares the

⁶⁴ Vrablikova and Traunmüller 2015.

participation of affiliated and non-affiliated protesters.⁶⁵ Thus, since the identity priming effect on nonmembers (less likely to be censored) is expected to be greater than the effect on members (more likely to be censored), the absolute value of the observed coefficient is expected to be less than the absolute value of the true coefficient such that $|\beta_{32}| < |\beta_{31}|$. This expectation means that we should have increased confidence if these coefficients exhibit significance since they would have achieved significance even though there was a bias against that finding. However, if the coefficients were not significant, we would have reduced confidence in this finding since attenuation could be the cause.


In summary, we expect no clear direction of endogeneity bias on identity interactions in models that compare independence supporters to nonsupporters in the general population. In models that compare independence supporters in the general population to independence supporters observed at rallies, we expect positive endogeneity bias on identity interactions. In models that compare independence organisation members to nonmembers (both observed at demonstrations), we expect attenuation on identity interactions. These expectations help to guide reasonable interpretations of our statistical findings.

Statistical Results

Descriptive statistics on identity and levels of mobilisation (reported in Figure 4) offer a simplified yet informative overview of their relationship. They indicate that stronger Scottish identities were associated with higher levels of involvement with the movement. British identities were stronger than European identities in Scotland overall. However, British identities diminished as increasing levels of movement involvement were observed. Conversely, European identities were stronger as higher movement involvement was observed. Thus,

⁶⁵ Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damen, van Troost, and van Leeuwen 2014.

Figure 4. Identity and Mobilisation into the Scottish Independence (Yes) Movement



among the most ardent supporters of independence, Scottish identities were strongest, followed by European and then British identities.

We estimated three sets of Probit models. Missing values were imputed using complete-case imputation, constrained to the range of possible values, which is an appropriate method when there is a low incidence of missing data (less than 20 percent), as was the case in this study.⁶⁶ Survey weights were applied to all models to adjust for response differences between respondents and the relevant population reference group (all Scotland or all demonstrators). In Table 1, we report models in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a BES respondent indicated support for independence and 0 if they indicated opposition to independence. Model 1.1 accounts for the direct effects of Scottish, British, and European identities, along with control variables for *Sex / Gender*, *Person of Colour*, *Age*, *Education*, and *Income*. This model did not test the hypotheses because it did not include interaction effects. To that end, we estimated Models 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Each model included one interaction effect for a combination of Scottish, British, and European identities. We did not estimate models with

⁶⁶ King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2001; Little 1988.

Table 1. Models of Support for Independence by Residents of Scotland

Dependent Variable: Independence Supporter (Yes Voter = 1, No Voter = 0)					
	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 1.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.228 * (0.029)	0.292 * (0.071)	0.236 * (0.031)	0.290 * (0.078)	5.609 (1.887)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.515 * (0.026)	--0.428 * (0.097)	--0.372 * (0.045)	--0.514 * (0.026)	4.593 (2.052)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.219 * (0.023)	0.220 * (0.023)	0.418 * (0.063)	0.310 * (0.101)	3.817 (2.111)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.015 (0.015)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.042 * (0.012)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				--0.015 (0.016)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	0.011 (0.099)	0.011 (0.098)	0.013 (0.098)	0.008 (0.099)	0.506 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.299 (0.309)	--0.296 (0.302)	--0.256 (0.326)	--0.256 (0.316)	0.024 (0.152)
<i>Age in Years</i>	--0.007 * (0.004)	--0.007 * (0.004)	--0.008 * (0.004)	--0.007 * (0.004)	49.956 (14.430)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.076 (0.090)	0.078 (0.089)	0.060 (0.092)	0.078 (0.090)	0.412 (0.492)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.012 (0.035)	--0.011 (0.035)	--0.005 (0.035)	--0.010 (0.035)	21.634 (15.299)
<i>Constant</i>	0.426 (0.340)	0.027 (0.508)	--0.314 (0.396)	--0.036 (0.545)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1791					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.428					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.495					
F Statistic	59 *	53 *	48 *	53 *	
F degrees of freedom	8, 921	9, 920	9, 920	9, 920	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June 2019) for respondents living in Scotland and weighted using weights provided in the BES.


three-way interactions (i.e., Scottish X British X European identities) because our theoretical approach does not yield clear hypotheses for such interactions.

While the models reported in Table 1 are necessary to test the hypotheses, conclusions cannot be drawn directly from the table because interaction effects may change nonlinearly throughout the sample space.⁶⁷ Instead, examining marginal effects substitutes for significance tests on the coefficient parameters. Indeed, a significant coefficient on the Probit coefficient is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition in making an inference about the significance of the interaction effects.

The marginal effects graphs reported in Figure 5 provide the information necessary to draw inferences about the hypotheses. The marginal effects graph associated with Model 1.2 presents compelling evidence that there is significant interference between Scottish and British identities, supporting Hypothesis 1 for the general Scottish population. The marginal effects graph associated with Model 1.3 appears to demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between European and British identities. However, a careful reader will quickly observe that the nonlinearity is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the nonlinearity does complicate the interpretation of the result. There is significant interference between British and European identities when very high and very low British identities are compared. Finally, the graph associated with Model 1.4 is unambiguous that there is no significant interference or complementarity between Scottish and European identities regarding support for independence in the general population. Thus, the evidence suggests the presence of identity independence. We find this result surprising and note that it does not support Hypothesis 3. It is discussed further below. We do not have a clear expectation that endogeneity bias affects these results, as we illustrate in Figure 3, Example 1.

⁶⁷ Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019.

Figure 5. Interaction Effects in Mobilising the Scottish Independence Movement



In Table 2, we report models in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a movement-only respondent indicated support for independence and 0 if a BES-sample respondent indicated support for independence. This approach “stacks” the data in a way that creates the positive endogeneity bias that we illustrate in Figure 3, Example 2. These models follow the same specification as the models reported in Table 1 with respect to independent variables. These models reveal the difference between independence supporters observed at rallies and independence supporters observed in the general population. Since we know that 100 percent of persons observed at rallies actually attend independence rallies, while only about 13 percent⁶⁸ of residents of Scotland who support independence have attended any kind of public demonstration in the past 12 months, these models differentiate between persons who attend rallies and those who only support the movement at the ballot box.

To interpret the results in Table 2, we turn our attention to the graphs in Figure 5 for Models 2.2, 2.3., and 2.4. Remembering that we expect positive endogeneity bias on the interactions in these models, it is apparent that Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are all supported. That is, the models show identity interference between Scottish and British, as well as British and European, identities; but they show identity complementarity between Scottish and European identities with respect to people turning out to demonstrations.

In Table 3, we report models in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a participant in a demonstration is also a member of an independence organisation and 0 if they are not a member of an independence organisation. Examples of such organisations include Women for Independence, Yes Stones, Bikers for Independence, and the SNP. These models follow the same specification as those in Tables 1 and 2 with respect to independent variables.

⁶⁸ British Election Study 2019, Wave 6.

Table 2. Models of Attendance by Scottish Independence Supporters at Independence Demonstrations

Dependent Variable: Attended Demonstration (Independence Supporter Observed at Demonstration=1, Independence Supporter Observed in Scottish Population Survey=0)					
	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.035 (0.031)	0.262 * (0.047)	--0.012 (0.028)	--0.466 * (0.068)	6.483 (1.319)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.300 * (0.020)	0.252 * (0.080)	-0.053 (0.050)	--0.318 * (0.020)	2.181 (1.699)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.160 * (0.028)	0.168 * (0.028)	0.274 * (0.044)	--0.475 * (0.093)	5.334 (1.890)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.915 * (0.013)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.051 * (0.010)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.102 * (0.016)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise =0	0.002 (0.107)	0.010 (0.108)	0.003 (0.106)	0.028 (0.113)	0.485 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.942 * (0.413)	0.874 * (0.411)	0.930 * (0.414)	0.843 * (0.416)	0.092 (0.289)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.010 * (0.004)	0.008 (0.004)	0.009 * (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	49.469 (14.724)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.185 * (0.078)	--0.143 (0.083)	--0.171 * (0.079)	--0.188 * (0.080)	0.440 (0.497)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.166 * (0.019)	--0.166 * (0.018)	--0.159 * (0.018)	--0.160 * (0.019)	21.284 (18.977)
<i>Constant</i>	0.934 * (0.434)	0.933 (0.558)	0.177 (0.458)	3.666 * (0.494)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=2031					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.626					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.484					
F Statistic	50 *	45 *	53 *	48 *	
F degrees of freedom	8, 439	9, 438	9, 438	9, 438	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data on independence supporters in the Scottish population were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June, 2019) for respondents living in Scotland and weighted using weights provided in the BES. Data on independence supporters at demonstrations were collected at rallies in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (August-November 2019) and weighted using differences in response by event, gender, and race.

Table 3. Models of Organisational Membership by Scottish Independence Demonstrators

Dependent Variable: Organisational Member (Independence Demonstrator is Member of Independence Organisation=1, Independence Demonstrator is not Member of Independence Organisation=0)					
	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	Model 3.3	Model 3.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.016 (0.028)	0.221 * (0.063)	0.056 * (0.024)	--0.111 * (0.047)	6.631 (1.224)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.120 * (0.050)	0.231 * (0.101)	0.063 (0.098)	--0.189 * (0.084)	1.602 (1.328)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.040 (0.029)	0.049 (0.030)	0.099 * (0.037)	--0.131 * (0.051)	5.778 (1.630)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.061 * (0.013)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.037 * (0.012)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.036 * (0.114)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	0.055 (0.067)	0.057 (0.065)	0.063 (0.066)	0.059 (0.066)	0.477 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.089 (0.139)	--0.088 (0.141)	--0.093 (0.137)	--0.099 (0.134)	0.124 (0.329)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.021 * (0.002)	0.019 * (0.003)	0.020 * (0.002)	0.020 * (0.002)	50.604 (14.865)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.013 (0.079)	0.014 (0.075)	0.000 (0.078)	--0.006 (0.077)	0.421 (0.421)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	0.000 (0.015)	0.001 (0.014)	0.002 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)	21.735 (21.114)
<i>Constant</i>	--1.488 * (0.335)	--2.806 * (0.513)	--2.067 * (0.345)	--0.657 (0.436)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1199					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.396					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.489					
F Statistic	36 *	28 *	43 *	58 *	
F degrees of freedom	8, 9	9, 8	9, 8	9, 8	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data on independence supporters were collected at rallies in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (August-November 2019) and weighted using differences in response by event, gender, and race.

To interpret the results in Table 3, we turn our attention to the graphs in Figure 5 for Models 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Remembering that we expect attenuation of interaction effects in these models, it is apparent that Hypotheses 1 and 3 are supported but Hypothesis 2 is not supported for involvement in movement organisations. That is, the models suggest identity interference between British and Scottish identities, as well as identity complementarity between Scottish and European identities. On the other hand, the results tend toward independence between British and European identities.

In reviewing the full set of regression results, informative patterns emerge. First, there is evidence of interference between Scottish and British identities in every model. It is true when effects are positively biased, when they are attenuated, and when we have no clear expectation for bias. Thus, we have strong confidence in this finding, consistent with Hypothesis 1. In some ways, this result is not surprising in the sense that the independence movement is fundamentally about breaking the relationship between Scottish and British identities. If there were *not* interference between these identities, we would think that something was wrong with our models. Thus, this result may be viewed as a validity test for the overall study.

Second, we have a comparatively low level of confidence in concluding that there is interference between British and European identities. It is true that there are significant interactions between these identities in Models 1.3 and 2.3. However, Model 1.3 exhibits a nonlinearity that begs for more exploration. It could be that people with strong European identities and low levels of British identity do not have much of a stake in the UK, creating a complementarity at low levels of Britishness. Still, it would be wise to obtain more data before reaching a firm conclusion here. In Model 2.3, we observe significant interference, but we also believe that this result is likely affected by positive endogeneity bias. Given that Model 3.3 suggests independence, we are hesitant to reach a firm conclusion. All of this recommends caution and more research with respect to Hypothesis 2.

Third, the analysis of Scottish-European interactions is surprising and interesting. Model 1.4 weighs in favor of independence between Scottish and European identities. We have confidence in this finding given that we have no clear expectation for the direction of endogeneity bias here. It may be that people with strong European identities are less likely to have a deep emotional connection to Scotland and, therefore, do not experience significant interactions between the two identities. On the other hand, Models 2.4 and 3.4 both support complementarity between Scottish and European identities. We find significant coefficients both when positive endogeneity bias and attenuation are expected. Thus, we detect support for complementarity both at the upper and lower bounds resulting from endogeneity, lending confidence to our conclusion of complementarity. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported among independence supporters but not in the general population.

Robustness Analysis

We conducted additional analyses to further verify that our conclusions are not contingent on arbitrary specification decisions. First, Figure 5 contains only half of the relevant graphs. For example, Model 1.2 plots the strength of Scottish identity against the average marginal effects of British identity. It is also possible to estimate a graph of the strength of British identity against the average marginal effects of Scottish identity. Likewise, it is possible to produce a corresponding graph for every model in Figure 5. The companion graphs (in Online Appendix B) are very similar – but not identical – and yield substantively similar conclusions to those reported in Figure 5.

Second, the analysis in Table 2 likely includes some people answering the BES who attended Scottish independence demonstrations (unlikely to be more than 13 percent of respondents, as documented above). It is impossible to identify these people precisely because the BES does not ask explicitly if respondents attended *independence* rallies. Yet it does ask if

respondents attended *any* demonstrations. In Online Appendix C we report models that exclude BES respondents that attended any rallies. This approach is an overcorrection since it excludes people who only attended non-independence demonstrations (such as rallies to oppose climate change). However, since we obtain nearly the same results when we overcorrect, this exercise reduces concerns that may stem from this issue.

Third, the control variables reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3 are limited to variables that are available in both the BES and the movement-only survey. However, both the BES and the movement-only survey contain additional relevant control variables. Additional models using some of these variables reported in Online Appendix D do not differ from those in the article with respect to their support for the hypotheses.

Finally, we report estimates of all models without survey weights in Online Appendix E, which verifies that the weights did not substantively alter the conclusions.

Conclusion

This article extends what is known about the relevance of identity interactions in the mobilisation of social movements. It demonstrates that different types of interactive processes – interference, complementarity, and independence – may be present simultaneously as a movement tries to build support. These interactions are not necessarily restricted by identity hierarchies or limited to dichotomous states but may exhibit a wide range of possible configurations. Interactions may be important at some levels of mobilisation but not at others. Sometimes interactions may be consistent with movement goals and sometimes they may not.

Considering these findings, social movement scholars would be on firm ground to explore more widely the types of identities relevant to social movements and how they interact. Our study focused on three important types of political identities but there are many other identities that may be relevant to movements. These may include gender, race, occupation,

religion, language, sexuality, ability/disability, and other social dimensions that are salient to people in the political sphere.

The analysis presented here is particularly relevant to understanding nationalism and the movements linked to debates about nationalism. The Scottish case is especially interesting because subnational, national, and supranational are all salient. Similar conditions may also be present in places such as Catalonia. We find evidence that it is possible for subnational and supranational identities to operate together in undermining national loyalties. This finding helps to build intuition for why national politicians may not be eager to endorse or support the development of supranational identities within their boundaries.

When examining the Scottish population overall, the data are strongly suggestive of independence between European and Scottish identities. This finding indicates that the SNP's argument about synergy between Scotland and Europe has not translated into support for independence anchored deeply within the public. However, the argument does appear convincing for generating greater involvement among already active movement supporters. These results suggest that European identities may present both opportunities and risks for the movement as it attempts to secure a second referendum on independence.

As Brexit transitions from political aspiration to policy implementation, and as a potential Scottish-European alliance moves from flirtation to courtship, interactions among multiple political identities must be taken into consideration. As nationalist movements and elected officials alike learn from the sagas of Brexit and Scottish independence, new strategies for articulating, strengthening, and mobilising European identities are likely to be on the table.

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Online Appendix A. Survey Questions

Questions taken from British Election Study

1. Where would you place yourself on these scales? 1 Not at all to 7 Very strongly.
Britishness [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]; Scottishness [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]; Europeanness[1,2,3,4,5,6,7].
2. If there was another referendum on Scottish independence, how do you think that you would vote? [I would vote “Yes” (leave the UK)]; [I would vote “No” (stay in the UK)]; [Would not vote]; [Don’t know].
3. Are you male or female? [Male]; [Female].
4. What is your age? [Under 18]; [18-25]; [26-35]; [36-45]; [46-55]; [56-65]; [66+].
5. To which of these groups do you consider you belong? [White British]; [Any other white background]; [What and Black Caribbean]; [White and Black African]; [White and Asian]; [Any other mixed background]; [Indian]; [Pakistani]; [Bangladeshi]; [Any other Asian background]; [Black Caribbean]; [Black African]; [Any other black background]; [Chinese]; [Other ethnic group]; [Don’t know].
6. At what age did you finish full-time education? [15 or under]; [16]; [17-18]; [19]; [20+]; [Still at school / Full time student]; [Can’t remember].
7. What is your gross personal income? [under 5,000 per year]; [5,000 to 9,999 per year]; [10,000 to 14,999 per year]; [15,000 to 19,999 per year]; [20,000 to 24,999 per year]; [20,000 to 24,999 per year]; [25,000 to 29,999 per year]; [30,000 to 39,999 per year]; [40,000 to 44,999 per year]; [45,000 to 49,999 per year]; [50,000 to 59,999 per year]; [60,000 to 69,999 per year]; [70,000 to 99,999 per year]; [100,000 and over]; [Don’t know]; [Prefer not to answer].
8. Thinking now about have active you are in politics and community affairs, during the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? [Taken part in a public demonstration?]

Questions on Movement-Only Survey

1. Are you a member of any political organisations, social movement organisations, interest groups, or policy advocacy groups? Please circle one. [Yes]; [No]. If yes, which ones? [Write in].
2. What is the first alphanumeric code in your postcode? For example, in the postcode G12 8TT, the first alphanumeric code is G12. [Write in].

Online Appendix B. Additional Average Marginal Effects Graphs for Main Models

Figure 5 of the article contains nine interaction plots that serve to test the hypotheses of the study. However, these plots are only half of the possible plots. For each plot, there is a corresponding plot in which the horizontal and vertical axes are reversed. On the following page in this appendix, we report these corresponding plots in Alt. Figure 5.


The corresponding plots are very similar but not identical to the original plots in Figure 5. Seven of the nine plots are effectively identical: Models 1.4, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. There are some differences in the plots for Model 1.2 and 1.3. These plots are basically flipped in their patterns displayed in the main next. These plots lead to similar conclusions to those obtained from Figure 5.

Model 1.2 indicates identity interference from middle to high levels of identity in both Figure 5 and Alt. Figure 5. However, Figure 5 shows identity interference over the entire entity space, while Alt. Figure 5 shows complementarity from low to middle levels of identity. This nonlinear pattern is statistically significant.

Model 1.3 indicates identity interference from the middle to high levels of identity in both Figure 5 and Alt. Figure 5. However, Alt. Figure 5 shows identity interference over the entire entity space, while Figure 5 shows an insignificant nonlinearity in the low to middle levels of identity.

In summary, the two sets of figures yield the same conclusions for seven of the nine plots. They yield the same conclusions for the upper half of the other two plots. However, the lower half of the remaining two plots are reversed between the two figures. These results do not substantially alter the conclusions drawn from the overall study since they are mostly consistent with the hypothesised patterns of identity interference.

Online Appendix B. Alt. Figure 5. Corresponding Average Marginal Effects Graphs with Axes Reversed



Online Appendix C. Alternative Models for Table 1 and Table 3

In selecting the control variables for our models, we limited our selections to variables that were available in both the BES and the movement-only survey. This constraint enables us to make clear comparisons across the three models that we estimated. Yet, there are some variables that are available in one but not both datasets that may be wise to use as control variables. Hence, we estimated alternative models for Table 1 (based on the BES) and Table 3 (based on the movement-only survey) that included some of these variables in the specification.

In Alt. Table 1, we included one additional control variable in the specification for self-placement on the left-right continuum, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The exact wording of this question is as follows: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale? [Left 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right]. The coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant in all four models reported in Alt. Table 1. These findings notwithstanding, our revised plots of the Average Marginal Effects demonstrate that the tests of our hypotheses are no different when this variable is included in the analysis. As a result, this exercise does not alter the conclusions of the study.




In Alt. Table 3, we included two additional control variables in the specification. First, we include a variable for whether a respondent was a member of any organisation that was not aligned with the independence movement (question wording provided in Online Appendix A). For example, an environmental advocacy organisation, such as Greenpeace, would satisfy this criterion. We added this variable because we wanted to control for an individual's propensity to join organisations, separate from whether or not they were members of an independence organisation. We find that the coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant in all four models reported in Alt. Table 3. Further, we added a variable for distance travelled in miles to the rally site (question wording provided in Online Appendix A). We included this variable because we suspected that individuals that travelled a long distance would be more likely to be affiliated with organisations than were individuals that were not affiliated. We did not find support for this expectation in any of the four models we reported in Alt. Table 3. These findings notwithstanding, our revised plots of the Average Marginal Effects demonstrate that the tests of our hypotheses are no different when these two variables are included in the analysis. As a result, this exercise does not alter the conclusions of the study.

Online Appendix C. Table 1. Models of Support for Independence by Residents of Scotland – Ideology Added to Model

Dependent Variable: Independence Supporter (Yes Voter = 1, No Voter = 0)					
	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 1.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.223 * (0.030)	0.286 * (0.067)	0.242 * (0.031)	0.280 * (0.077)	5.609 (1.887)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.463 * (0.026)	--0.392 * (0.096)	--0.320 * (0.045)	--0.463 * (0.026)	4.593 (2.052)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.163 * (0.023)	0.220 * (0.023)	0.358 * (0.061)	0.230 * (0.099)	3.817 (2.111)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.012 (0.015)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.042 * (0.011)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				--0.011 (0.016)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	--0.038 (0.099)	--0.037 (0.099)	--0.037 (0.099)	--0.039 (0.099)	0.506 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.197 (0.327)	--0.199 (0.321)	--0.175 (0.348)	--0.169 (0.333)	0.024 (0.152)
<i>Age in Years</i>	--0.007 (0.004)	--0.007 (0.004)	--0.007 (0.004)	--0.007 (0.004)	49.956 (14.430)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.049 (0.093)	0.051 (0.092)	0.034 (0.096)	0.051 (0.093)	0.412 (0.492)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.011 (0.0357)	--0.010 (0.037)	--0.018 (0.038)	--0.012 (0.037)	21.634 (15.299)
<i>Ideology</i> (0=left, 10=right)	--0.191 * (0.028)	--0.191 * (0.028)	--0.193 * (0.028)	--0.191 * (0.028)	4.967 (2.215)
<i>Constant</i>	1.060 (0.350)	0.756 (0.493)	0.339 (0.404)	0.768 (0.556)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1791					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.428					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.495					
F Statistic	53 *	48 *	46 *	48 *	
F degrees of freedom	9, 920	10, 919	10, 919	10, 919	

Note: * p ≤ 0.05. Data were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June 2019) for respondents living in Scotland and weighted using weights provided in the BES.

Online Appendix C. Alt. Figure 5. Interaction Effects in Mobilising the Scottish Independence Movement – Ideology Added to Models 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4






**Online Appendix C. Alt. Table 3. Models of Organisational Membership by
Scottish Independence Demonstrators – Additional Control Variables**

Dependent Variable: *Organisational Member* (Independence Demonstrator is Member of Independence Organisation=1, Independence Demonstrator is not Member of Independence Organisation=0)

	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	Model 3.3	Model 3.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.007 (0.028)	0.219 * (0.064)	0.047 * (0.026)	--0.140 * (0.049)	6.631 (1.224)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.042 * (0.030)	0.240 * (0.101)	0.064 (0.092)	--0.137 * (0.047)	1.602 (1.328)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.042 (0.030)	0.051 (0.031)	0.102 * (0.038)	--0.216 * (0.080)	5.778 (1.630)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.062 * (0.014)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.038 * (0.011)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.040 * (0.112)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	0.057 (0.069)	0.051 (0.031)	0.064 (0.068)	0.062 (0.068)	0.477 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.087 (0.144)	--0.086 (0.145)	--0.091 (0.142)	--0.099 (0.139)	0.124 (0.329)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.021 * (0.002)	0.019 * (0.003)	0.021 * (0.002)	0.020 * (0.002)	50.604 (14.865)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.060 (0.079)	--0.037 (0.073)	--0.049 (0.078)	--0.053 (0.077)	0.421 (0.421)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.002 (0.015)	0.002 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	--0.001 (0.014)	21.735 (21.114)
<i>Member of Nonmovement Organisation</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.386 * (0.149)	0.394 * (0.150)	0.389 * (0.148)	0.390 * (0.145)	0.127 (0.333)
<i>Distance Traveled to Event in Miles</i>	--0.000 (0.000)	--0.000 (0.000)	--0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	76.592 (631.193)
<i>Constant</i>	--1.449 * (0.344)	--2.882 * (0.524)	--2.042 * (0.361)	--0.492 (0.413)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1198					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.396					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.489					
F Statistic	123 *	67 *	66 *	121 *	
F degrees of freedom	10, 7	11, 6	11, 6	11, 6	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data on independence supporters were collected at rallies in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (August-November 2019) and weighted using differences in response by event, gender, and race.

Online Appendix C. Alt. Figure 5. Interaction Effects in Mobilising the Scottish Independence Movement – Additional Control Variables in Models 3.2, 3.3, & 3.4



Online Appendix D. People Who Attended Prior Demonstrations Excluded


Table 2 of the article compares independence supporters observed at independence demonstrations with independence supporters observed in the general population. This analysis is designed to ascertain the factors that differentiate passive supporters in the general population from active supporters at demonstrations. However, since a small percentage of the supporters in the general population also attend demonstrations, the differentiation is not perfect. To address this concern, we re-estimated the models while excluding respondents from the BES who indicated that they had previously attended any kind of political demonstration, even demonstrations unrelated to independence. The results are reported below in Alt. Table 2 and Alt. Figure 5. They reveal no substantive differences with Table 2 or Figure 5 in the article.

Online Appnedix D. Alt. Table 2. Models of Attendance by Scottish Independence Supporters at Independence Demonstrations – No Prior Demonstrators from BES

Dependent Variable: Attended Demonstration (Independence Supporter Observed at Demonstration=1, Independence Supporter Observed in Scottish Population Survey=0)					
	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.041 (0.031)	0.270 * (0.046)	--0.015 (0.029)	--0.492 * (0.070)	6.488 (1.321)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.314 * (0.020)	0.255 * (0.079)	--0.048 (0.050)	--0.335 * (0.022)	2.185 (1.710)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.173 * (0.029)	0.182 * (0.028)	0.298 * (0.044)	--0.491 * (0.095)	5.322 (1.901)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.095 * (0.013)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.055 * (0.011)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.106 * (0.016)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise =0	--0.010 (0.104)	--0.001 (0.105)	--0.011 (0.103)	0.017 (0.110)	0.485 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.910 * (0.416)	0.839 * (0.413)	0.898 * (0.417)	0.805 * (0.419)	0.095 (0.293)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.009 * (0.416)	0.007 (0.004)	0.008 * (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	49.611 (14.747)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.159 * (0.076)	--0.114 (0.080)	--0.142 * (0.077)	--0.161 * (0.078)	0.434 (0.496)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.168 * (0.019)	--0.168 * (0.018)	--0.160 * (0.018)	--0.161 * (0.019)	21.233 (18.001)
<i>Constant</i>	1.039 * (0.430)	--0.911 (0.548)	0.215 (0.456)	3.897 * (0.509)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1968					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.645					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.478					
F Statistic	49 *	44 *	53 *	48 *	
F degrees of freedom	8, 423	9, 422	9, 422	9, 422	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data on independence supporters in the Scottish population were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June, 2019) for respondents living in Scotland and weighted using weights provided in the BES. Persons who indicated in Wave 6 that they had previously attended a demonstration were excluded. Data on independence are from an original survey and are weighted using differences in response by event, gender, and race.

Online Appendix D. Alt. Figure 5. Interaction Effects in Mobilising the Scottish Independence Movement – No Prior Demonstrators from BES



Online Appendix E. All Models without Survey Weights

Some readers may be concerned that the use of survey weights distorts the conclusions generated by the research. To quell these concerns, we re-estimated all models without survey weights. We report these results on the following pages in Alt. Table 2, Alt. Table 3, Alt. Table 4, and Alt. Figure 5. These results yield identical conclusions to those based on Tables 2, 3, and 5, as well as Figure 5.

Online Appendix E. Alt. Table 1. Models of Support for Independence by Residents of Scotland – No Survey Weights

Dependent Variable: Independence Supporter (Yes Voter = 1, No Voter = 0)					
	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 1.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.228 * (0.024)	0.292 * (0.062)	0.236 * (0.026)	0.290 * (0.058)	5.609 (1.887)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.515 * (0.025)	--0.428 * (0.079)	--0.372 * (0.043)	--0.514 * (0.024)	4.593 (2.052)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.219 * (0.021)	0.220 * (0.021)	0.418 * (0.058)	0.310 * (0.079)	3.817 (2.111)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.015 (0.013)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.042 * (0.011)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				--0.015 (0.013)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	0.011 (0.079)	0.011 (0.079)	0.013 (0.080)	0.008 (0.079)	0.506 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.299 (0.278)	--0.296 (0.280)	--0.256 (0.288)	--0.256 (0.282)	0.024 (0.152)
<i>Age in Years</i>	--0.007 * (0.003)	--0.007 * (0.003)	--0.008 * (0.003)	--0.007 * (0.003)	49.956 (14.430)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.076 (0.089)	0.078 (0.089)	0.060 (0.090)	0.078 (0.089)	0.412 (0.492)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.012 (0.033)	--0.011 (0.033)	--0.005 (0.033)	--0.010 (0.033)	21.634 (15.299)
<i>Constant</i>	0.426 (0.310)	0.027 (0.444)	--0.314 (0.366)	--0.036 (0.451)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1791					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.428					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.495					
Log Likelihood	--664	--663	--657	--663	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	1117 *	1118 *	1132 *	1119 *	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2 degrees of freedom	8	9	9	9	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June 2019) for respondents living in Scotland.

Online Appendix E. Alt. Table 2. Models of Attendance by Scottish Independence Supporters at Independence Demonstrations – No Survey Weights

Dependent Variable: Attended Demonstration (Independence Supporter Observed at Demonstration=1, Independence Supporter Observed in Scottish Population Survey=0)					
	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.035 (0.024)	0.262 * (0.043)	--0.012 (0.025)	--0.466 * (0.055)	6.483 (1.319)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.300 * (0.021)	0.252 * (0.070)	-0.053 (0.050)	--0.318 * (0.022)	2.181 (1.699)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.160 * (0.018)	0.018 * (0.028)	0.274 * (0.028)	--0.475 * (0.073)	5.334 (1.890)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.915 * (0.011)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.051 * (0.010)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.102 * (0.011)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise =0	0.002 (0.064)	0.010 (0.065)	0.003 (0.065)	0.028 (0.065)	0.485 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	0.942 * (0.142)	0.874 * (0.140)	0.930 * (0.142)	0.843 * (0.141)	0.092 (0.289)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.010 * (0.002)	0.008 * (0.002)	0.009 * (0.002)	0.007 * (0.002)	49.469 (14.724)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.185 * (0.068)	--0.143 * (0.069)	--0.171 * (0.068)	--0.188 * (0.069)	0.440 (0.497)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	--0.166 * (0.018)	--0.166 * (0.019)	--0.159 * (0.018)	--0.160 * (0.019)	21.284 (18.977)
<i>Constant</i>	0.934 * (0.235)	0.933 * (0.321)	0.177 (0.274)	3.666 * (0.398)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=2031					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.626					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.484					
Log Likelihood	--1041	--1005	--1027	--996	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	609 *	681 *	637 *	699 *	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2 degrees of freedom	8	9	9	9	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$. Data on independence supporters in the Scottish population were drawn from Wave 16 of the BES (May-June, 2019) for respondents living in Scotland. Data on independence supporters at demonstrations were collected at rallies in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (August-November 2019).

**Online Appendix E. Alt. Table 3. Models of Organisational Membership by
Scottish Independence Demonstrators – No Survey Weights**

Dependent Variable: Organisational Member (Independence Demonstrator is Member of Independence Organisation=1, Independence Demonstrator is not Member of Independence Organisation=0)					
	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	Model 3.3	Model 3.4	Descriptive Statistics
	Coefficient (Standard Error)				Mean (Std. Dev.)
Political Identity					
<i>Scottishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.016 (0.041)	0.221 * (0.076)	0.056 (0.046)	--0.111 (0.070)	6.631 (1.224)
<i>Britishness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	--0.120 * (0.028)	0.231 * (0.108)	0.063 (0.095)	--0.189 (0.112)	1.602 (1.328)
<i>Europeanness</i> (1=weak to 7=strong)	0.040 (0.028)	0.049 (0.028)	0.099 * (0.039)	--0.131 * (0.039)	5.778 (1.630)
Interacting Identities					
<i>Scottishness X Britishness</i>		--0.061 * (0.017)			
<i>Britishness X Europeanness</i>			--0.037 * (0.018)		
<i>Scottishness X Europeanness</i>				0.036 * (0.017)	
Control Variable					
<i>Sex / Gender</i> is Female=1, Otherwise=0	0.055 (0.076)	0.057 (0.077)	0.063 (0.077)	0.059 (0.076)	0.477 (0.500)
<i>Person of Colour</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.089 (0.126)	--0.088 (0.127)	--0.093 (0.127)	--0.099 (0.127)	0.124 (0.329)
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.021 * (0.003)	0.019 * (0.003)	0.020 * (0.003)	0.020 * (0.003)	50.604 (14.865)
<i>Education Completed Age 20 or Older</i> =1, Otherwise=0	--0.013 (0.079)	0.014 (0.080)	0.000 (0.079)	--0.006 (0.079)	0.421 (0.421)
<i>Income in Thousands of GBP (£)</i>	0.000 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	0.002 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	21.735 (21.114)
<i>Constant</i>	--1.488 * (0.337)	--2.806 * (0.544)	--2.067 * (0.443)	--0.657 (0.499)	
Probit Model Information					
Sample Size (N)=1199					
Mean of Dependent Var.=0.396					
Std. Dev. of Dependent Var.=0.489					
Log Likelihood	--759	--753	--757	--757	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	91 *	105 *	96 *	96 *	
Likelihood Ratio χ^2 degrees of freedom	8	9	9	9	

Note: * p ≤ 0.05. Data on independence supporters were collected at rallies in Aberdeen, Perth, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (August-November 2019).

Online Appendix E. Alt. Figure 5. Average Marginal Effects Graphs for Models without Survey Weights

