


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The Partisan Politics of Antiwar Legislation in Congress, 2001–2011

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The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war and to extend all appropriations for the conduct of war, but designates the president as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.¹ In requiring Congress and the president to share war-making powers, the framers of the Constitution intended to balance decision making on questions of war and to limit abuses of these powers.² Despite the balance envisioned by the framers, in practice, the president enjoys distinct advantages over Congress in the conduct of war. Most importantly, the president possesses superior information about threats to the United States, especially prior to the engagement of US forces. Given their relatively limited access to information, members of Congress are hesitant to challenge the president's judgment about potential threats.³ Once troops are engaged in a conflict, efforts by Congress to oppose the president are likely to be met by charges that Congress has failed to "support the troops." Although the War Powers Resolution of 1973 attempts to bring the president's power into check, the resolution's practical effect has been to create a kind of "stage management" that limits the duration of conflicts, rather than stopping the president from initiating the use of force.⁴ As a result, there is often little that can be

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¹ US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11; Art I, § 9, cl 7; Art II, § 2, cl 1.

² See generally Federalist 51 (Madison), in *The Federalist* 347 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).

³ See generally Douglas L. Kriner, *After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War* (Chicago 2010); William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers* (Princeton 2007).

⁴ 50 USC §§ 1541–1548; David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, *Ballotbox Diplo-*

done effectively to stop a president who has decided to commit troops to a conflict.

Congress may often appear to be powerless in the war-making arena, but it does retain some tools with which to cajole the president. By offering antiwar resolutions and speaking out against the president's use of force, Congress has the ability to raise the domestic political costs of military action to the president. In his recent book, *After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War*, Douglas L. Kriner uses statistical analysis to demonstrate persuasively that opposition within Congress has the effect of significantly shortening the duration of military conflicts.⁵ He concludes that "the maneuverings of individual members of Congress in the public sphere have significant ramifications for the president's conduct of ongoing military operations."⁶

Yet, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven to be exceptionally difficult cases for Congress to exert control over the president's war-making prerogatives. During his two terms in office, President George W. Bush demonstrated the willingness to pay immense domestic political costs in order to maintain the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷ President Barack Obama, after having campaigned for the presidency, in part on an antiwar platform, largely maintained Bush's policies in this domain.⁸ Obama's positions are especially surprising in light of the substantial electoral benefits that the Democratic Party reaped due to its opposition to the Iraq War.⁹ Indeed, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have gone on to be among the longest military conflicts in American history.¹⁰ This Article argues that partisan politics is a critical factor explaining congressional opposition to these wars, as well as support for their continuation.

macy: *The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force*, 41 Intl Stud Q 505, 506 (1997).

⁵ Kriner, *After the Rubicon* at 147–92 (cited in note 3).

⁶ Id at 191.

⁷ Id at 269–86.

⁸ Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas, *The Partisan Dynamics of Contention: Demobilization of the Antiwar Movement in the United States, 2007–2009*, 16 Mobilization Intl J 45 (2011).

⁹ See generally Christian R. Grose and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *The Iraq War, Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Variation in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections*, 32 Legis Stud Q 531 (2007); Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen, *Iraq Casualties and the 2006 Senate Election*, 32 Legis Stud Q 507 (2007); Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, *All Politics are Still Local: The Iraq War and the 2006 Midterm Elections*, 41 PS Polit Sci Polit 95 (2008).

¹⁰ See generally Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda* (Free Press 2011).

In light of the continued American military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to examine the nature of the congressional response to executive war-making prerogatives in these theaters. To that end, this Article asks what factors determined congressional opposition to war from 2001 to 2011. First, the Article explains the link between political parties and the exercise of war-making powers by Congress and the president. It argues that, while Democratic partisanship sometimes yields incentives to oppose war and Republican partisanship sometimes encourages support for war, these incentives may be reversed, in part, depending on the party of the president at the time. Second, the Article explains the methodology for conducting content analysis of all antiwar legislation introduced in the 107th through 111th Congresses (2001–2011). Third, the Article presents a statistical analysis of the decisions of individual members of Congress to sponsor or cosponsor antiwar legislation. Fourth, it examines trends in the introduction and progress of antiwar legislation, as well as the emergence of congressional networks supporting that legislation. Fifth, it considers the substance of antiwar legislation and how it reflects the evolving conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their political contexts. The Article concludes by discussing the political implications created by partisanship for opponents of war and suggests political strategies to counteract the power of parties in this domain.

I. POLITICAL PARTIES AND WAR

Members of Congress have both policy and partisan reasons to take positions on questions of war and peace. Members have sincerely held beliefs about how the United States should or should not use force in the international arena. These beliefs may be influenced by ideology, the desire to represent constituents, personal characteristics (for example, veteran status, gender), or other factors that shape members' understandings of the issue. At the same time, there may be strategic reasons to support or oppose going to war. If a member is of the same party as that of the president, then that member may have political incentives to support the president's war initiatives.¹¹ Conversely, if a member is of the opposite party as that of the president, then that member may have political incentives to oppose the president's use of force.

¹¹ William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force*, 59 *Intl Org* 209, 216 (2005).

The sincere beliefs of members of Congress about war may correlate with political party membership. This correlation may exist because of commonalities among the members of a party in ideology, the composition of their constituencies, personal characteristics, and other factors. In particular, a strong antiwar faction has long been connected to the Democratic Party. In the post-World War II era, liberal Democrats emerged as a voice for peace in a world dominated by a Cold War with the Soviet Union and a developing nuclear arms race.¹² During the Vietnam War era, important voices for peace came in the form of politicians within the Democratic Party, such as US Senators George McGovern and Robert F. Kennedy. Democrats were a key part of the coalition opposing the Iraq War in the early 2000s, which led to benefits for the Democratic Party at the polls due to antiwar sentiments in the public, especially in the 2006 midterm congressional elections.¹³ At the same time, the Democratic Party has included strong advocates for war, particularly from among its members from southern states.¹⁴ The existence of this pro-war faction means that the Democratic Party is often split on questions of war and peace. Analogously, the Republican Party contains a libertarian-isolationist wing, embodied by members such as Congressman Ron Paul of Texas.¹⁵ Yet, to the extent that antiwar voices are raised within Congress, they usually (but not always) come from within the Democratic Party.

The strategic incentives for members of Congress to support or oppose going to war are closely connected to the demands of their party leaders. Parties act as teams because members know that their fates rise and fall together.¹⁶ In order to compel teamwork, the parties have created institutions and rules within Congress to incentivize members' compliance with the leadership

¹² Charles DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era 18–19* (Syracuse 1990).

¹³ At the mass level, Democrats and Republicans exhibited considerable differences in their approval of the Iraq War, with the gap between the two groups exceeding seventy points in most public opinion polls. See Gary C. Jacobson, *Perception, Memory, and Partisan Polarization on the Iraq War*, 125 *Polit Sci Q* 31, 32 (2010). Similarly large divisions existed among mobilized protesters along party lines. See Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas, *Partisans, Nonpartisans, and the Antiwar Movement in the United States*, 35 *Am Polit Res* 431 (2007).

¹⁴ Glenn Feldmann, *Southern Disillusionment with the Democratic Party: Cultural Conformity and "the Great Melding" of Racial and Economic Conservatism in Alabama during World War II*, 43 *J Am Stud* 199, 221 (2009).

¹⁵ Jason A. Edwards, *Debating America's Role in the World: Representative Ron Paul's Exceptionalist Jeremiad*, 55 *Am Behavioral Sci* 253, 253 (2011).

¹⁶ See generally Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (California 2007).

of their party caucus.¹⁷ The power of parties to exert control over their members has risen steadily since the 1970s, during which time the polarization between the parties increased to its highest point in over a century.¹⁸ Thus, members of Congress who oppose their party's line are more isolated today than at any time in recent memory. Concomitantly, congressional party leaders have greater resources to punish defectors from their party line, especially by leveraging party-directed campaign contributions.¹⁹ Congressional responses to matters of war and peace, like any other issue, are thus likely to conform closely with the agendas of party leaders.

Incentives for members of Congress to toe the party line come not only from within Congress, but from the president as well. Presidents have been much more partisan actors since the Reagan era than they had been during the middle of the twentieth century.²⁰ President George W. Bush, in particular, stood as a relentlessly partisan leader.²¹ In the present era, presidents work actively to support their co-partisans in Congress during elections, craft notably partisan agendas, and, in turn, find that their public support comes largely from citizens identifying with their own party.²² As a result, partisans of the opposite party have little incentive to cooperate with the president in the legislative arena. The president comes to rely almost exclusively on the members of his own party to advance legislation and becomes intimately involved in the workings of his party's congressional caucus.²³ The pressures of the strong partisan presidency, along with leader-enforced party discipline in Congress, make it likely

¹⁷ David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* 82–160 (Chicago 1991).

¹⁸ Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*, 23 (MIT 2006); Jeffrey W. Ladewig, *Ideological Polarization and the Vanishing of Marginals: Retrospective Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Congress*, 72 J Polit 499, 499 (2010); Richard Born, *Party Polarization and the Rise of Partisan Voting in U.S. House Elections*, 36 Am Polit Res 62, 62–63 (2008); Sean M. Theriault, *Party Polarization in Congress 20–28* (Cambridge 2008); Seth E. Maskett, *No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures* 3 (Michigan 2009).

¹⁹ Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler, *The Transition to Democratic Leadership in a Polarized House*, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, *Congress Reconsidered* 165–88 (CQ 9th ed 2009).

²⁰ Richard M. Skinner, *George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency*, 123 Polit Sci Q 605, 605 (2009).

²¹ See generally Gary C. Jacobson, *A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People* (Pearson 2007).

²² Skinner, *George W. Bush* at 610–15 (cited in note 20).

²³ Skinner, *George W. Bush* at 614 (cited in note 20).

that members of Congress will support wars prosecuted by their co-partisans in the White House and oppose war-making adventures of presidents of the opposite party.²⁴

This Article makes three arguments about partisanship and the behavior of members of Congress on issues of war and peace. First, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to oppose war, other things equal. Second, members of Congress are likely to support war when it is prosecuted by a president of their own party and to oppose war when it is undertaken by a president from the opposing party, other things equal. Third, partisanship affects the introduction of antiwar legislation, the content of that legislation, and the network of support that develops around it. These arguments collectively suggest that parties have enormous power on issues of war and peace, and that the direction of these pressures may change with the alignment of the parties.

II. METHODOLOGY

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan enjoyed considerable formal support from Congress. The war in Afghanistan was authorized by a vote of 420-1 in the US House of Representatives and 98-0 in the US Senate.²⁵ The war in Iraq was authorized by a vote of 297-133 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate.²⁶ After authorizing the wars, Congress passed annual appropriations and several supplemental appropriation bills to fund the military occupations.²⁷ Efforts to add antiwar provisions to these bills through appropriation riders and other tactics proved futile.²⁸ Republican control of Congress for most of the 2001–2006 period meant that most antiwar bills failed to come to a vote, and thus, Congress put few obstacles in the way of President Bush's conduct of war.²⁹ Similarly, Democrats in Congress have not allowed many votes on antiwar legislation since the inauguration of President Obama in 2009. Thus, given the paucity of bills that came

²⁴ See generally Kriner, *After the Rubicon* (cited in note 3).

²⁵ *Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists*, Pub Law No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001), codified at 50 USC § 1541; Library of Congress, *Thomas*, online at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107.SJ00023.@@@X> (visited Sept 19, 2011).

²⁶ *Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002*, Pub Law No 107-243, 116 Stat 1498 (2002), codified at 50 USC § 1541; online at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hres114enr/pdf/BILLS-107hres114enr.pdf> (visited Sept 19, 2011).

²⁷ Charles Tiefer, *Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?*, 42 Stan J Intl L 291, 291–92 (2006).

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ Kriner, *After the Rubicon* at 269–86 (cited in note 3).

to a vote in Congress, examining roll call votes in Congress—the most common method of assessing congressional position-taking on issues—would be a poor way to understand the nature of congressional opposition to war in the post-9/11 period. Instead, this Article examines the sponsors, cosponsors, and content of all antiwar legislation introduced from 2001 to 2011. This approach facilitates the investigation of the sources and causes of opposition to war in Congress, even if the vehicles of this opposition did not advance very far in the legislative process.

Data on antiwar legislation were gathered by searching the Thomas.gov web site hosted by the Library of Congress.³⁰ The database was searched for legislation containing any of fifteen key terms.³¹ Four research assistants read each piece of legislation identified by this search to determine if it was antiwar in nature. Legislation was labeled as antiwar if it appeared to have the intent to impede the ability of the president to carry out military actions or if it was intended to express disapproval of those actions, or war in general. If any reader marked the legislation as potentially antiwar, then the legislation was placed on a list for further discussion. All the legislation on this list was then discussed among all readers (as well as the author of the study) to reach consensus on the final list. For each of the 131 pieces of legislation reaching the final list (which is provided in the Appendix), the sponsors and cosponsors of the legislation were recorded. The provisions of each piece of legislation were coded into one or more of thirteen substantive categories.³²

The sponsorship/cosponsorship data were compiled on a member-by-member basis. Using these data, the determinants of sponsorship/cosponsorship of antiwar legislation can be assessed. Further, the legislative progress of each piece of legislation was recorded. The following sections report the results of statistical analysis of these data.

³⁰ Library of Congress, *Thomas*, online at <http://thomas.gov/> (visited Sept 11, 2011).

³¹ The terms were: armed forces and national security, Afghanistan, civil liberties, Department of Defense, detention of persons, Iraq, military agreements, military bases, military intervention, military operations, military personnel, military policy, military withdrawal, National Guard and Reserves, and war crimes.

³² The thirteen categories were: immediate withdrawal, withdrawal by specific date, no escalation of troops, no permanent bases, redeployment of troops away from war zone, condemn doctrine of preemption, alter institutional powers for peace, require Iraqi approval for US actions, adopt policies to stabilize Iraq, focus on diplomatic relations, censuring of American Leadership, no war on Iran, and other provisions.

III. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION

Each bill presented for consideration in the US Congress has one unique sponsor. Since the mid-1930s in the Senate and 1967 in the House, members of Congress have been permitted to cosponsor legislation by adding their names to a bill in order to indicate support.³³ Cosponsorship is a common practice, with over half of all bills having at least one cosponsor.³⁴ However, cosponsorship is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a member ultimately to support legislation on the floor. Non-cosponsors may vote in favor of a bill, while cosponsors may withdraw their support at the last minute. A cosponsored bill might never come up for a vote. Rather than indicating solid commitments, cosponsorship is better understood as a low-cost method for members to signal policy positions to their constituents or other members.³⁵ Cosponsorship may also be a way for members to attempt to manipulate Congress's agenda in favor of their preferences.³⁶ Thus, examining sponsorship and cosponsorship is a particularly effective way to assess support for legislation that is unlikely to be voted on by the entire chamber, as was the case for much antiwar legislation between 2001 and 2011.

Most members of Congress did not sponsor or cosponsor antiwar legislation in the 107th Congress (2001–2003). In those years, forty members each sponsored or cosponsored one piece of antiwar legislation, twenty-four members each supported two pieces, and three members each got behind three pieces. 475 members, which constituted an overwhelming majority (88 percent), supported no antiwar legislation at all. The antiwar cause grew in the ensuing years, reaching a peak of support in the 110th Congress (2007–2009). During that Congress, eighty-one members each sponsored or cosponsored one piece of antiwar legislation, fifty-six members each supported two pieces, and 149 members each signed on to three or more pieces of antiwar legislation. At the maximum, two members each sponsored or cospon-

³³ James E. Campbell, *Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress*, 7 *Legis Stud Q* 415, 415 (1982).

³⁴ Rick K. Wilson and Cheryl D. Young, *Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress*, 22 *Legis Stud Q* 25, 40 (1997).

³⁵ David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* 61 n 105 (Yale 1974) (see discussion of cosponsorship in footnote); Daniel Kessler and Keith Krehbiel, *Dynamics of Cosponsorship*, 90 *Am Polit Sci Rev* 555, 563 (1996).

³⁶ See Gregory Koger, *Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House*, 28 *Legis Stud Q* 225, 241 (2003); Jeffrey C. Talbert and Matthew Potoski, *Setting the Legislative Agenda: The Dimensional Structure of Bill Cosponsoring and Floor Voting*, 64 *J Polit* 864, 865 (2002).

sored twenty antiwar initiatives. Slightly less than a majority of 263 members (48 percent) did not back any antiwar legislation. What accounts for this variation?

This Section reports the results of three regression models that explain why members of Congress sponsored or cosponsored antiwar legislation. The dependent variable in these models is the count of the number of times, per Congress, that a member sponsored or cosponsored antiwar legislation. This measure provides a useful (though imperfect) indication of the strength of a member's public opposition to war. Members sponsoring/cosponsoring more antiwar bills/resolutions are assumed to take a stronger public antiwar stance than members sponsoring/cosponsoring fewer bills/resolutions.³⁷

The regressions are estimated using negative binomial regression models. This approach is appropriate when the dependent variable is a count of something that has zero values occurring frequently.³⁸ Model 1 examines the count of all sponsorships and cosponsorships by all members of the 107th through 111th Congresses (2001 to 2011). Models 2 and 3 break the results down by political party. Model 2 examines only Democrats for the 107th through 111th Congresses. Model 3 examines only Republicans for the 110th Congress (2007 to 2009), which was the only Congress in this period during which Republicans sponsored/cosponsored a significant number of antiwar bills. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using random effects negative binomial models with bootstrap standard errors, due to the panel nature of the data.³⁹ Model 3 is estimated with a standard negative binomial model because the data involve only one Congress and, thus, do not constitute a panel.

Each model contains four sets of independent variables: (1) partisanship and ideology, (2) Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) position in Congress, and (4) personal characteristics. The partisanship and ideology variables include whether a member is a Democrat or not (scored 1 or 0), whether or not the member is of the same party as the president, and the degree to which the member has

³⁷ This measure is imperfect because members may choose to express their opposition to war, for example, by making strong speeches against war instead of cosponsoring legislation. Or, they may choose to cosponsor weak antiwar bills/resolutions. However, the assumption behind using the measure is that these other indicators of opposition to war are likely to correlate highly with sponsorship/cosponsorship of legislation.

³⁸ Joseph M. Hilbe, *Negative Binomial Regression*, 4-6 (Cambridge 2d ed 2007).

³⁹ *Id.* at 478. The data are "panel data" because there are repeated observations of individual members of Congress, with some members of Congress appearing in all five Congresses.

a liberal ideology (scored from -1.315—extremely conservative—to 0.778—extremely liberal).⁴⁰ The Iraq and Afghanistan variables include total deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan (per Congress),⁴¹ percent of the public against war in Iraq (per Congress),⁴² and whether or not (1 or 0) the member voted in favor of the Iraq War (HJ Res 114).⁴³ The position-in-Congress variables include whether a member is in the House of Representatives (=1) or the Senate (=0), whether or not the member is party of her party's leadership (scored 1 or 0), whether or not a member serves on the Armed Services Committee or the Veterans' Affairs Committee (scored 1 for membership, or 0), and seniority as indicated by the number of Congresses of which she has been a member.⁴⁴ The personal characteristics variables included gender (female=1, male=0), race (black/African American=1, non-black=0), ethnicity (Latino/Hispanic=1, non-Latino=0), and military veteran status (veteran=1, nonveteran=0).

The estimates of the three models are reported in Table 1. The estimates of Model 1 provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that Democrats are more supportive of antiwar legislation than are Republicans. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant. This result implies that being a Democrat increases the expected number of antiwar bills/resolutions that a member sponsors/consponsors.⁴⁵ Republicans may sponsor/cosponsor legislation against war, but they do so less often than Democrats, other things equal.

The estimates of Models 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that members are less likely to support antiwar legislation when their

⁴⁰ Royce Carroll, et al, *DW-NOMINATE Scores With Bootstrapped Standard Errors* (2011), online at <http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp> (visited Sept 11, 2011). Ideology is measured using members' roll call votes. For an explanation of this method, see generally Royce Carroll, et al, *Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap* 17 *Polit Anal* 261 (2009). For ease of interpretation, the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores have been multiplied by -1 in order to reverse the interpretation of the variable from "conservative" ideology to "liberal" ideology.

⁴¹ US Department of Defense, *Military Casualty Information* (2011), online at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm> (visited Sept 11, 2011).

⁴² Gallup, *Iraq* online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx> (visited Sept 19, 2011).

⁴³ Clerk of the US House of Representatives, *Final Vote Results for Roll Call 455*, online at <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll455.xml> (visited Sept 11, 2011).

⁴⁴ United States Congress, *Official Congressional Directory* (US Government Printing Office 2001–2011).

⁴⁵ This variable is excluded from Models 2 and 3 because party membership does not vary in these models: all cases of the regression are either Democrats (Model 2) or Republicans (Model 3).

party controls the White House. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant in Model 1, indicating that all members are subject to this effect, regardless of their party membership. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant in Model 2, indicating that this effect applies specifically in the case of Democrats: when Barack Obama became President, Democrats became significantly less likely to sponsor or cosponsor antiwar legislation.⁴⁶ Thus, these results provide statistical support that members of Congress tend to abandon their party's typical position on war if doing so allows them to help their copartisan in the White House or score political points if their partisan opponent occupies the White House.

The estimates of Models 2 and 3 support the hypothesis that backing of antiwar legislation is more likely to come from relatively more liberal (or less conservative) members of both the Democratic and Republican caucuses. The coefficient on the liberal ideology variable is positive and statistically significant in both equations.⁴⁷ Thus, intensely liberal Democrats are the ones that are more likely to support the antiwar cause, while relatively more moderate/conservative Democrats are less likely to sponsor/cosponsor antiwar legislation. In the Republican Party, strongly conservative members are less likely to oppose war, while relatively more moderate/liberal members are more likely to support antiwar legislation. Overall, the regression results of the three models reported in Table 1 support the argument that there are significant connections between partisanship and congressional positions on questions of war and peace.

In addition to examining the statistical effects of partisanship and ideology, it is essential to control for the effects of potential confounding variables. For example, it is possible that a statistical effect seemingly due to Democratic Party membership is, in fact, due to gender, race, or another variable that correlates with party membership. Thus, by controlling for these factors in the regression, it is possible to reduce the chances that the conclusions about partisanship drawn from the regression are the spurious result of other causes.

⁴⁶ This variable is excluded from Model 3 because party membership does not vary among the cases of this Republican-only regression.

⁴⁷ This variable is excluded from Model 1 because of the high degree of correlation ($=0.9377$) between ideology and party membership. This correlation causes strong multicollinearity, which makes it difficult to estimate the effects of party and ideology separately. The effects of ideology are thus better understood *within* parties than *across* parties.

TABLE 1. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS ON ANTIWAR
LEGISLATIVE SPONSORSHIP/COSPONSORSHIP IN CONGRESS,
2001-2011

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable: Count of Antiwar Sponsorships/ Cosponsorships per Member per Congress		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	All Members 107 th -111 th Congresses 2001-11	Democrats 107 th -111 th Congresses 2001-11	Republicans 110 th Congress 2007-09
	Coefficient (Bootstrap Standard Error)		
Partisanship and Ideology			
<i>Democrat</i> = 1	1.9012*** (0.1888)		
<i>Same Party as President</i> = 1	-0.8858*** (0.0567)	-0.9223*** (0.0575)	
<i>Liberal Ideology</i>		6.6391*** (0.3454)	3.6169* (1.4244)
Iraq and Afghanistan			
<i>Total Deaths in Iraq and Afghani stan</i> (per Congress)	0.0005*** (0.0001)	0.0004*** (0.0000)	
<i>Percent of Public Against War in Iraq</i> (per Congress)	0.0685*** (0.0044)	0.0749*** (0.0054)	
<i>Voted in Favor of Iraq War</i> (HJRes114) = 1	-1.0006*** (0.1400)	-0.2943 (0.1637)	0.0219 (0.4478)
Position in Congress			
<i>Member of House of Representatives</i> = 1	0.7047*** (0.1936)	0.9730*** (0.1320)	0.2432 (0.3909)
<i>Member of Party Leadership</i> = 1	0.0352 (0.1297)	0.0457 (0.1131)	-0.9274* (0.4522)
<i>Member of Armed Services Committee</i> = 1	-0.0663 (0.1559)	0.2026 (0.1568)	-0.2397 (0.3643)
<i>Member of Veterans' Affairs Committee</i> = 1	0.0196 (0.1869)	0.0503 (0.1785)	0.5315 (5.7544)
<i>Seniority in Number of Congresses Served</i>	0.0670*** (0.0128)	-0.0140 (0.0121)	0.1004 (0.0564)

Table continued on next page.

TABLE 1 CONTINUED. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS ON
ANTIWAR LEGISLATIVE SPONSORSHIP/COSPONSORSHIP IN
CONGRESS, 2001–2011

Personal Characteristics			
<i>Sex/Gender is Female</i> = 1	0.4664*** (0.1346)	0.2080 (0.1115)	-0.1672 (0.6031)
<i>Race is Black/African American</i> = 1	0.7529*** (0.1281)	0.2612** (0.0981)	
<i>Ethnicity is Latino/Hispanic</i> = 1	-0.1607 (0.1928)	-0.2036 (0.1634)	14.2740*** (3.5922)
<i>Military Veteran</i> = 1	0.2071 (0.1785)	0.1200 (0.1365)	0.0492 (0.3154)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.7537*** (0.4956)	6.0304*** (0.5105)	0.1142 (0.6485)
ρ	6.1301*** (1.5355)	14.9156*** (3.3430)	
σ	0.9909*** (0.1104)	3.6906*** (0.7883)	
α			1.7449 (6.9578)
Data Format	Panel	Panel	Cross Section
Sample Size (N)	2,719	1,380	256
Mean of the Dependent Variable	1.0029	1.855797	0.3750
Log Likelihood	-2,289.6467	-1,791.6098	185.0596
χ^2	4,977.43***	2,041.89***	39.86***
Degrees of Freedom	14	14	10

Note: * $p \leq 0.050$, ** $p \leq 0.010$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

The first set of control variables account for the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, public reactions to that situation, and positions that members have taken on the Iraq War. Members of Congress are likely to be sensitive to battle deaths in lending their support to war.⁴⁸ Consistent with this concern, Models 1 and 2 show that support for antiwar positions significantly in-

⁴⁸ Kriner, *After the Rubicon* at 243 (cited in note 3).

creases with the rise in casualties among US service members.⁴⁹ Politicians are similarly sensitive to public opinion about war.⁵⁰ The results reveal that sponsorships/cosponsorships increase positively and significantly as public opinion turns against war.⁵¹ Finally, individual members are constrained by their own prior positions on war. All three models include a variable that indicates whether or not the member voted for (=1) or did not vote for (=0) the resolution to use force in Iraq. It was possible to vote in favor of this resolution only if the member was serving in Congress on October 16, 2002. As a result, any person joining Congress after this date is scored as a zero on this variable. The expectation is that having voted in favor of the Iraq War serves as a constraint on members' willingness to support antiwar legislation, as opposing the war at a later date may make them appear inconsistent, even if the factual situation about the war changes over time. Consistent with this expectation, the results of Model 1 show the expected significant, negative relationship: having voted to authorize the Iraq War makes it less likely that a member will join the antiwar cause. This effect is not present in Models 2 and 3, however, where the data are split according to party. This finding suggests that members may be influenced more by their party membership in sponsoring/cosponsoring legislation than by their earlier vote on the use of force in Iraq.

The second set of control variables examines the effects of members' positions in Congress on their sponsorship/cosponsorship. The results of Model 1 show that members of the House of Representatives sponsor/cosponsor more antiwar legislation than members of the Senate, which is largely due to the different sizes of the chambers, with 100 members in the Senate and 435 members in the House. This finding holds in Model 2 when only Democrats are examined, but the estimates of Model 3 suggest that the relative size of the chambers does not matter for sponsorship/cosponsorship by Republicans. The results of Models 1 and 2 show that being a member of the party leadership does

⁴⁹ This variable is not included in Model 3 because casualties are measured per Congress, but there is only one Congress (the 110th) included in Model 3.

⁵⁰ Adam J. Berinsky, *In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq* 192 (Chicago 2009).

⁵¹ It is important to consider whether this result may have been created by reverse causation. That is, could public opinion in this case have been caused by congressional action? Indeed, it is reasonable to hypothesize that public opinion may be shaped by significant legislation passed by Congress. However, in this case, Congress took no action against war. Since it is unlikely that a substantial percentage of the public was aware of members' sponsorships/cosponsorships, the possibility of reverse causation is implausible.

not matter for the Congress as a whole or for Democrats only, but Model 3 reveals that members of the Republican Party leadership are significantly less likely to sponsor/cosponsor antiwar legislation than are rank-and-file Republicans. Holding a seat on the Armed Services or Veterans Affairs committees does not matter in any of the estimated models. Seniority is a significant, positive predictor of sponsorship/cosponsorship for the Congress as a whole but no longer appears significant when the data are split by party.⁵²

The final set of control variables takes into account the potential effect of personal characteristics on sponsorship/cosponsorship behavior. Women appear significantly more likely to sponsor/cosponsor legislation when examining the Congress as a whole, but this variable loses its significance when the data are split by party.⁵³ African Americans display a greater willingness to sponsor/cosponsor legislation in Models 1 and 2, though this coefficient cannot be estimated in the Republican-only equation, since there were no African-American Republican members of the 110th Congress. Latino ethnicity reduced the likelihood of supporting the antiwar cause among Republicans (in Model 3) but made no difference among Democrats or Congress as a whole. Military veteran status did not affect the propensity to sponsor/cosponsor legislation in any of the three models.

Overall, the regression analysis highlights the power of political parties in affecting congressional resistance to war. Democrats are much more likely to support antiwar legislation than are Republicans, though the election of a Democratic president in 2008 reduced Democratic willingness to back the antiwar cause. Although some Democrats still supported antiwar legislation after the election of Obama, the center of this support collapsed in the 111th Congress. However, partisanship was not the only factor that determined members' responses to war. US battle deaths, public opinion, and members' previous commitments on war mattered, as did gender, race, and ethnicity. The next section reports on how partisanship affected the progress of antiwar legislation in Congress over the 2001–2011 period.

⁵² The seniority effect vanishes in Model 2 and 3 because of the introduction of the ideology variable in these models. Seniority is correlated with ideology, with the more senior Democrats more likely to hail from the liberal wing of the party and more senior Republicans more likely to identify with the conservative wing of the party. Thus, the inclusion of the ideology variable suppresses the statistical effect of seniority.


⁵³ The statistical significance of the gender effect disappears from the regression when the data are split by party because of the correlation between gender and party membership.

IV. PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE DYNAMICS

The previous Section explains the role of partisanship in the decisions of individual members of Congress to sponsor/cosponsor antiwar legislation or not. This Section considers the effect of partisan politics on the overall pattern of development of antiwar legislation in Congress. First, it looks at trends in the introduction, sponsorship, and cosponsorship of legislation. Second, it reports on the progress of legislation in committees and on the floor of the House and Senate. Third, it maps the evolution of networks of legislative sponsorship/cosponsorship. Each of these trends reveals the importance of partisan politics in the unfolding of antiwar legislation.

Members of Congress may introduce antiwar legislation because of their sincere opposition to war or because they want to convey an antiwar stance to their constituents and other political actors. However, the likelihood of success of the legislation may be a factor in determining whether or not to introduce it. Since parties take strong stands on this issue, it may be advisable for members to look to the partisan composition of Congress and the party of the president in deciding whether or not to introduce a bill. The data reported in Figure 1, which tracks the volume of antiwar legislation in Congress over time, strongly suggests that members do, indeed, pay close attention to the partisan balance in Congress when making these decisions.

FIGURE 1. VOLUME OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS, 2001–2011



Republican control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress for most of the 107th through 109th Congresses made it highly unlikely that antiwar bills would progress much during this period. Figure 1 reveals that, in keeping with this expectation, members of Congress introduced fewer than thirty antiwar bills per year during those years. All but one of these bills were sponsored by Democrats. The Democrats' capture of both houses of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections changed this calculus. Democrats had ridden the wave of antiwar sentiment to achieve a governing majority.⁵⁴ Thus, there was reason to believe that antiwar legislation stood a chance in the 110th Congress. Democrats introduced sixty-six pieces of legislation with antiwar content. Seeking to have a voice in this emerging issue, Republicans introduced ten bills with antiwar content in the 110th Congress. However, after the election of a Democrat as president in 2008, the introduction of antiwar legislation plummeted to its lowest level since the period immediately following 9/11. Democrats introduced only eleven antiwar bills in the 111th Congress, with Republicans introducing none. Even though the Democrats still controlled both chambers of the 111th Congress, changing war policy through legislation was less a part of the Democrats' political strategy with Barack Obama in the White House.

Introducing legislation allows members of Congress to express their positions on issues that might not come up for a vote and signal to their constituents that they are "doing something" about the matters that concern them. Nonetheless, legislation generally has a greater impact on policy if it actually becomes law than if it merely is logged in the *Congressional Record*.⁵⁵ To determine the impact of legislation, it is essential to examine its progress through Congress. To that end, the data reported in Figure 2 document the progress of antiwar legislation.


Antiwar legislation did not make much progress in Congress during the 107th through 109th Congresses. As indicated in Figure 2, the Republican leadership did not allow committee meet-

⁵⁴ Gartner and Segura, 41 PS Polit Sci Polit at 95 (cited in note 9).

⁵⁵ Legislation which is introduced, but not enacted into law, may influence public policy if it receives a great deal of support from within Congress. The expression of support signals the salience of the issue to other political actors, such as the president, who may wish to preempt future congressional action by resolving the issue administratively. See William G. Howell, *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action* 107–09 (Princeton 2003); William Howell and Douglas Kriner, *Power Without Persuasion: Identifying Executive Influence*, in Bert A. Rockman and Richard W. Waterman, eds, *Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power* 105–44 (Oxford 2008). See also Kenneth R. Mayer, *With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power* 155 (Princeton 2001).

ings on antiwar legislation or allow votes on the floor, except in a small handful of cases. Not a single antiwar bill was passed by Congress. The situation changed noticeably in the 110th Congress with the resurgence of Democratic control. Sixteen antiwar bills were discussed in committee meetings, five were voted on in the House, and four passed the House.⁵⁶ None of these bills passed the Senate, preventing them from becoming law. By the 111th Congress, the Democratic leadership lost its interest in advancing antiwar legislation. Indeed, rates of consideration and passage of antiwar legislation returned to the levels during the period of Republican control. Democrats in Congress had no plans to tie President Obama's hands in dealing with Iraq or Afghanistan.

FIGURE 2. PROGRESS OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS, 2001–2011



The evolution of partisan support for antiwar legislation can be understood more clearly by mapping the network of support for legislation over time. Network analysis is a method of visualizing the patterns of support for cosponsored legislation.⁵⁷ In the

⁵⁶ The bills that passed the House were: 1. H CON RES 63, a resolution disapproving of the decision of the president announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional US combat troops to Iraq; 2. HR 2929, a bill to limit the use of funds to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of US Armed Forces in Iraq; 3. HR 2956, the Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act; and 4. HR 4156, Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008.

⁵⁷ See generally James H. Fowler, *Legislative Cosponsorship Networks in the US House and Senate*, 28 Soc Net 454 (2006); James H. Fowler, *Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks*, 14 Polit Anal 456 (2006); Wendy K. Tam Cho and

five figures that follow, the connections between members of Congress and legislation are mapped for each of the five Congresses in this study (107th through 111th). In these figures, black squares represent bills, white circles represent Democratic members of Congress, and gray circles represent Republican members of Congress. The existence of a line between a circle and a square means that a member of Congress (circle) has sponsored/cosponsored a piece of legislation (square). The graphs are drawn using an algorithm that places circles close to one another if they are connected with the same squares and places squares close to one another if they are connected with the same circles.⁵⁸ The most central⁵⁹ pieces of legislation are identified in each graph with labels for their bill numbers.

The network of antiwar legislation from the 107th Congress is represented in Figure 3. This network includes six bills—five from the House and one from the Senate, which is a relatively small amount of legislative activity. The most popular bills/resolutions were HR 2459, H Con Res 473, HJ Res 110, and S Con Res 133. HR 2459 was a resolution introduced by Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) to create a Department of Peace, a longstanding cause of the Congressman. H Con Res 473 was a resolution introduced by Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), which was perhaps the first comprehensive statement by antiwar voices within Congress. It “express[ed] the sense of Congress with respect to the importance of the United States [sic] working through the United Nations to assure Iraq’s compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and advance peace and security in the Persian Gulf region.”⁶⁰ HJ Res 110 was a resolution introduced by Congressman Alcee Hastings (D-FL) that would have required the United States to obtain sanction from the United Nations Security Council before attacking Iraq. S Con Res 133 was a resolution introduced by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should not attack Iraq without explicit authorization

James H. Fowler, *Legislative Success in a Small World: Social Network Analysis and the Dynamics of Congressional Legislation*, 72 J Polit 124 (2010).


⁵⁸ See generally Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman, *Ucinet 6.221 for Windows* (Analytic Technologies 2009).

⁵⁹ The “betweenness” measure of centrality is used, which is calculated on the basis of the number of shortest paths between a piece of legislation and a specific legislator in the network. For an explanation of this procedure, see generally Linton C. Freeman, *Centrality in Social Networks: I. Conceptual Clarification*, 1 Soc Net 215 (1978/1979).

⁶⁰ Library of Congress, *Thomas* at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.CON.RES.473>: (visited Sept 19, 2011).

from a vote of the US Congress. In the House, HJ Res 110 drew on a different coalition of support than HR 2459 and H Con Res 473. H J Res 110 used more bellicose language than the other two bills, as, in principle, it would have authorized war if certain (highly unlikely) conditions were met by the president. This language appealed to more hawkish members of the Democratic caucus but was unpalatable to the relatively liberal Democrats who signed on to HR 2459 and H Con Res 473, which explains its comparative isolation from the rest of the network. On the whole, the network displays a fledgling opposition to war that had only begun to gather strength.


FIGURE 3. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS



The network of antiwar legislation from the 108th Congress is represented in Figure 4. This network is notably larger than the networks of the 107th Congress because antiwar voices in

Congress grew louder. A series of additional proposals were put forward, creating a core in the center of the network. The network was still overwhelmingly Democratic in orientation, as indicated by the dominance of white circles in the figure. The lone gray circle in this figure indicates that Republican Congressman Ron Paul joined the network by cosponsoring HJ Res 20, a resolution to repeal the authorization for use of military force against Iraq. At the core of this network were a series of proposals that challenged President Bush's approach to Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism. The emergence of this core reflected the coalescence of war opposition within Congress.


FIGURE 4. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN THE 108TH CONGRESS



The most central antiwar proposal in the 108th Congress was H Con Res 392, which called for a multilateral response to terrorism. Other key pieces of legislation were HR 1673, which would have established a Department of Peace, and H Res 640,

which addressed torture at Abu Ghraib. In the Senate, S Res 28, which sought to allow United Nations weapons inspectors more time to do their work, gained the support of nine senators. These bills/resolutions sprouted from a mix of longstanding proposals (such as the Department of Peace) as well as efforts to respond to emerging problems (such as the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib).

FIGURE 5. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS



The network of antiwar legislation from the 109th Congress is represented in Figure 5. This graph reflects the increased density of the network resulting from a 40 percent increase in proposed legislation. Members of Congress were likely emboldened by a number of visible missteps by the Bush Administration and decreasing public support for war. This network is no longer homogeneously Democratic, with eight Republicans joining Democrats in the antiwar cause. However, Republicans largely con-

fined their involvement to the periphery of the Democrats' antiwar efforts, rather than coalescing around proposals of their own. The most central antiwar proposals in the House were HR 3760, to establish a Department of Peace, HJ Res 73, to redeploy US forces from Iraq, and H Con Res 197, opposing the formation of permanent US military bases in Iraq. Although several bills were introduced by war opponents in the Senate, none managed to attract a significant following during this Congress.

The network of antiwar legislation from the 110th Congress is represented in Figure 6. The contrast between this network and the network from the 107th Congress (in Figure 3) is quite striking. In response to the Democrats' reclaiming of the House and Senate, the network expanded dramatically to encompass slightly more than half the Congress. While the network still had an overwhelming Democratic majority, over fifty Republicans cosponsored antiwar legislation.

Rather than work only at the margins of Democratic efforts, some Republicans also forged their own proposals in the 110th Congress. Most of these Republicans signed on to HR 2574, sponsored by Mark Udall (D-CO), which sought to implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.⁶¹ These recommendations included shoring up diplomatic relations in Iraq and redeploying US combat brigades by early 2008. As is clear from the lower right corner of Figure 6, HR 2574 not only attracted many Republican cosponsors, it also attracted Democratic cosponsors who did not support most of the other antiwar legislation that was introduced in the 110th Congress. As such, HR 2574 was an effort to find a middle ground in the debate over ending the Iraq War.


The core of Democratic opposition to war in the House during the 110th Congress was represented by HR 2929 and HJ Res 18. HR 2929 sought to prevent the United States from establishing permanent military bases in Iraq, while HJ Res 18 called for the redeployment of US forces from Iraq. Democratic opposition in the Senate gelled around SJ Res 9, which also called for redeployment of US forces out of Iraq. Limited Republican opposition in the Senate emerged on the periphery of the antiwar network.

The network of antiwar legislation from the 111th Congress is represented in Figure 7. This figure depicts the collapse of an-

⁶¹ James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, and the Iraq Study Group, *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward - A New Approach* (United States Institute of Peace 2006), online at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-iraq_study_group.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2011).

central bills in the House were HR 1052, which attempted to limit the deployment of troops to combat zones; HR 5015, which proposed to redeploy forces out of Afghanistan; and HR 2404, which called for the Secretary of Defense to submit a report outlining an exit strategy from Afghanistan.

FIGURE 7. SPONSORSHIP AND COSPONSORSHIP OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION IN THE 111TH CONGRESS



Legend

- Democratic Member of Congress
- Republican Member of Congress
- Legislation
- Sponsorship or Cosponsorship of Legislation

The power of parties and their role in shaping opposition is illustrated by the developments in antiwar legislation reported in this Section. Not only does partisanship shape which legislators sponsor/cosponsor legislation (as demonstrated in the previous Section), but partisan power is critical to the timing and progress of legislation. The antiwar cause was a relatively minor force in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. Fewer than thirty bills were introduced in each of these Congresses, and these bills made little progress either in committees or on the floor. However, once the Democrats assumed control of the 110th Con-

gress, antiwar legislation was considered much more seriously in committees and on the floor. Once a Democratic president was elected, however, the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate no longer directed their energies toward antiwar legislation. The Democrats no doubt would have faced difficulties in passing antiwar legislation in the 111th Congress, had they attempted earnestly to do so. Centrist Democrats (the so-called "Blue Dogs") would have raised obstacles in the House, while passing anything over a filibuster in the Senate would have been a challenge.⁶² Nonetheless, the odds of passage were higher in the 111th Congress than in the 110th Congress. Yet, ironically, Democrats abandoned antiwar legislation once they had greater potential to actually pass it.

Networks of antiwar legislation reveal the role of partisanship beyond what can be understood simply by counting pieces of legislation. Democratic partisanship structured opposition to war around certain legislation. Republicans joined the effort to end the Iraq War in the 110th Congress. However, they did so on the periphery of the larger antiwar coalition organized mostly by liberal Democrats. Once Barack Obama became President, peripheral opposition dissolved, leaving little more than the hardcore liberal members of the Democratic Party to oppose the wars. Support for parties—whether induced by judicious trust in co-partisans, pure loyalty, or some other reason—not only defines whether, but also when and how, members of Congress raise their voices against war.

V. THE SUBSTANCE OF ANTIWAR LEGISLATION

The nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan changed dramatically from 2001 to 2011. US policy evolved from pending invasions, to prosecuting active wars, to managing occupations, to seeking viable exit strategies, with some nonlinear back-and-forth among these conditions. Likewise, the substance of congressional opposition to war varied with changing conditions and US policy. Examination of the substance of congressional proposals to oppose war highlights the limits of Congress's capacity to challenge the commander in chief of the armed forces. Congress is constrained by the mandate given by the Constitution to the president, the informational advantages of the executive, and public opinion. At the same time, the substance of antiwar pro-

⁶² Gregory Koger, *Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate* 3 (Chicago 2010).

posals varied with the alignment between the party of the president and control of congressional majorities in Congress.

This Section considers the variation in antiwar proposals over time. Even if legislation is introduced by its sponsors for largely symbolic purposes, tracking changes in the substantive content reveals much about the contours of the debate on the issue in Congress. Table 2 reports the substantive evolution of antiwar legislative provisions. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, during the 107th Congress, members of Congress chose to tread lightly in their introduction of antiwar proposals. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan both enjoyed high levels of public support at that time.⁶³ Members of Congress chose to limit their opposition to condemnation of the doctrine of preemption—which holds that the United States has the right to attack nations that are preparing to attack it before they do so—and calls for institutional powers for peace, diplomacy, and stabilization of Iraq.⁶⁴ These mild proposals might be expected from a “loyal opposition” during wartime. Antiwar proposals became more common during the 108th Congress. They followed a similar substantive focus as those of the 107th Congress, though proposals placed a greater emphasis on the condemning of the doctrine of preemption. With public opinion turning against the war and the situation on the ground beginning to deteriorate, members of Congress were more willing to take a stronger stand against the war than they had been in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

The US military occupation of Iraq faced troubled times in 2005 and 2006.⁶⁵ With a rising insurgency and increasing US battle deaths, public opinion turned more solidly against the war. In an effort to respond to a shifting public mood, war opponents offered a wider range of antiwar proposals in the 109th Congress than they had in previous years. Three resolutions called for an “immediate” withdrawal, while six resolutions called for withdrawal by a specific date or on a timetable prescribed by Congress. However, the most frequently advanced proposal in the 109th Congress adopted more cautious language. Seeking to avoid the potential negative connotation associated with the word “withdrawal,” eight bills proposed to “redeploy”

⁶³ Berinsky, *In Time of War* at 28, 32 (cited in note 50).

⁶⁴ See, for example, HR 2459, online at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107s2459is/pdf/BILLS-107s2459is.pdf> (visited Sept 19, 2011).

⁶⁵ See generally Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (Yale 2007).

troops away from war zones.⁶⁶ Members of Congress began to introduce legislation to block the establishment of permanent US military bases in Iraq. Various other provisions emerged in these years, such as resolutions to stop plans for a war on Iran, censure American leadership, and require Iraqi approval for a continued American military presence in Iraq. Thus, while the 109th Congress reflected only a marginal increase in the volume of legislation over the 108th Congress, the content of antiwar legislation underwent a qualitative shift that reflected a more aggressive antiwar agenda.

TABLE 2. PROVISIONS IN ANTIWAR LEGISLATION BY CONGRESS, 2001–2011

Provision Type	Number of Bills per Congress				
	107 th Congress 2001-03	108 th Congress 2003-05	109 th Congress 2005-07	110 th Congress 2007-09	111 th Congress 2009-11
Immediate Withdrawal	0	0	3	2	1
Withdrawal by Specific Date	0	0	6	26	6
No Escalation of Troops	0	0	0	24	2
No Permanent Bases	0	0	3	8	0
Redeployment of Troops away from War Zone	0	0	8	32	2
Condemn Doctrine of Preemption	1	8	2	6	1
Alter Institutional Powers for Peace	4	12	5	5	3
Require Iraqi Approval for US Actions	0	0	2	7	0
Adopt Policies to Stabilize Iraq	1	3	4	25	1
Focus on Diplomatic Relations	4	6	6	21	1
Censuring of American Leadership	0	1	4	6	0
No War on Iran	0	0	1	4	0
Other Provisions	0	2	2	1	0
Total Bills	6	20	28	76	11

Note: Bills were coded into as many provision types as relevant, so the sum of each column exceeds the total number of bills.

Source: Author's tabulations from Library of Congress, *Thom-*

⁶⁶ The term "redeployment" signals that the speaker still supports military power, but that this power is better used in another battlefield. Using "redeployment" makes it less likely that the advocate will seem weak or in favor of "surrender," than if the term "withdrawal" is used. For a discussion of how peace advocates moderate their language in order to avoid questions about their patriotism, see Lynne M. Woehrle, Patrick G. Coy, and Gregory M. Maney, *Contesting Patriotism: Culture, Power, and Strategy in the Peace Movement* (Rowman and Littlefield 2008).

as (cited in note 30).

The substance of antiwar proposals underwent another qualitative shift after the Democrats assumed control of the 110th Congress. The Democrats offered a governing challenge to the Bush Administration's management of Iraq. Proportionately less attention went to purely symbolic legislation—such as condemnations of the doctrine of preemption or censure of American leaders—and proportionately more attention was devoted to management issues. Commonly offered resolutions called for a greater focus on diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and stabilization policies in Iraq. The language of “redeployment” was used in thirty-two bills, more than any other category identified in the content analysis. In twenty-four bills, Congress directly challenged President Bush's proposed “surge” of troops in 2007.⁶⁷ The overall trends in legislative provisions suggest an increasing seriousness by Congress in taking control of the situation in Iraq.

Once Barack Obama moved into the White House, the volume of proposals attempting to manage the Iraq War from Congress declined. Afghanistan became the focus of the majority in the small number of antiwar proposals that were introduced, including resolutions to withdraw from Afghanistan or stop President Obama's planned surge there. The 111th Congress was less insistent about its institutional prerogatives in the war-making arena than its predecessor had been. The partisan alignment between the president and Congress was decisive in ending Democrats' push for peace legislation.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Partisanship pervades the congressional politics of war. Parties shape members' preferences on war and guide members' decision making on military policies. Members tend to support the president's war policies when they are of his party and oppose those policies when they are of the opposite party. The partisan composition of Congress influences the introduction of antiwar legislation, its content, progress, and networks that surround it. Although the Constitution mandates that Congress and the president share war-making powers, Congress is often willing to de-

⁶⁷ For a discussion of the politics of the surge, see generally Peter D. Feaver, *The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision*, 35 *Intl Sec* 87 (2011).

fer its war-making prerogatives when the president is of the same party as the congressional majority.

Members of the Democratic Party led the way in building opposition to the Iraq War in the 107th through 110th Congresses. They leveraged the issue to great effect, helping them to win control of Congress in 2006 and the Presidency in 2008. Yet, when the Democrats were finally positioned to make good on their promises of peace, they abandoned the crusade. This outcome is not just a story of how the Democrats failed to follow through on a campaign promise. Politicians breaking their campaign promises is very old news to anyone who studies politics. The notable story is that the Democrats' electoral victories made it likely that they would subsequently support their president's military adventures once he inevitably undertook them. The very nature of polarized partisan politics discourages members of Congress from scrutinizing the military decisions of their co-partisan in the White House.

The power of political parties comes from their ability to coordinate the actions of politicians across multiple institutions and political contexts. In the case of war and peace, coordination means deference to the president if he is of the same party. In light of parties' ability to exert such power, how should opponents of war respond? If winning elections is not enough, what political tactics are likely to advance the cause of peace?

First, there may be very little that peace advocates can do to counter the hegemony of political parties. With record levels of polarization between the two major parties at the mass level and the elite level in the United States, most political actors and citizens take their cues from parties, especially on issues of war and peace.⁶⁸ The president has considerable discretion as the commander in chief of the military, and history shows that he is inclined to use it. When he does, his party members in Congress and the public tend to support him. Adding to this tendency is the increasing herd mentality of media and the efforts of politicians to "win the news cycle" each day.⁶⁹ Since any dissension from the party line constitutes a major news story on any given day, members of Congress are under strong pressure to stick with the agenda of their party. While a few rogue Congress members may break away at any given time, the prospect of a

⁶⁸ See generally Kriner, *After the Rubicon* (cited in note 3); Jacobson, 125 *Polit Sci Q* 31 (cited in note 13); Berinsky, *In Time of War* (cited in note 50).

⁶⁹ Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, *Off Center: The Republican Revolution & the Erosion of American Democracy* 179 (Yale 2005).

supermajority of members opposing the president to stop military action seems unrealistic.

Second, in order to win short-term victories, peace advocates have to do more long-term coalition building in Congress. Advocates for peace relied heavily on the internal congressional caucus system for organizing their opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011.⁷⁰ The Progressive Caucus and the Out-of-Iraq Caucus were the principal vehicles of this organization most of the time.⁷¹ On May 18, 2010, John Conyers, Jr (D-MI) and twenty-eight other members of Congress formed the Out-of-Afghanistan Caucus as an additional organizing mechanism to press for peace.⁷² However, the membership of these caucuses never exceeded 100 members and, thus, could not sway the center of gravity of the Democratic Party in Congress. Achieving victories in the longer term could be aided by building the membership of these caucuses from within Congress, supporting the election of more sympathetic members to Congress, and creating a more robust infrastructure for generating policy analysis and argumentation. By building a progressive majority within the Democratic Party and assuming key positions of leadership within the party, peace advocates may be able to garner concessions from a hawkish Democratic White House, even if they do not win every debate. Alliances across party lines with libertarian and isolationist Republicans would strengthen this approach even further.

Third, successful congressional campaigns may be built not only from within Congress, but also in conjunction with broad grassroots movements.⁷³ A sizeable grassroots peace movement existed between 2003 and 2006, but its close ties with the Democratic Party led it to collapse after the Democrats achieved electoral success in 2006 and 2008, much the same as happened with

⁷⁰ For a discussion of the political role of congressional caucuses, see generally Susan Webb Hammond, *Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making* (John Hopkins 1998).

⁷¹ Author's interview with Bill Goold, Executive Director of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, United States House of Representatives, in Washington, DC (June 20, 2006) (on file with author); Author's interview with Representative Lynn Woolsey, United States House of Representatives, in Washington, DC (June 26, 2008) (on file with author).

⁷² John Conyers, Jr., *Out of Afghanistan Caucus*, online at http://conyers.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.Home&Issue_id=falc6003-19b9-b4b1-12a8-2ae6f1546bd5 (visited Sept 11, 2011).

⁷³ Ken Kollman, *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion & Interest Group Strategies* 3 (Princeton 1998); Kenneth M. Goldstein, *Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America* 3 (Cambridge 1999).

Democratic antiwar legislation in Congress.⁷⁴ In order to achieve sustained influence, movements must structure their opposition in a way that is orthogonal to the party system.⁷⁵ To do so, they must cultivate supporters among both major political parties and independents, as well as from among the myriad demographic constituencies that oppose war (for example, African Americans, Latinos). Greater emphasis on communicating policy expertise and facts to those broad publics would make it more difficult for politicians of either party to ignore public pressure.

The power of political parties on questions of war and peace is not immutable, but it is deeply integrated into the entire system of American politics and government. Politicians turn to parties because they provide reliable information, electoral coalitions, and opportunities for individual advancement. Individual citizens turn to parties because they provide reliable cues on how to interpret ambiguous information in an uncertain political world. In order to overcome the hegemony of parties, peace advocates must either offer alternative sources of information, coalitions, and opportunities, or they must convince party leaders that war is not in the interests of the party. Achieving either goal would be a major political accomplishment and would, no doubt, be part of a transformation of American politics and government into something that would be unrecognizable today. At the same time, achieving these goals would be a considerable step toward restoring Congress's constitutional role in genuinely sharing war-making powers with the president.

⁷⁴ Heaney and Rojas, 16 *Mobilization Intl J* at 46 (cited in note 8).

⁷⁵ For a historical accounting of how the Farm Bureau gained influence when it was able to establish itself as an independent, nonpartisan force, but then lost influence when it became too closely aligned with the Republican Party, see John Mark Hansen, *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981* (Chicago 1991).

APPENDIX. ANTIWAR LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS,
2001-2011

107 th Congress (2001-2003)	
H Con Res 473	Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the importance of the United States working through the United Nations to assure Iraq's compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and advance peace and security in the Persian Gulf region.
H Con Res 518	Expressing the sense of Congress that the deployment of United States Armed Forces against Iraq without prior specific authorization by the United Nations Security Council and specific congressional authorization pursuant to a declaration of war would constitute a violation of the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter and a violation of the United States Constitution, respectively.
HJ Res 110	Liberation of the Iraqi People Resolution.
HR 2459	To establish a Department of Peace.
HR 2503	Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 2001.
S Con Res 133	A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should not use force against Iraq, outside of the existing Rules of Engagement, without specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States.
108 th Congress (2003-2005)	
H Con Res 101	Expressing the sense of the Congress that Public Law 107-243, the authorization to use military force against Iraq, is null and void.
H Con Res 296	Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the President's \$87 billion supplemental appropriation request for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.
H Con Res 392	Calling for the adoption of a Sensible, Multilateral American Response to Terrorism ("SMART") Security Platform for the 21st Century.
H Res 141	Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.
H Con Res 2	Expressing the sense of Congress that the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 should be repealed.
HJ Res 20	To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
HJ Res 24	Presidential Report on Iraq Resolution of 2003.
HR 1673	To establish a Department of Peace.
HR 2647	Nuclear Disarmament and Economic Conversion Act of 2003.
HR 3132	War Funding Accountability Act of 2003.
HR 3616	Commission on Preemptive Foreign Policy and Military Planning Act.
HR 4825	Excess War Profits Act of 2004.

H Res 260	Requesting the President to transmit to the House of Representatives not later [than] 14 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution documents or other materials in the President's possession relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
H Res 629	Impeaching Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.
H Res 640	Of inquiry requesting that the Secretary of Defense transmit to the House of Representatives before the expiration of the 14-day period beginning on the date of the adoption of this resolution any picture, photograph, video, communication, or report produced in conjunction with any completed Department of Defense investigation conducted by Major General Antonio M. Taguba relating to allegations of torture or allegations of violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or any completed Department of Defense investigation relating to the abuse or alleged abuse of a prisoner of war or detainee by any civilian contractor working in Iraq who is employed on behalf of the Department of Defense.
SJ Res 9	Presidential Report on Iraq Resolution of 2003.
S Res 28	A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United Nations weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time for a thorough assessment of the level of compliance by the Government of Iraq with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and that the United States should seek a United Nations Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force before initiating any offensive military operations against Iraq.
S Res 32	A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the actions the President should take before any use of military force against Iraq without the broad support of the international community.
S Res 76	A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the policy of preemption, combined with a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, creates an incentive for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and is inconsistent with the long-term security of the United States.
S Res 479	A resolution establishing a special committee administered by the Committee on Governmental Affairs to conduct an investigation involving Halliburton Company and war profiteering, and other related matters.
109 th Congress (2005–2007)	
H Con Res 35	Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should develop and implement a plan to begin the immediate withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from Iraq.
H Con Res 197	Declaring that it is policy of the United States not to enter into any base agreement with the Government of Iraq that would lead to a permanent United States military presence in Iraq.
H Con Res 321	Providing that the new permanent Council of Representatives of Iraq is encouraged to debate and vote on whether or not a continued United States military presence in Iraq is desired by the Government of Iraq.
H Con Res 348	Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq.

H Con Res 391	Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran with respect to its nuclear program without first obtaining authorization from Congress.
H Con Res 470	Expressing the sense of Congress that Donald Rumsfeld should be replaced as Secretary of Defense.
HJ Res 55	Withdrawal of United States Armed Forces From Iraq Resolution of 2005—Homeward Bound.
HJ Res 70	Requiring the President to submit to Congress a plan for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and for other purposes.
HJ Res 73	To redeploy US Forces from Iraq.
HR 3760	Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.
HR 4232	End the War in Iraq Act of 2005.
HR 4853	Excess War Profits Act of 2006.
HR 4983	First Step to Redeployment Act of 2006.
HR 5875	Iraq War Powers Repeal Act of 2006.
H Res 82	Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.
H Res 571	Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the deployment of United States forces in Iraq be terminated immediately.
H Res 635	Creating a select committee to investigate the Administration's intent to go to war before congressional authorization, manipulation of pre-war intelligence, encouraging and countenancing torture, retaliating against critics, and to make recommendations regarding grounds for possible impeachment.
H Res 636	Censuring President George W. Bush for failing to respond to requests for information concerning allegations that he and others in his Administration misled Congress and the American people regarding the decision to go to war in Iraq, misstated and manipulated intelligence information regarding the justification for the war, countenanced torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in Iraq, and permitted inappropriate retaliation against critics of his Administration, for failing to adequately account for specific misstatements he made regarding the war, and for failing to comply with Executive Order 12958.
H Res 637	Censuring Vice President Richard B. Cheney for failing to respond to requests for information concerning allegations that he and others in the Administration misled Congress and the American people regarding the decision to go to war in Iraq, misstated and manipulated intelligence information regarding the justification for the war, countenanced torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of persons in Iraq, and permitted inappropriate retaliation against critics of the Administration, and for failing to adequately account for specific misstatements he made regarding the war.
H Res 990	Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the original authorization for use of force against Iraq contained in Public Law 107-243 is outdated and Congress should vote on a new use of force resolution that reflects the current situation in Iraq.
S 1756	Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.

S 1993	Strategy for Success in Iraq Act.
S 4049	A bill to provide for the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq by July 1, 2007.
S Con Res 93	Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to accomplishing the mission in Iraq.
SJ Res 33	A joint resolution to provide for a strategy for successfully empowering a new unity government in Iraq.
SJ Res 36	A joint resolution providing a strategy for stabilizing Iraq and withdrawing United States troops.
SJ Res 39	A joint resolution to spur a political solution in Iraq and encourage the people of Iraq to provide for their own security through the redeployment of the United States military forces.
S Res 171	A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to Congress a report on the time frame for the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq.
110 th Congress (2007–2009)	
H Con Res 23	Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not order an escalation in the total number of members of the United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq.
H Con Res 33	Expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress.
H Con Res 46	Declaring that it is the policy of the United States not to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq and not to exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.
H Con Res 63	Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.
H Con Res 65	Disagreeing with the plan announced by the President on January 10, 2007, to increase by more than 20,000 the number of United States combat troops in Iraq, and urging the President instead to consider options and alternatives for achieving success in Iraq.
H Con Res 110	Expressing the sense of Congress that Iraq should vote to approve or disapprove the continued deployment of United States Armed Forces to Iraq and, unless Iraq votes to approve such continued deployment, the President of the United States should commence the phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq within 60 days of the Iraqi vote.
H Con Res 201	Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq should schedule a referendum to determine whether or not the people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the United States to be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is restored to the country.

H Con Res 219	Expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of Iraq should schedule a referendum to determine whether or not the people of Iraq want the Armed Forces of the United States to be withdrawn from Iraq or to remain in Iraq until order is restored to the country.
H Con Res 319	Recognizing March 19, 2008, as the fifth anniversary of the Iraq war and urging President George W. Bush to begin an immediate and safe redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq.
HJ Res 18	To redeploy US forces from Iraq.
HJ Res 64	Clarifying that the use of force against Iran is not authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, any resolution previously adopted, or any other provision of law.
HR 353	To prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.
HR 413	To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243) and to require the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Iraq.
HR 438	To prohibit an escalation in the number of members of the United States Armed Forces deployed in Iraq.
HR 455	Protect the Troops and Bring Them Home Act of 2007.
HR 508	Bring the Troops Home and Iraq Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2007.
HR 645	Comprehensive Strategy for Iraq Act of 2007.
HR 663	New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007.
HR 746	Safe and Orderly Withdrawal from Iraq Act.
HR 787	Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007.
HR 808	Department of Peace and Nonviolence Act.
HR 930	Military Success in Iraq And Diplomatic Surge for National and Political Reconciliation in Iraq Act of 2007.
HR 960	Enhancing America's Security through Redeployment from Iraq Act.
HR 1263	Iraq Benchmarks Act.
HR 1292	To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), and for other purposes.
HR 1460	Change the Course in Iraq Act.
HR 1837	To require the President to develop a plan containing dates certain for the commencement and completion of a phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq, and for other purposes.
HR 2031	To safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq.
HR 2062	Iraq Troop Protection and Reduction Act of 2007.
HR 2237	To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and defense contractors from Iraq.

HR 2450	To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).
HR 2451	To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and defense contractors from Iraq.
HR 2539	National Guard Redeployment and Homeland Protection Act of 2007.
HR 2574	Iraq Study Group Recommendations Implementation Act of 2007.
HR 2605	Sunset of Public Law 107-243 Act of 2007.
HR 2929	To limit the use of funds to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq or to exercise United States economic control of the oil resources of Iraq.
HR 2956	Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act.
HR 3071	Iraq Redeployment and Regional Security Act.
HR 3125	Opt Out of Iraq War Act of 2007.
HR 3178	To limit the length of deployment of members of the Armed Forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
HR 3190	Opt Out of Iraq War Act of 2007.
HR 3863	Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act.
HR 3938	Bring Our Troops Home Responsibly Act of 2007.
HR 4156	Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008.
HR 5128	Disapproving of any formal agreement emerging from the "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America" unless the agreement is approved through an Act of Congress.
HR 5499	Iraq Redeployment Timetable and Political Reconciliation Act of 2008.
HR 5507	Fully-Funded United States Military Redeployment and Sovereignty of Iraq Restoration Act of 2008.
HR 5626	Protect Our Troops and Our Constitution Act of 2008.
H Res 23	Disavowing the doctrine of preemption.
H Res 41	Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that an increase in number of members of the United States Forces deployed in Iraq is the wrong course of action and that a drastic shift in the political and diplomatic strategy of the United States is needed to help secure and stabilize Iraq.
H Res 333	Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.
H Res 625	Censuring the President and Vice President.
H Res 799	Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.

H Res 1019	Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the current economic slowdown in the United States is directly related to the enormous costs of the ongoing occupation of Iraq, consigning the United States to what can only be called the Iraq recession, and for other purposes.
H Res 1123	Calling on the President of the United States not to commit the United States to any status of forces agreement or any other bilateral agreement with the Republic of Iraq that involves the continued presence of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq unless the agreement includes a provision under which the Republic of Iraq agrees to reimburse the United States for all costs incurred by the United States related to the presence of United States Armed Forces in Iraq after the effective date of the agreement.
S 121	A bill to provide for the redeployment of United States forces from Iraq.
S 1077	A bill to safely redeploy United States troops from Iraq.
S 1545	Iraq Study Group Recommendations Implementation Act of 2007.
S 233	A bill to prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.
S 287	A bill to prohibit the use of funds for an escalation of United States military forces in Iraq above the numbers existing as of January 9, 2007.
S 308	A bill to prohibit an escalation in United States military forces in Iraq without prior authorization by Congress.
S 433	Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007.
S 448	Iraq Redeployment Act of 2007.
S 470	A bill to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.
S 574	A bill to express the sense of Congress on Iraq.
S 670	Iraq Troop Protection and Reduction Act of 2007.
S 679	A bill to provide a comprehensive strategy for stabilizing Iraq and redeploying United States troops from Iraq within one year.
S 2633	A bill to provide for the safe redeployment of United States troops from Iraq.
S Con Res 13	A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress.
S Con Res 2	A concurrent resolution expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq.
S Con Res 4	A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.
S Con Res 7	A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.
SJ Res 3	A joint resolution to specify an expiration date for the authorization of use of military force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and to authorize the continuing presence of United States forces in Iraq after that date for certain military operations and activities.

SJ Res 15	United States Policy in Iraq Resolution of 2007.
SJ Res 9	United States Policy in Iraq Resolution of 2007.
S Res 302	A resolution censuring the President and Vice President.
111th Congress (2009–2011)	
H Con Res 248	Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.
H Con Res 301	Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Pakistan.
HR 66	Military Success in Iraq and Diplomatic Surge for National and Political Reconciliation in Iraq Act of 2009.
HR 1052	Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and Predictability Deployment Policy Act.
HR 2404	To require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress outlining the United States' exit strategy for United States military forces in Afghanistan participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.
HR 3699	To prohibit any increase in the number of members of the United States Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan.
HR 5015	To require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.
HR 5353	War is Making You Poor Act.
HR 6045	Responsible End to the War in Afghanistan Act.
H Res 417	Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that President Barack Obama should immediately work to reverse damaging and illegal actions taken by the Bush/Cheney Administration and collaborate with Congress to proactively prevent any further abuses of executive branch power.
S 3197	A bill to require a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan.