

# Intersectionality at the Grassroots

**Michael T. Heaney**

Institute for Research on Women and Gender  
University of Michigan  
michaeltheaney@gmail.com

Paper presented at the 114<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,  
Boston, Massachusetts, August 30-September 2.

**Abstract.** Intersectionality is an analysis of power, rooted in black feminist thought and activism, that pays close attention to the ways in which social structures shape the advantages and disadvantages faced by individuals as a function of their social identities. A key observation in this analysis is that social identities interact such that the effect of two identities held together may be quite different than of one or the other identity held separately. Intersectionality is relevant to women's activism because of concerns that advocacy organizations led by straight, white women have not fully included individuals with more marginalized identities. These concerns have been raised prominently in the latest round of women's organizing, led by the Women's March. This article considers the views of activists on the importance of addressing intersectionality within social movements. To this end, it analyzes surveys conducted of participants at the 2017 Women's Convention, events on the first anniversary of the Women's March, and four comparison events on non-gendered issues held in Washington, DC in early 2018. The results demonstrate robust support for the conclusion that more liberal political ideologies are associated with greater support for addressing intersectionality, and this association holds both within and between activist events.

**Acknowledgments.** The author is grateful for helpful comments from Sara Angevine, Rhiannon Auriemma, Lisa Disch, Dana Fisher, Anna Kirkland, Dara Strolovitch, Sid Tarrow, and participants in symposia of the Institute for Research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan in 2017 and 2018 and the 2018 Women's History Month Symposium at Wayne State University. Special thanks are owed to many surveyors, research assistants, and anonymous survey respondents who contributed to this research. This research was funded by grants from the National Institute for Civil Discourse and the University of Michigan, through the Institute for Research on Women and Gender, the National Center for Institutional Diversity, the Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program, and the Organizational Studies Program.

We will be brave, intentional, and unapologetic in addressing the intersections of our identities. And, collectively, we will stand up for the most marginalized among us, because they are us.

Carmen Perez, National Co-Chair, Women's March on Washington (Perez 2017: 4:15-4:31)

Intersectionality is an analysis of power, rooted in black feminist thought and activism, that pays close attention to the ways in which social structures shape the advantages and disadvantages faced by individuals as a function of their social identities (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Hancock 2016; McCall 2005). A key observation in this analysis is that social identities interact such that the effect of two identities held together may be quite different than of one or the other identity held separately. That is, the effects of holding social identities are multiplicative, rather than additive (Hancock 2007). For example, black women have distinctive experiences in facing violence that cannot be reduced to their identities either as being "black" or as being "women". While much of the early discussion of this idea concentrated on race and gender, more recent conversations on this topic have also included other dimensions of difference, such as ethnicity, nationality, sex, class, religion, ability, and sexuality (Dhamoon 2011).

The concept of intersectionality has strong roots in the academy, among activists, and within social movements. In her recent intellectual history on the topic, Hancock (2016: 38) stresses that activists have adopted intersectional arguments in responding to oppression since at least the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Feminist activists, such as hooks (1984) and Davis (2016), have simultaneously made contributions to the praxis of organizing and theories of intersectionality. Intersectionality provides methodology for critiquing social institutions that activists can use in proposing solutions to social problems, such as by pointing to variations in privilege among social groups in their experience with a policy (Dhamoon 2011).

When planning began for the Women’s March on Washington in 2017, which was held in response to the presidential inauguration of Donald Trump, many critics raised concerns that the planning process had not given enough attention to intersectionality. Critics charged that the organizers failed to include or reach out to women with diverse identities and had instead relied too heavily on white women and their concerns (Berry and Chenoweth 2018; Tolentino 2017). These complaints reiterated longstanding arguments that women’s organizing tends not to involve all women equally and does not prioritize the goals of marginalized groups of women (Freeman 2013; Newman 1999; Strolovitch 2007).

Carmen Perez’s speech at the 2017 Women’s March on Washington, quoted above, responded to these criticisms and made clear that the national leadership of the Women’s March would aim to rectify the problems of intersectionality through its organizing and its advocacy for changes in public policy. Indeed, Perez returned to the issue of intersectionality in her statement on the first anniversary of the March in 2018, declaring that it was time for white activists to move over and make more room in the movement for unrepresented groups (Solis 2018). By addressing intersectionality as part of its organizing agenda, the Women’s March formally embraced what is sometimes referred to as “intersectional activism” (Gebreyes 2017; Hancock 2016: 39).

Discussions of intersectionality have penetrated beyond the circles of feminist academics and leading activists. They have entered broader social conversations about diversity, inclusion, and how individuals and institutions should further these goals (Davis 2008). As the concept of intersectionality has become “mainstreamed” (Dhamoon 2011), participants in social movements have raised their demands that activism address intersectional concerns. These demands have been felt acutely within the women’s movement in the United States since Donald Trump became president.

The question of whether the women’s movement adequately addresses intersectionality is normative in nature and may be difficult, or impossible, to settle. Yet there is little doubt that *debates*

about intersectionality occupy a central place in the contemporary women's movement's struggle to define itself, engage in collective action, and effect change in American politics, policy, and society. In other words, activists in the women's movement are *thinking* and *talking* about intersectionality, regardless of whether they are *addressing* intersectionality (Berry and Chenoweth 2018).

This article begins with the premise that, because intersectionality is an important part of discourses surrounding the contemporary women's movement in the United States, understanding how participating activists think about intersectionality is relevant to making sense of the movement's nature and trajectory. Intersectionality is an element of the symbolic politics of the movement such that participants may align with or against addressing intersectionality as a mobilizing goal, or perhaps by contesting its standing, interpretation, or implementation. This symbolic politics draws upon framing strategies, identity construction, and emotional work within the movement (Tarrow 2011: 143). As such, discussions of intersectionality may help to map the contours of the movement's cleavages (Zald and Berger 1978) and guide the work of activists.

This article investigates the attitudes of participants in the women's movement about intersectionality. First, it discusses the relationship between intersectionality, activism, and social movements generally. Second, it considers theories of how social identity, political attitudes, and socio-economic status affect participants' attitudes about addressing intersectionality. Third, it lays out a research design for conducting surveys at numerous events sponsored by the Women's March and its allied organizations, as well as at comparison events staged by other social movement organizations. Fourth, it reports the results of statistical analyses that examine the characteristics associated with activists' support for addressing intersectionality. Fifth, the robustness of the results is considered. Finally, the article discusses the implications of these results for contemporary organizing and concludes with an outlook for an intersectional women's movement.

This research contributes to what is known about women's activism, identity politics, and social movements broadly. First, it illuminates the contemporary politics of the women's movement in the United States and the underlying factors that are influencing organizing. Second, it provides insight on how rank-and-file participants in social movements are thinking about identity politics through the lens of intersectionality. Finally, it reveals how mainstreamed dialogues about intersectionality map on to ideological and demographic divisions within social movements. In doing so, it helps to lay the foundation for continued research on grassroots politics during the presidency of Donald Trump and beyond.

### **Intersectionality and Social Movements**

Intersectionality may be used within social movements as a justification for marginalized groups to amplify their voices and steer collective action in the direction of their interests. In their analysis of Québécois women's movement, Laperrière and Lépinard (2016) illustrate how intersectionality can be invoked as a tool to achieve inclusion and balanced representation. They explain that this "strategy usually means recognizing minority women's experiences and cultural differences by making sure that their specific needs are addressed in terms of service provision, and that they feel comfortable inside the organization" (Laperrière and Lépinard 2016: 376). Further, they observe that "the adoption of intersectionality also encourages officers in these organizations to acknowledge their privileged social position within the organization and in society at large" (Laperrière and Eléonore 2016: 377). This study, and others in this nascent field, create a sense of optimism that self-reflective movement organizations can overcome legacies of inequality within their ranks (Nixon and Humphreys 2010; Tomos 2017; Tungohan 2016). However, in the absence of such intentionally intersectional campaigns, even social justice organizations founded to combat inequality may operate in ways that (intentionally or unintentionally) re-marginalize their least-advantaged constituents (Strolovitch 2007).

This context is the backdrop against which women’s movement organizations have increasingly struggled to address intersectionality. Recent survey research yields some evidence that it has been at least partially successful in this regard. The results of Fisher, Dow, and Ray’s (2017) field survey at the 2017 Women’s March on Washington show that the March increased activism using an intersectional approach that manifested as a broad coalition of diverse advocates and alliances across diversity-based issues.

As is discussed above, an intersectional approach within women’s activism involves framing strategies, identity construction, and emotional work. First, framing involves the challenge to movement leaders to present an image of the movement that a wide coalition can rally behind (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). The intersectional framing challenge of activists is to present their organizations as focused on issues of concern to marginalized women – such as immigration, poverty, and interpersonal violence – rather than only as concerned with issues of greater relevance to more privileged women – such as college admissions and breaking the glass ceiling in corporate leadership. Second, identity construction involves forging a collective identity that embraces the subgroups desired by movement leaders, while excluding subgroups that threaten the movement’s framing (Melucci 1988). For the Women’s March, the project of intersectional identity construction has largely been an effort to convince straight white women, women of color, and non-straight women to work together, while at the same time excluding the participation of pro-life women. Finally, emotion work demands that the movement “reflect, capture, and shape” the emotions of its followers (Tarrow 2011: 143, emphasis removed from original). For contemporary women’s organizations, this has meant providing an outlet for the tremendous anger that women have felt toward President Donald Trump, while at the same time managing the anger that subgroups of women have felt toward one another, which are the “echoes of backlash against previous mobilization efforts by women” (Goss and Heaney 2010: 27; see also Jasper 1997).

In order to advance the symbolic politics of intersectionality, concrete organizations are needed. The women's movement in the United States has a long history of organizing, which serves both to enable and inhibit the present generation of organizers (Goss 2013: 3). Enabling factors include an existing organizational community (with established leaders such as Planned Parenthood and Code Pink: Women for Peace), a cadre of seasoned activists, and a rich narrative history of the movement's achievements. Inhibiting factors include racism, classism, heteronormativity, enduring personality conflicts, and the legacy of attacks from decades of criticism on the political right. Goss and Heaney (2010) demonstrate that it is possible to address these inhibiting factors when organizations draw upon hybrid strategies by working between movements, institutions, and tactics.

Claims about intersectionality are also claims to power within social movements. An intersectional approach to activism makes strong claims about who should lead movement organizations, how these organizations should work, and what they should fight for. If a social movement organization embraces intersectional activism, this endorsement empowers otherwise marginalized members of the organization to demand change if certain intersectional goals are not achieved. For example, if the leadership of an organization does not have many (or any) persons of color, LGBTQIA+-identified persons, or representatives of relevant religious groups, rank-and-file members of the organization may be legitimized in demanding that persons in the appropriate categories be added to the organization's board. Demands along these lines were successful in restructuring the leadership of the Women's March between its initial conceptualization in November 2016 and its actual staging in January 2017 (Berry and Chenoweth 2018).

If intersectionality is an instrument of power within movements, then it has the potential to also serve as a source of divisiveness. It is certainly possible that members of traditionally privileged groups (e.g., white women) will readily stand aside when intersectional claims to power are made by historically marginalized groups (e.g., women of color, lesbian/queer/transgender persons) and accept re-

prioritization of issues on the movement's agenda. At the same time, it is possible that the members of traditionally privileged groups will contest their displacement from centers of power and continue to push for traditional movement goals. Sorting between these possibilities is a rationale for inquiring about the formation of cleavages around intersectionality, which is discussed in the following section.

### **Theorizing Cleavages over Intersectionality**

When leaders, members, supporters, or critics of a social movement/organization propose that the movement/organization should address intersectionality, it is conceivable that such a proposal will be accepted noncontroversially and enthusiastically. Alternatively, it is possible that some groups will push back against such an initiative, thus generating cleavages within a movement/organization. What are the roots of these cleavages likely to be?

Three potential sources of cleavage are social identity, political attitudes, and participants' socio-economic status. Social identity is the first and most obvious potential explanation for cleavages over intersectionality. The adoption of intersectional activism has the potential to channel direct benefits to activists who hold intersectional identities (Tungohan 2016). These benefits may come through increased access to power structures or by directing movements toward working on causes that create positive effects for local communities. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that individuals with marginalized identities are more likely to lend their support to intersectionality than are individuals without marginalized identities. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that there will be differences in support for intersectionality between members of marginalized and advantaged groups. Instead, members of advantaged groups may choose to see themselves as allies to marginalized groups, thus potentially muting the effects of the difference (Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, and Louis 2016).

Second, political attitudes are a potential source of division on intersectionality. Activists' beliefs about intersectionality are a specific example of what people think about how politics should

work. Yet these beliefs are likely to be embedded in the broader package of ideas that they have been offered by political elites, which are generally presented as existing along the liberal-conservative continuum and/or through the platforms of political parties (Converse 1964; Noel 2013). These views may also be developed through contact with activist and advocacy organizations (Walker 1991: 129-30). As Heaney and Rojas (2015) argue, movement organizations may play a notable role in advising activists about how to think about contemporary political issues and partisan politics. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that activists who identify themselves with parties, ideologies, and/or activist organizations may align their views on intersectionality with these entities (Mason 2018).

Third, socio-economic status may play a role in whether activists support intersectionality. Schlozman, Brady, and Verba (2018) document that persons with lower socio-economic status are less likely to be recruited by social movement organizations and less likely to volunteer on their own to participate in activism than are persons with higher socio-economic status (but see Schussman and Soule 2005 for contrary evidence). As a result, persons of lower socio-economic status may feel more isolated within social movements and, therefore, may be more sympathetic with appeals to intersectionality and inclusion.

Even though there is no necessity that the contemporary women's movement suffers the presence of cleavages over intersectionality, if such cleavages were to emerge, then there are good theoretical reasons to believe that social identity, political attitudes, and socio-economic status would help to define those cleavages. The next section outlines a research design that aims to detect the presence and shape of cleavages along these lines.

## **Research Design**

The goal of the research is to understand the views of participants in the contemporary women's movement in the United States regarding intersectionality, as well as factors that are

associated with those views. To this end, I conducted surveys at the 2017 Women’s Convention, held in Detroit, Michigan, October 27-29, 2017, as well as at events commemorating the first anniversary of the Women’s March, January 20-21, 2018. The Women’s Convention was a typical convention, with keynote addresses, panels, breakout sessions, and related activities, held at Cobo Center in downtown Detroit, with approximately 4,000 people in attendance. The first anniversary events were a series of rallies and marches held worldwide, which were planned by independent organizations acting in solidarity with one another. For example, the event in Las Vegas was planned by a national organization called the “Women’s March”, while the event in New York was planned by the “Women’s March Alliance.” This study examined rallies in five cities in the United States: New York, New York; Washington, DC; Lansing, Michigan; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Los Angeles, California. A photo of participants in the Women’s March in Lansing is presented in Figure 1. These cities were selected in an effort to be roughly geographically representative of the United States and because they were advertised with sufficient advanced notice to plan a survey. These rallies were among the largest Women’s March events held that weekend, with hundreds of thousands attending in New York and Los Angeles, and thousands attending in Washington, Las Vegas, and Lansing (Altavena 2018; Griffiths 2018; WUSA 2018; and surveyors’ observations).

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

In addition to surveying at Women’s March events, I conducted surveys at four rallies held on other issues in Washington, DC in early 2018. These rallies were the March for Life (January 19), the People’s March on Washington (pro-impeachment, January 27), the March for Trump (March 4), and the March for Our Lives (March 24). The purpose of these surveys was to assess if attitudes toward intersectionality expressed at Women’s March events were distinctive to the Women’s March, per se, or if they were held more generally among participants in social movements. These rallies were selected because they were advertised broadly on social media and held on a weekend day, downtown in the

nation's capital, around the same time as the Women's March events. Coincidentally, they yield a desirable comparison of two liberal rallies (People's March, March for Our Lives) and two conservative rallies (March for Life, March for Trump).

The anonymous, pen-and-paper survey contained six pages of questions, such as questions about political attitudes, past electoral participation, past movement participation, social identity, and socio-economic status. To assess attitudes regarding intersectionality, the survey asked participants in the event their opinion on how important it is for the movement to address the concerns of marginalized groups in the organizing process. Specifically, the question was as follows:

How important is it that the women's movement center, represent, and empower the perspectives of subgroups of women, such as women of color, LGBTQIA+ women, and low-income women? Please circle one.

- Equal to the highest priority for the movement
- A high priority, but not the highest priority
- A moderate priority
- A low priority
- Not a priority
- Don't know / No opinion

This question does not use the word "intersectionality" but uses language that is consistent with the prevailing viewpoints about intersectional activism. It asks about marginalized groups of women, giving examples of race, sexuality, and class – but does not imply that these are the only subgroups that should be considered.

The intersectionality question was modified for the non-Women's March events to allow for differences in the context. At the March for Life, it read "How important is it that the pro-life movement center, represent, and empower the perspectives of members of disadvantaged groups, such as African

Americans, women of color, LGBTQIA+ persons, and low-income persons?” The other rallies used this wording but substituted the names of the pertinent movement (e.g., “the impeachment movement”) for “pro-life movement”.

To conduct the surveys, a team of surveyors began by positioning itself around the perimeter of the rally. Each of the surveyor was instructed to look out into the crowd and select one person, called the anchor. The anchor was not surveyed because of the assumption that this person was selected with bias by the surveyor. The surveyors were instructed to count five persons to the right of the anchor and invite that person to participate in the survey. Invitations were then issued to every fifth person until three surveys were accepted, after which a new anchor was selected and the process was repeated until the end of the rally. Surveyors kept a record of nonrespondents, making their best guesses of the race and gender of persons refusing. This study follows the protocol established by Heaney and Rojas (2007; 2014; 2015), though similar protocols have been employed by numerous other studies, such as Fisher, Stanley, Berman, and Neff (2005), Goss (2006), and Walgrave and Rucht (2010). Research shows that when protest surveys are conducted with careful attention to selection issues, as was the case in this study, they can provide a good representation of the protest population (Walgrave and Verhulst 2017; Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars 2016).

## **Results**

My research teams collected 231 surveys at the Women’s Convention, with a response rate of 64 percent, over the weekend of October 27-29, 2017. On the first anniversary of the Women’s March (January 20-21, 2018) they collected 597 surveys (72 percent response rate) across five events. At the comparison events, they collected 80 surveys at the March for Life (61 percent response rate), 118 surveys at the People’s March (86 response rate), 16 surveys at the March for Trump (73 percent response rate), and 286 surveys at the March for Our Lives (78 response rate).

The histograms reported in Figure 2 reveal similarities and differences across events in participants' attitudes toward intersectionality. Participants at both the Women's Convention and the first anniversary of the Women's March strongly supported prioritizing intersectionality within the women's movement. At the Women's Convention, 86 percent placed it as equal to the highest priority in the movement, while 73 percent said the same at the first anniversary events. Intersectionality was considered a high but not highest priority by 10 percent of women's conventioners and 21 percent of first anniversary event participants. All other response options were selected by less than 5 percent of respondents.

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

Participants at comparison events gave less support to addressing intersectionality within their movements than did participants at Women's March events. However, it is important to recognize that a notable contingent at every event was interested in seeing a high priority given to addressing intersectionality. Support was lowest at the two conservative events. At the March for Life, addressing intersectionality was rated as equal to the highest priority by 20 percent of participants and a high priority by 25 percent of respondents. At the March for Trump, 12 percent considered addressing intersectionality equal to the highest priority and a high priority by 55 percent of respondents. Support was considerably higher at the two liberal events, though not as high as was observed at the Women's March events. At the People's March, addressing intersectionality was rated as equal to the highest priority by 59 percent of participants and a high priority by 31 percent of respondents. At the March for Our Lives, 56 percent considered addressing intersectionality equal to the highest priority and a high priority by 31 percent of respondents, which was almost an exact match to the responses at the People's March.

In Table 1, ordered probit analysis is applied to determine which individual-level factors are associated with support for intersectionality. Table 1 contains three models. Model 1 uses data from

the Women's Convention, Model 2 uses data from the first anniversary of the Women's March, and Model 3 uses data from the four comparison marches. The estimates are weighted to account for variations in survey nonresponse by gender and race and adjusted for stratification across events. Missing values were imputed using complete-case imputation, which is the appropriate method when there is a relatively low incidence of missing data, as is the case in this study (Little 1988; Wood, White, Hillsdon, and Carpenter 2005; King, Honaker, Joseph, and Schevee 2001). Descriptive statistics for these models are provided in Table 2, including survey-weighted means, standard deviations, and the percentage of observations imputed.

INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE

Considering results across the three models, it is apparent that social identity is associated with views on intersectionality, but how it is associated depends on the context. Women's attitudes were statistically different from men's at neither the Women's Convention nor the first anniversary events. The likely reason for this result is that women dominated participation in these events, compressing variation in the independent variable. Women were 92 percent of participants at the Women's Convention and 79 percent of participants at the first anniversary events. However, at the non-gender-focused events examined in Model 3, the coefficient on women's gender does present as positive and statistically significant. Women made up approximately 62 percent of the participants at these events, which allows for greater comparison between women and non-women. Women reported greater support for intersectionality, other things equal, than the men present at these events.

Model 1 shows that trans-identified persons were more likely to support addressing intersectionality than were cis-gendered persons at the Women's Convention. Model 2 shows that nonwhite persons (encompassing those persons identifying at least partly as Native American, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, and Asian, Asian American, or Pacific Islander) and LGBTQIA+ persons (encompassing those persons identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, intersex,

asexual, or otherwise non-straight) were significantly more likely to support addressing intersectionality than were white or straight persons at the first anniversary events. It is notable that the nonwhite variable is significant in only Model 2, given the historical role that women of color have played in developing the concept of intersectionality. However, the result here simply indicates that white and nonwhite persons do not disagree over intersectionality in two of the three models, which is not necessarily inconsistent with the role that women of color have played. Age in years did not appear as significant in any model.

Variations in political attitudes exhibited consistent results across all three models. The analysis revealed that holding more ideologically liberal attitudes is associated with support for intersectionality at events organized under the umbrella of the Women’s March and at comparison events. Ideology was measured on a nine-point scale, with options for “to the ‘right’ of strong conservative” (1), “a strong conservative” (2), “a not very strong conservative” (3), “a moderate who leans conservative” (4), “a moderate” (5), “a moderate who leans liberal” (6), “a not very strong liberal” (7), “a strong liberal” (8), and “to the ‘left’ of strong liberal” (9), and “other (please specify)”, which was treated as missing. It is important to note that the distribution of ideology varied across the three models. At the Women’s Convention, 21 percent of respondents placed themselves to the left of a strong liberal, 56 percent described themselves as strong liberals, 15 percent said that they leaned toward being liberal or were not a strong liberal, and the remaining 8 percent were to the right of this point. Participants at the first anniversary events were somewhat less liberal, with 18 percent to the left of strong liberal, 54 percent in the strong liberal category, 20 percent leaned liberal or identified as not strong liberals, and 8 percent were to the right of this point. The data on the comparison events, which included two conservative events and two liberal events, placed 78 percent of respondents on the left or leaning left, 6 percent as moderates, and 16 percent on the right or leaning right. These results, in conjunction with graphs presented below in Figure 2, establish that liberal ideology predicts support for intersectionality both

within events (i.e., between different participants at the same event) and between events (i.e., levels of support for intersectionality are greater at liberal events than at conservative events).

The evidence does not confirm an association between party identification and support for intersectionality. This variable was measured on a seven-point scale, with options for “strong Republican” (1), “not very strong Republican” (2), “independent who leans Republican” (3), “independent” (4), independent who leans Democrat” (5), “not very strong Democrat” (6), “strong Democrat” (7), and “other (please specify)”, which was treated as missing. The absence of significance on this variable may be partly due to the high correlation between party identification and ideology in American politics. It may also be partly due to the fact that the events studied exhibited considerable partisan homogeneity, which suppresses the variation in the independent variable.

Membership in a political organization was not significantly associated with support for intersectionality in any model. Likewise, neither of the socio-economic status variables (income and education) were statistically significantly, perhaps partly due to the above average levels of income and education at activist events.

Model 1 did not contain any variables representing events because all the data were collected at one event, the Women’s Convention. Model 2 included variables for the Women’s March in New York, Lansing, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles. This specification designates Washington, DC as the base category. The absence of significance in these variables indicates that there were no differences in support for intersectionality among the five events once the other variables in the model were taken into account. Similarly, Model 3 did not show any differences among the comparison events that were not otherwise captured by the model specification.

Given that the positive, significant coefficients of ideology on support for addressing intersectionality are the only consistent effects across all models, these effects merit closer examination. Figure 3 reports the marginal effects of ideology on support for addressing intersectionality. Models 1,

2, and 3 all display a generally similar pattern of marginal effects. Outcome 5 – which indicates that the respondent believes that addressing intersectionality should be equal to the highest priority in the movement – has an upward sloping marginal effect in all three models. On the other hand, outcomes 1, 2, 3, and 4 – which range from “Not a Priority” to “A high priority, but not the highest priority” – all exhibited level or modestly downward sloping marginal effects. These results indicate that the strongest effect of ideology is in the shift between addressing intersectionality as “equal to the highest priority” and being a “high but not highest priority.” As ideology becomes more liberal, the probability that respondents rate addressing intersectionality as equal to the highest priority in the movement approaches  $p=1.0$ . As ideology becomes more conservative, respondents are more likely to say that it is lower than the highest priority for the movement, approaching  $p=0.35$ . Examining the marginal effects reveals that the ideological politics of intersectionality is focused on whether addressing intersectionality should be equal to the highest priority of the movement, or something less than that.

INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE

### **Robustness Analysis**

Robustness analysis examines how the assumptions underlying a statistical analysis affect the results. The method for testing the assumptions is to systematically change the specification of the model and observe changes in the parameters (Leamer 1978). This section discusses the effects of using weighted survey data, surveying persons of all genders (as opposed to limiting the survey by gender), and whether the results in the models for comparison events may be the result of contagion from women’s activism.

The purpose of survey weights is to correct the biases in a survey when some groups in the population are more likely to be surveyed than are others. Such weights are used in this study to correct differences among groups in nonresponse rates, particularly to account for the tendency of

women to respond to the survey at higher rates than nonwomen. To see the effects of this correction, the models were estimated without survey weights, which did lead to some modest differences in the results. In Model 1, the coefficient on trans identity falls below the threshold for significance when the weights are removed, however the positive, significant coefficient on ideology is unaffected. In Model 2, the coefficient on age is significant and negative without survey weights, suggesting that younger people may be more supportive of addressing intersectionality than are older people. However, the coefficients on nonwhite identity, LGBTQIA identity, and ideology were unaffected by removing survey weights. In Model 3, the coefficient on LGBTQIA identity fell slightly below the threshold for significance in the unweighted model, while other coefficients were unaffected.

Another question to examine is how the statistical results are affected by the fact that the data included persons from all genders. It might be argued that it would be more appropriate to limit the analysis only to women, especially at the Women's March events, since their interests were the focus of the marches. Recognizing this consideration, the models were re-estimated using only the responses from women. In Model 1, the trans-identity coefficient loses its significance with this alternative specification, but other coefficients in the model are unaffected. In Model 2, the coefficient on nonwhite identity fell outside the range of statistical significance when only women were included, while the coefficient on age entered the model as negative and statistically significant. Other coefficients were unaffected. In Model 3, the coefficient on LGBTQIA+ identity fell out of significance in the women-only specification, while other coefficients were not affected.

A final question arises from the possible relationship between Model 3 and the other two models. Models 1 and 2 show a high level of support for addressing intersectionality among participants in the Women's March. Model 3 shows a higher level of support for addressing intersectionality than might be expected at non-identity-focused marches. Is it possible that responses given at the comparison events were directly influenced by the Women's March or previous rounds of women's

organizing? In other words, is there boundary-spanning between movements that led to a diffusion of the idea of intersectionality from movement to movement (Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018)? If such diffusion took place, it could cloud the inferences drawn from Model 3. In order to evaluate this possibility, two new versions of Model 3 were estimated. One version of the model included a variable for whether the respondent at a comparison march had previously attended a Women's March event. The second version included a variable for whether the respondent had previously participated in women's rights activism (which was not limited to only the Women's March). If the coefficient on either of these variables was positive and significant, it would suggest that people attending the comparison marches who had experience with the women's movement would be more supportive of addressing intersectionality than would those not previously involved in women's activism. The results showed, however, that neither of these coefficients were significant. Thus, the evidence does not suggest that diffusion between movements affects the analysis of supporting intersectionality in individual movements.

Examination of the models reported in this article, as well as the variations to these models discussed in the robustness analysis, yields substantial confidence that there is a significant, positive association between support for addressing intersectionality and the ideology of movement participants. The marginal effects analysis showed that this effect was steepest at the Women's Convention, followed closely by the first anniversary of the Women's March, and followed less closely by the comparison marches.

## **Discussion**

While the planning of the initial Women's March on January 21, 2017 was clouded by concerns that its organizers had exhibited insufficient support for intersectionality, this research demonstrates that activists who participated in the Women's March in 2018 expressed a high level of support for

intersectional activism on the part of this organization. Over 90 percent of survey respondents at Women's March events said that intersectional activism should be equal to the highest, or is one of the highest, priorities of the women's movement. It must be acknowledged that saying that one *believes* in intersectional activism is not the same as putting intersectional activism into practice. Surely, it is possible that a person publicly preaches the gospel of intersectionality while privately making decisions that serve to exclude, marginalize, and undercut members of disadvantaged subgroups. Still, the fact that rank-and-file activists nearly universally claimed to embrace intersectional activism to some degree is a good starting point for organizations that may be a force in American politics for a long time.

Although the relevance of social identity to supporting intersectionality is highly context-dependent, the statistical analysis in this article yields robust evidence in favor of the notion that there is a positive association between liberal political ideology and support for addressing intersectionality. When organizational participants are homogeneously liberal, the belief in intersectional activism may near consensus, but with ideological heterogeneity comes disagreement on this topic. This result points to an opportunity for cleavage formation within the Women's March. Committed liberal and left women in the Women's March claim to be ready to embrace intersectionality and put it into practice. However, less liberal and moderate women may become frustrated if they believe that the pursuit of intersectionality comes at the cost of advancing traditional movement goals, such as protecting the right to choose in reproductive health and attaining wage equity with men. Such disputes could play out in choosing which candidates to back in primary campaigns, formulating lobbying strategies, or in balancing tactics between institutional and contentious approaches. Leading activists may be able to reduce the impact of these disputes partly by framing them in substantive, rather than ideological, terms.

Leading activists in the contemporary women's movement in the United States would be well advised to think strategically about how to approach disputes that may emerge around an ideological

cleavage. Many Women's March organizations are committed to addressing intersectionality. Yet it also to the advantage of these organizations to find ways to incorporate participation by those who might not be as convinced on this point. Women's March organizations, as well as others in the women's movement writ large, are stronger if they can speak on behalf of a broader group of women. In this case, "broader" may require embracing some more moderate and conservative women.

Intersectionality is clearly an important subject within women's activism. The evidence reported in this research indicates that it is also a relevant consideration within a wide range of types of activism. It is unlikely that the March for Life will pass a resolution embracing intersectionality in the near future. There is no doubt that conservative activists, on the whole, are much less concerned with the structural inequalities and power asymmetries that are emphasized by an intersectional analysis. But it is nontrivial to observe that almost half of the activists in the conservative pro-life movement are willing to state that this idea deserves to receive some degree of priority within their movement. Support for addressing intersectionality is spreading through the grassroots, in the women's movement and beyond.

## **Conclusion**

Once upon a time, the leadership elites of social movements were able to operate as relatively isolated oligopolies in which self-selected informal groups could direct the work of a movement without much outside oversight (Freeman 2013). The rise of the internet, mobile communication technologies, and social media have altered this situation. Rank-and-file activists are now more readily able to penetrate elite circles by bringing to bear new technologies, modes of organization, and strategies than they once could (Milkman 2017; Tufekci 2017). While it may be naïve to believe that old oligarchical patterns of movement

organization are truly gone, it is fair to say that they operate under greater scrutiny than they once did.

The mainstreaming of discourses about intersectionality provide a case in point for the role that activists may now play in social movements in the milieu of e-activism. When many interested activists believed that the Women's March planned for January 2017 would not address their concerns about intersectionality, they used online tools to compel the leadership to respond. The Women's March and its allied organizations are now populated with activists who generally want to see intersectional concerns receive a high priority. Concerns about addressing intersectionality are even present among activists in movements that are not typically known for focusing their attention on this topic.

The spread of attention to intersectionality at the grassroots presents an opportunity to observe the extent of, and limits on, the power of ideas to transform social movements. Will the contemporary women's movement in the United States be divided by ideology over questions of intersectionality, as is presaged by the analysis in this article? Or, will grassroots pressure lead movement organizations to be more self-reflective about who leads them, allowing positions of trust to be more widely distributed than has been the case in the past? Will this result in a genuine sharing of power on an egalitarian basis or will it lead to the replacement of one set of biases with another? Does a movement toward addressing intersectionality serve the interests of black women more or less than the interests of other groups of marginalized women? How much of a trade-off is there, if any, between genuine egalitarianism in movement organizations and their effectiveness in spurring social, political

and policy change? The mainstreaming of discussions about intersectionality may make it possible to address some of these questions in the near future.

## References

- Altavena, Lily. 2008. "Las Vegas Women's March 2018 draws thousands to Sunday event." *azcentral*.  
Revised January 21, 2018. Retrieved September 3, 2018  
(<https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/nation/2018/01/21/2018-womens-march-las-vegas-nevada-draws-thousands/1052368001/>).
- Berry, Marie, and Erica Chenoweth. 2018. "Who Made the Women's March?" Pp. 75-89 in David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *The Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics". Pp. 206-61 in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 140: 139-67.
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241-99.
- Davis, Angela Y. 2016. *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Davis, Kathy. 2008. "Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful." *Feminist Theory* 9 (1): 67-85.

- Dhamoon, Rita Kaur. 2011. "Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(1) 230-43.
- Droogendky, Lisa, Stephen C. Wright, Micah Lubensky, and Winnifred R. Louis. 2016. "Acting in Solidarity: Cross-Group Contact between Disadvantaged Group Members and Advantaged Group Allies." *Journal of Social Issues* 72 (2): 315-334.
- Fisher, Dana R., Dawn M. Dow, and Rashawn Ray. 2017. "Intersectionality takes it to the streets: Mobilizing across diverse interests for the Women's March." *Science Advances* 3 (September): 1-8.
- Fisher, Dana. R., Kevin Stanley, David Berman, and Gina Neff. 2005. "How do organizations matter? Mobilization and support for participants at five globalization protests." *Social Problems* 52(1): 102-121.
- Freeman, Jo. 2013. "The Tyranny of Structurelessness." *Women's Studies Quarterly* 41 (3/4): 231-46.
- Gebreyes, Rahel. 2017. "Women's March Organizers Address Intersectionality As The Movement Grows." *Huffington Post*. Revised January 27, 2017. Retrieved February 3, 2017 ([https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/womens-march-organizers-address-intersectionality-as-the-movement-grows\\_us\\_5883f9d9e4b070d8cad314c0](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/womens-march-organizers-address-intersectionality-as-the-movement-grows_us_5883f9d9e4b070d8cad314c0)).
- Gerhards, Jurgen, and Dieter Rucht. 1992. "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (3): 555-96.
- Goss, Kristin A. 2006. *Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Goss, Kristin A. 2013. *The Paradox of Gender Equality: How American Women's Groups Gained and Lost Their Public Voice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Goss, Kristin A., and Michael T. Heaney. 2010. "Organizing Women as Women: Hybridity and Grassroots Collective Action in the 21st Century." *Perspectives on Politics* 8 (1): 27-52.

- Griffiths, Brian D. 2018. . "Hundreds of thousands protest in D.C., across country on women's march anniversary." *Politico*. Retrieved September 3, 2018. Revised January 20, 2018 (<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/20/womens-march-anniversary-dc-352231>).
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2007. "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm." *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (1): 63-79.
- Hancock, Ange-Marie. 2016. *Intersectionality: An Intellectual History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Heaney, Michael T., and Fabio Rojas. 2007. "Partisans, Nonpartisans, and the Antiwar Movement in the United States." *American Politics Research* 35 (4): 431-464.
- Heaney, Michael T., and Fabio Rojas. 2014. "Hybrid Activism: Social Movement Mobilization in a Multimovement Environment." *American Journal of Sociology* 119 (4): 1047-1103.
- Heaney, Michael T., and Fabio Rojas. 2015. *Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and the Democratic Party after 9/11*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- hooks, bell. 1984. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press
- Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Culture in Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation." *American Political Science Review* 95 (1): 49-69.
- Laperrière, Marie, and Eléonore Lépinard. 2016. "Intersectionality as a tool for social movements: Strategies of inclusion and representation in the Québécois women's movement." *Politics* 36 (4) 374-382.
- Leamer, Edward E. 1978. *Specification Searches: Ad Hoc Inference with Nonexperimental Data*. New York: Wiley.

- Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Signs* 30 (3): 1771-1800.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1995. "The Process of Collective Identity." Pp. 41-63 in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Milkman, Ruth. 2017. "A New Political Generation: Millennials and the Post-2008 Wave of Protest." *American Sociological Review* 82 (1): 1-31.
- Newman, Louise Michele. 1999. *White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nixon, Jennifer, and Cathy Humphreys. 2010. "Marshalling the Evidence: Using Intersectionality in the Domestic Violence Frame." *Social Politics* 17 (2): 137-58.
- Noel, Hans. 2013. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Perez, Carmen. 2017. "CARMEN PEREZ Speech: 2017 Womens March on Washington." *YouTube*.  
Published on February 2, 2017. Retrieved August 23, 2018  
(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32uPDwdKGQ8>).
- Schussman, Alan, and Sarah A. Soule. 2005. "Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation." *Social Forces* 84 (2): 1083-1108.
- Solis, Marie. 2018. "Women's March 2018 Calls on White Women to Give Black Women a Seat at the Table." *Newsweek*. Revised January 21, 2018. Retrieved February 5, 2018  
(<http://www.newsweek.com/womens-march-wants-give-black-women-keys-future-electoral-politics-786218>).
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Henry E. Brady, and Sidney Verba. 2018. *Unequal and Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People's Voice the New Gilded Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Strolovitch, Dara Z. 2007. *Affirmative Advocacy: Race, Class, and Gender in Interest Group Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2011. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Updated and Revised 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tolentino, Jia. 2017. "The Somehow Controversial Women's March on Washington." *The New Yorker*. Revised January 18, 2017. Retrieved February 5, 2018 (<https://www.newyorker.com/culture/jia-tolentino/the-somehow-controversial-womens-march-on-washington>).
- Tormos, F. 2017. "Intersectional Solidarity." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5 (4): 707-20.
- Tufekci, Zeynep. 2017. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tungohan, Ethel. 2016. "Intersectionality and Social Justice: Assessing Activists' Use of Intersectionality through Grassroots Migrants' Organizations in Canada." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4 (3): 347-62.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, and Dieter Rucht, eds. 2010. *The World Says No to War: Demonstrations against the War on Iraq*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, and Joris Verhulst. 2011. "Selection and Response Bias in Protest Surveys." *Mobilization* 16 (2): 203-22.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, Ruud Wouters, and Pauline Ketelaars. 2016. "Response Problems in the Protest Study Design: Evidence from Fifty-One Protest Events in Seven Countries." *Mobilization* 21 (1): 83-104.
- Walker, Jack L., Jr. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Wang, Dan, Alessandro Piazza, and Sarah A. Soule. 2018. "Boundary-Spanning in Social Movements: Antecedents and Outcomes." *Annual Review of Sociology* 44: 167-87.
- Wood, Angela M., Ian R. White, Melvyn Hillsdon, and James Carpenter. 2005. "Comparison of Imputation and Modeling Methods in the Analysis of a Physical Activity Trial with Missing Outcomes." *International Journal of Epidemiology* 34 (1): 89–99.
- WUSA. 2018. "Thousands Gather for 2018 Women's March in DC." *WUSA9*. Revised January 20, 2018. Retrieved September 3, 2018 (<https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/dc/thousands-gather-for-2018-womens-march-in-dc/509711469>).
- Zald, Mayer N., and Michael A. Berger. 1978. "Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d'Etat, Insurgency, and Mass Movements." *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (4): 823-861.


Figure 1. Participants in the Women’s March on Lansing, Michigan, January 21, 2018




Note: Photo by Michael T. Heaney.

**Figure 2. Support for Addressing Intersectionality**

**A. Women’s March Events**



**B. Comparison Events**



**Table 1. Factors Associated with Support for Addressing Intersectionality**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Model 1</b> <i>Women's Convention</i>	<b>Model 2</b> <i>First Anniversary of Women's March</i>	<b>Model 3</b> <i>Comparison Events</i>
<b>Social Identity</b>			
<i>Gender is Female = 1</i>	0.239 (0.338)	0.251 (0.143)	0.390 * (0.129)
<i>Gender is Trans = 1</i>	2.778 * (0.431)	2.737 (2.682)	0.985 (0.564)
<i>Race is Nonwhite = 1</i>	-0.209 (0.229)	0.355 * (0.156)	0.008 (0.191)
<i>LGBTQIA+ = 1</i>	0.307 (0.429)	0.471 * (0.189)	0.405 * (0.191)
<i>Age in Years</i>	-0.014 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
<b>Political Attitudes</b>			
<i>Ideology (Conservative to Liberal 1 to 9)</i>	0.381 * (0.082)	0.246 * (0.053)	0.139 * (0.049)
<i>Party Identification (Republican to Democrat 1 to 7)</i>	0.069 (0.118)	0.537 (0.474)	-0.007 (0.041)
<i>Member of Political Organization = 1</i>	0.433 (0.231)	-0.088 (0.133)	0.091 (0.137)
<b>Socio-Economic Status</b>			
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>Level of Education (Less than High School Grad. to Grad. Degree 1 to 6)</i>	-0.000 (0.111)	-0.040 (0.051)	-0.030 (0.049)
<b>Event</b>			
<i>New York Women's March = 1</i>		0.221 (0.171)	
<i>Lansing, Michigan Women's March = 1</i>		-0.054 (0.200)	
<i>Las Vegas Women's March = 1</i>		0.016 (0.186)	
<i>Los Angeles Women's March = 1</i>		-0.220 (0.177)	
<i>March for Life = 1</i>			-0.564 (0.295)
<i>People's March = 1</i>			0.088 (0.135)
<i>March for Trump = 1</i>			-0.135 (0.341)

(Table is continued on next page.)

**Table 1 Continued. Factors Associated with Support for Addressing Intersectionality**

<b>Cut Points</b>			
<i>Cut Point 1</i>	-0.112 (0.943)	0.664 (1.390)	-1.012 * (0.458)
<i>Cut Point 2</i>	0.472 (0.920)	0.974 (1.429)	-0.708 (0.457)
<i>Cut Point 3</i>	0.888 (0.920)	1.606 (1.408)	-0.160 (0.469)
<i>Cut Point 4</i>	1.843 (0.954)	2.668 (1.406)	0.850 (0.466)
<b>Model Statistics</b>			
Sample Size	215	521	422
F Statistic	26.85 *	3.58 *	5.03 *
F degrees of freedom	10, 205	14, 503	13, 406


*Notes:* \* $p \leq 0.05$ . Models estimated using an ordered-probit estimator. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – Survey Weighed Mean / (Standard Deviation) / [Percent Imputed]**

<b>Variable</b>	<i>Women’s Convention</i>		<i>First Anniversary of Women’s March</i>		<i>Comparison Events</i>	
<b>Dependent Variable</b>						
<i>Support for Addressing Intersectionality (1 to 5)</i>	4.801 (0.561)	N.A.	4.648 (0.671)	N.A.	4.192	N.A.
<b>Social Identity</b>						
<i>Gender is Female = 1</i>	0.924 (0.258)	[8.66%]	0.789 (0.400)	[13.13%]	0.625 (0.480)	[17.50%]
<i>Gender is Trans = 1</i>	0.005 (0.069)	[8.66%]	0.006 (0.076)	[13.13%]	0.016 (0.129)	[17.50%]
<i>Race is Nonwhite = 1</i>	0.388 (0.477)	[7.36%]	0.268 (0.453)	[12.46%]	0.193 (0.401)	[16.90%]
<i>LGBTQIA+ = 1</i>	0.243 (0.431)	[29.00%]	0.212 (0.411)	[36.36%]	0.171 (0.386)	[38.77%]
<i>Age in Years</i>	36.943 (16.130)	[9.52%]	43.610 (14.48%)	[14.48%]	41.942 (18.417)	[19.48%]
<b>Political Attitudes</b>						
<i>Ideology (Conservative to Liberal 1 to 9)</i>	7.663 (1.303)	[10.82%]	7.552 (1.325)	[15.15%]	6.702 (2.007)	[19.88%]
<i>Party Identification (Republican to Democrat 1 to 7)</i>	6.077 (1.089)	[13.85%]	6.226 (1.156)	[8.08%]	5.475 (1.749)	[10.74%]
<i>Member of Political Organization = 1</i>	0.643 (0.473)	[5.63%]	0.474 (0.500)	[10.94%]	0.334 (0.472)	[11.53%]
<b>Socio-Economic Status</b>						
<i>Income in Thousands of Dollars</i>	66.142 (73.901)	[12.99%]	99.257 (104.233)	[16.67%]	102.189 (100.640)	[22.27%]
<i>Level of Education (Less than High School Grad. to Grad. 1 to 6 Degree)</i>	4.335 (4.368)	[8.23%]	4.506 (1.439)	[12.29%]	4.323 (1.660)	[16.90%]
<b>Event</b>						
<i>New York Women’s March = 1</i>			0.213 (0.410)	[0.00%]		
<i>Washington, DC Women’s March = 1</i>			0.300 (0.458)	[0.00%]		
<i>Lansing, Michigan Women’s March = 1</i>			0.123 (0.327)	[0.00%]		
<i>Las Vegas Women’s March = 1</i>			0.179 (0.386)	[0.00%]		
<i>Los Angeles Women’s March = 1</i>			0.184 (0.389)	[0.00%]		
<i>March for Life = 1</i>					0.177 (0.366)	[0.00%]
<i>People’s March = 1</i>					0.226 (0.424)	[0.00%]
<i>March for Trump = 1</i>					0.031 (0.176)	[0.00%]
<i>March for Our Lives = 1</i>					0.565 (0.494)	[0.00%]

**Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Ideology on Support for Addressing Intersectionality**

A. Women’s Convention (Model 1)



B. First Anniversary of Women’s March (Model 2)




Figure 3 Continued. Marginal Effects of Ideology on Support for Addressing Intersectionality

C. Comparison Events (Model 3)

