

COALITION DISSOLUTION, MOBILIZATION, AND NETWORK DYNAMICS IN THE U.S. ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Coalition formation and dissolution are integral parts of social movement politics. This article addresses two questions about the effect of coalition politics on organizational processes within social movements. First, how does coalition leadership influence who attends mass demonstrations? Second, how does the dissolution of a coalition affect the locations of organizations in activist networks? The case of schism between United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and Act Now to Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER) in the contemporary American antiwar movement (2001–2007) is examined. Survey results demonstrate that variations in coalition leadership do not significantly affect protest demographics, though they do attract supporters with different political attitudes, levels of commitment, and organizational affiliations. Further, network analysis establishes that coalition dissolution weakens the ties between previous coalition partners and creates opportunities for actors uninvolved in the split to reaffirm and improve brokerage opportunities. The end result is that preexisting network structures serve to mitigate the effects of coalition dissolution on social movements.

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When public approval of President George W. Bush's handling of the Iraq War stood at an unprecedented low in September 2005, the American antiwar movement seized the opportunity to get out its message.¹ The nation's two leading grassroots antiwar coalitions – United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and Act Now to Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER) – formed a grand coalition to sponsor a march in Washington, DC, on September 24, 2005. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators filled the streets surrounding the White House. They carried signs with a wide array of messages, such as “Quagmire Accomplished” and “Make Levees, Not War.” After the march, they flowed into “The Ellipse” where they attended an “Antiwar Fair” and listened to speakers, such as the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Cindy Sheehan. By many accounts, the rally was a success for the movement, with the *Washington Post* reporting that it was “the largest show of antiwar sentiment in the nation's capital since the conflict in Iraq began” (Dvorak, 2005, p. A1).

Coalitions are among the most vital tools that social movements have in their tactical repertoire (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Hathaway & Meyer, 1997; Jones, Hutchinson, Van Dyke, Gates, & Companion, 2001; Krinsky & Reese, 2006; Levi & Murphy, 2006; McCammon & Campbell, 2002; Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005; Staggenborg, 1986; Van Dyke, 2003). They allow organizations to share resources, intelligence, expertise, and networks (Levi & Murphy, 2006). In doing so, they help movements to project an image of strength in numbers. For example, the partnership between ANSWER and UFPJ contributed to the success of the September 24 event. Among other things, ANSWER lent its expertise in securing demonstration permits in Washington, DC, while UFPJ activated its considerably broader mobilizing network. Most significantly, the formation of a grand coalition sent the message that the antiwar movement was unified in its opposition to the Iraq War.

Coalitions do not always actualize their cooperative potential if they become consumed in ideological contests and internal power struggles, as some members attempt to co-opt coalitional agendas (Balsler, 1997; Staggenborg, 1986). The UFPJ–ANSWER alliance, like many coalitions, suffered from these problems. Both organizations were angling to be the preeminent leader of the antiwar movement, with ANSWER representing the movement's radical flank and UFPJ leading its moderate flank (cf. Haines, 1988). When conflicts erupted during the planning and execution of the September 24 demonstration, UFPJ declared (after the rally) that it would not engage in future organizing work with ANSWER (United for Peace and Justice, 2005d). This decision caused a rift in the antiwar movement that lasted for at least 2 years.

Disunity within social movements has the potential to undermine their success by providing conflicting images to the media, opening opportunities for countermovements, and diverting activists' energy away from public policy issues (Gamson, 1975; Gitlin, 1980; Mansbridge, 1986; Polletta, 2002). Thus, it is important to investigate how the conflict between UFPJ and ANSWER affected the antiwar movement. Were the activists and organizations opposing the war strongly influenced by which coalition led large antiwar rallies? Or, did they pursue opportunities to protest regardless of the sponsors?

An understanding of the dynamics of coalition politics and the causes of coalition dissolution is fairly well established (Rucht, 2004; Staggenborg, 1986; Tarrow, 2005, p. 171). However, less is known about the effects of these processes on other actors in social movements (Hathaway & Meyer, 1997). We examine these effects on two aspects of social movements. First, how does coalition leadership influence who attends antiwar rallies? Does the same crowd of people turn out no matter who the leaders are? Or, does the leadership of a coalition affect what kinds of constituencies are involved in terms of the ways that they learn about events and nature of their political commitments and affiliations? Second, how does the dissolution of a coalition affect the locations of organizations in activist networks? Did the split between ANSWER and UFPJ lead to polarization in the antiwar movement? Or, did key organizations find that their networks were largely unchanged?

We argue that coalition leadership does matter for the mobilization of social movements, though differently than movement leaders sometimes claim. First, we show that variations in coalition leadership do not significantly affect protest demographics, though they do attract supporters with different political attitudes, levels of commitment, and organizational affiliations. Second, we demonstrate that the underlying structure of activist networks is robust in the wake of coalition rifts. Nevertheless, coalition dissolution weakens the ties between previous coalition partners and creates opportunities for actors uninvolved in the split to reaffirm and improve their opportunities for brokerage in the network. The end result is that preexisting network structures serve to cushion the effects of coalition dissolution on the social movement.

We proceed, first, by discussing the relationships among coalitions, mobilization, and networks. Second, we compare ANSWER and UFPJ and explain the causes for the schism between them. Third, we present the results of our participant surveys at ANSWER and UFPJ rallies and identify differences in constituent mobilization. Fourth, we map the network consequences of the UFPJ-ANSWER split on the antiwar movement as a

whole. We conclude by elucidating the implications of shifting coalition structures for the antiwar movement and propose questions for future research.

COALITIONS, MOBILIZATION, AND NETWORKS

Social movements increasingly rely upon coalitions as tools to resolve differences among activists and organizations (Smith, 2004). In this section, we discuss the effect of coalitions on movement mobilization and networks. We begin by defining coalitions and describing their place within movement politics. We then explain how variations in coalition leadership affect the mobilization process. Finally, we consider the implications of coalition dissolution on activist networks.

Coalition Basics

Coalitions are interorganizational agreements formed for the purpose of collectively addressing a specific set of policy or political objectives. Organizations join coalitions when they believe that they are more likely to achieve their goals by working together with other organizations than they are by working separately. Against the prospect of an alliance, organizations weigh the costs of collaboration, including time spent in meetings, potential damage to their organizational identities, and the risk that politically sensitive information will leak during the coalition's deliberations (Browne, 1990; Heaney, 2004a; Hojnacki, 1997; Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005). Managing coalitions is necessarily tenuous and difficult, in part, because they often sow together the movement's moderate and radical strands, which are regularly in conflict with one another (Ansell, 2001; Haines, 1988; Rucht, 2004). Cooperation among members varies considerably, as some organizations are at the core of the coalition's activities, while others act in more peripheral roles (Hula, 1999).

When coalitions become formal entities, they usually hold regular meetings, hire paid staff, and create Web pages that list member organizations and coalitional goals. When coalitions operate strictly on an informal basis, they usually withhold public announcements of their goals and convene their members only infrequently. Coalitions may be established either on a long-term or an ad hoc basis. Long-term coalitions tend to address broad-based grievances within a general policy area, while ad hoc

coalitions may focus on more limited objectives, such as staging a one-time protest event (Levi & Murphy, 2006; Mahoney, 2007; Staggenborg, 1986; Tarrow, 2005, pp. 161–179).

Coalitions are most likely to function successfully when their goals are defined in terms of enhancing political influence, when they face threats from their environments, and when individual organizations within the coalition are able to retain distinct identities in the collaborative process (Hathaway & Meyer, 1997; McCammon & Campbell, 2002; see also Browne, 1990; Hojnacki, 1997; Hula, 1999). Coalitions are most likely to fail when they become plagued by ideological conflicts, when framing disputes occur, or when individual members of the coalition possess sufficient resources to operate independently (Jones et al., 2001; Rochford, 1989; Staggenborg, 1986). Problems may arise if participants begin to see the coalitions themselves as targets of activism (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004). Further, conflicting personalities and organizational imperatives may lead to coalition dissolution, “giving rise to recriminations among organizers about ‘who did what’ or who failed to carry out agreed-upon tasks” (Tarrow, 2005, p. 171).

The longevity of coalitions is endogenous to the political process. Coalitions may dissolve prematurely because of ideological disputes, altered political opportunity structures, dwindling resources, and personality conflicts (Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005; Krinsky & Reese, 2006; Rochon & Meyer, 1997; Staggenborg, 1986; Van Dyke, 2003; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Conversely, coalitions may expand their objectives when they find that the partnership is working successfully. Indeed, whether a coalition is truly ad hoc or enduring can be known only in retrospect, as experience with its actual formation and operation causes participants to revise their evaluations of the coalition’s benefits and costs (Mische & Pattison, 2000).

Coalitions and Mobilization

Coalitions perform the function of “mesomobilization,” which is the process of organizing other actors directly to mobilize participants (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). Coalitions facilitate mesomobilization by performing several tasks. They coax their member organizations to bring their disparate messages and tactics into alignment (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). They coordinate communications with the media to spread the word about the activities of the coalition (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Hammond, 2004). Most importantly, they invoke their networks of supporters to contribute to the coalition’s work (Jones et al., 2001). Since different

coalition leaders perform these tasks in varied ways, the results of mesomobilization fluctuate from coalition to coalition.

We argue that framing, connections with the media, and the structure of coalitional networks explain differences in mesomobilization from coalition to coalition. First, coalitions differ in the ways that they frame social movement activity (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Levi & Murphy, 2006; Meyer & Whittier, 1994). According to Goffman (1974, pp. 10–11), a “frame” establishes a “definition of a situation... in accordance with the principles of organization that govern events... and our subjective involvement in them.” Organizations attempt to use frames to align the beliefs and values of individuals with the activities of the movement (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Different frames may affect the demographics of the constituencies drawn by coalitions if leaders make appeals on the basis of race, sex, age, or class. Indeed, coalitions may be organized around their ability to attract women, the elderly, youth, Latinos, the working class, college graduates, or other groups. Or, they may develop messages that draw members of a particular political party (such as registered Democrats) or to people with a specific set of grievances (such as military families who have lost loved ones; Heaney & Rojas, 2006, 2007). If coalitions effectively project their intended frames, then the composition of the turnout at demonstrations should correspond with these efforts.

Second, competing coalitions gain unequal access to the mass media (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Media allocate attention to a social movement organization depending on their preconceptions about the value and social acceptance of the organization’s messages. If an organization is believed to reflect widespread social values, then it is likely to gain more attention than an organization that is believed to reflect marginal or counterculture values, unless the media anticipate the occurrence of violent conflict or other incidents that make for “good copy” (Gitlin, 1980). If coalitional events attract countermovement organizations, then the media may invoke fairness norms for equal time that reduce the amount of coverage given to the movement (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). The end result is that coverage choices made by the media feed back onto the movement (Koopmans, 2004). Favorable coverage by mass media boosts a coalition’s mobilization efforts, while lack of coverage forces a coalition to rely more heavily on other modes of mobilization (Fisher, Stanley, Berman, & Neff, 2005).

Third, coalitions vary in their access to networks that support the mobilization process (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Kitts, 1999, 2000). Jones et al. (2001) argue that coalitions that are able to rely on “network invocation”

mobilize more efficiently than those that are not. The content of a coalition's network and the degree to which it is able to activate it influences who turns out at the coalition's events. Activation depends on the geographic reach of the coalition's network (Miller, 2000), whether individuals have personal ties (as opposed to merely "checkbox" ties) with organizations (Skocpol, 2003), and the missions of organizations in the network (Heaney, 2004b).

Coalitions and Network Dynamics

Social movements are built out of complex webs of overlapping networks that span a multiplicity of issues, ideologies, and social relations (Diani, 1992, 2000; Mische, 2003). Social movement organizations draw upon these networks when mobilizing for action (Gould, 1995; McAdam, 1988). The underlying network structure unfolds from emerging social movements over time, as the advocates from allied movements gradually spill over into other arenas as issues and circumstances evolve (Meyer & Whittier, 1994). This spillover connects organizations through multiple, overlapping networks of activists working across issue areas that are robust to perturbations in any one network (Diani, 2004).

Social movement networks and coalitions are closely related phenomena (Diani & Bison, 2004; Diani, Lindsay, & Purdue, 2007). Members of a coalition may be closely networked with one another, though networks may transcend coalitional agreements by extending to actors and issues that are not relevant to the coalition. Networks provide information about which actors are likely to make desirable coalition partners (Corrigan-Brown & Meyer, 2007; Heaney, 2004a). Thus, preexisting social networks play a critical role in the formation and dissolution of coalitions by supporting (or undermining) trust and credible commitments among members and potential members (Levi & Murphy, 2006). In response, coalition politics feed back onto networks by helping "to structure concrete relationships in a changing political arena" (Mische & Pattison, 2000, p. 167).

Despite the relative stability of movement networks, the experience of working together in coalition alters the nature of some relationships; positive relationships are strengthened and problematic relationships are weakened or severed. Divisions created between some organizations during coalition dissolution become opportunities for other organizations to enhance their brokerage potential in the network (Burt, 1992; Simmel [1922], 1955). In particular, "actors who are adept at using strategic ambiguity ... might become central actors in alliance networks" (Mische &

Pattison, 2000, p. 277; see also Padgett & Ansell, 1993). As a result, actors that drive the dissolution of a coalition may find that they lose strategic position to organizations that are able to retain the appearance of neutrality in the conflict. Coalition dissolution is, thus, an opportunity for key actors to rearrange their positions in the network.

We argue that the underlying structure of activist networks is robust in the wake of coalition dissolution. Yet the process of activating networks also changes them. Mobilization through a coalition draws some actors in a network closer together, while coalition dissolution pushes them apart. In the next section, we consider the case of UFPJ and ANSWER and how their relationship fostered both unity and disunity in the antiwar movement, thus establishing the conditions for change in activist networks.

THE FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION OF A GRAND COALITION

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many observers believed that the United States would respond militarily in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Middle East. The contemporary American antiwar movement emerged to counter this anticipated military response with the founding of International ANSWER on September 14, 2001. ANSWER was established by the International Action Center (IAC) with financial and organizational support from the communist Worker's World Party (Albert & Shalom, 2002). Brian Becker, who had been a leader in the Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East (CSUSIME) during the Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991, served as its principal National Coordinator (Becker, 2007). In fact, ANSWER was composed of many of the same organizations and personalities that had comprised CSUSIME (Coles, 1999; Goldstein, 1999). The establishment of ANSWER and the growth of the antiwar movement spurred a “spillover” from the global justice movement as antiglobalization activists began to redirect their attention to issues of war and peace (Bennis, 2006; Della Porta & Mosca, 2007; Fisher, 2006; Hadden & Tarrow, 2007).

The antiwar movement remained relatively small as long as U.S. military intervention remained focused on Afghanistan. However, as it became clear by mid-2002 that the Bush Administration had its sights set on Iraq, the movement grew significantly (Cortright, 2004; Bennis, 2006; Hayden, 2007). UFPJ was founded on October 25, 2002 as part of an effort to assemble a broader coalition of activists from movements against previous wars, nuclear

weapons, and other aspects of U.S. foreign policy (Cortright, 2004, p. 13). Leslie Cagan, who had chaired the New York University Committee to End the War in Vietnam and had been the National Coordinator of the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East (NCPME) during the Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991, served as UFPJ’s National Coordinator (Cagan, 1998).² Analogously to ANSWER, many of the organizers who supported NCPME in 1990–1991 became the backbone of UFPJ (Coles, 1999).

We began observing ANSWER and UFPJ systematically in October 2002 and continued to observe them through December 2007. Our fieldwork on UFPJ involved attendance at five rallies, participation in three lobby days, visitation of five planning meetings, and two interviews with key organizers.³ Our fieldwork on ANSWER included attendance at seven rallies, participation in one lobby day, visitation of one planning meeting, and interviews with three key organizers.⁴ Additionally, we maintained subscriptions to the e-mail listservs of both organizations and monitored their Web pages regularly. Drawing upon these observations and documents, we outline below the principal similarities and differences between the two coalitions and expand upon the nature of the cooperation and conflict between them.

UFPJ and ANSWER are similar in that they are both large grassroots coalitions that regularly sponsor demonstrations opposing the U.S.–Iraq War. They mobilize substantially more participants than other coalitions, such as Not in Our Name or the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. Other active coalitions, such as Win Without War, the Iraq Coordinating Group, and the Americans Against Escalation in Iraq, mostly work behind the scenes in the legislative arena or by purchasing advertising in the mass media, rather than by staging street demonstrations (Corrigall-Brown & Meyer, 2007). A side-by-side comparison of ANSWER and UFPJ is presented in Table 1.

The most significant difference between UFPJ and ANSWER is the nature of their issue foci. UFPJ aims to segregate the Iraq War from other foreign policy issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It argues that in order to build the broadest coalition possible, it should focus on the one issue about which the largest number of organizations can agree: ending the war in Iraq (United for Peace and Justice, 2005b). When it does address other foreign policy issues (such as nuclear proliferation), it does so in distinct fora, so as to avoid alienating organizations that do not take a stand on the issue in question. For example, UFPJ organized a march for a “Just Peace in Palestine and Israel” on June 10, 2007, but very clearly distinguished this event from its anti-Iraq-War campaign.

Table 1. Comparison of UFPJ and ANSWER.

	UFPJ	ANSWER
<i>Politics</i>		
Issue focus	Issue segregation	Multi-issue unification
Ideology	Progressive/radical	Radical
Decision-making	Transparent and open; 2/3 majority	Opaque/informal
Tactics	Outside and inside	Mostly outside
Engagement with mainstream political institutions	Moderate	Low
Perspective on unity within the movement	Unity is desirable, but competing coalitions are acceptable	Unity is essential
Opposition from countermovement	Moderate/low	High
<i>Organization</i>		
Founding date	October 25, 2002	September 14, 2001
National coordinator	Leslie Cagan	Brian Becker
National headquarters	New York city	Washington, DC
Operating budget	\$1,189,482 in 2005	Not publicly available
<i>Membership</i>		
Number of member organizations	More than 1,300	Hundreds
Prominence of Steering Committee members within movement	High	Low
Governing bodies	National Peace and Justice Assembly; Steering Committee	Steering Committee

Source: ANSWER Coalition (2005, 2007), ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee (2005), United for Peace and Justice (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2007a, 2007b), and personal observations from interacting with the two coalitions over the 2002–2007 period.

In contrast to UFPJ, ANSWER maintains that opposition to the American occupation of Iraq must be linked to wider issues of U.S. militarism and imperialism around the globe, including intervention in places such as Haiti and Latin America. It references Martin Luther King, Jr.’s decision during the civil rights movement to oppose the Vietnam War, despite worries that doing so might have divided the civil rights movement (ANSWER Coalition, 2005). It argues that only by showing solidarity with oppressed peoples everywhere – especially Arab American and Muslim peoples – is it possible to halt American imperialism.

Beyond their issue foci, ANSWER and UFPJ diverge along a number of dimensions, with ANSWER serving as the leader of the “radical flank”

of the antiwar movement and UFPJ heading the “moderate flank” (cf. Haines, 1988). ANSWER and its member groups generally embrace radical ideologies, while UFPJ and its member groups come from more diverse ideological perspectives, ranging across a spectrum from progressive to radical.

UFPJ is more engaged with mainstream political institutions, such as the Democratic Party, than is ANSWER. UFPJ organized congressional lobby days in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and makes an effort to work with members of Congress who fight for the antiwar movement’s positions, such as Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), Barbara Lee (D-CA), and Jim McGovern (D-MA). In contrast, ANSWER favors outsider political tactics. When asked about his organization’s approach to lobbying, ANSWER’s National Student Organizer, Eugene Puryear (2007), responded that “[w]e feel that the easiest way to lobby is to get in the streets.”

From a rhetorical perspective, ANSWER almost always attempts to challenge American hegemony in its statements, while UFPJ and its member groups are more likely to attempt to harness American hegemony as a persuasive tool (cf. Maney, Woehrle, & Coy, 2005). UFPJ’s decision-making process tends to be transparent and open, requiring a two-third majority, while ANSWER’s decision-making process is more opaque and informal.

UFPJ is willing to tolerate some degree of disunity within the antiwar movement and to allow multiple coalitions to oppose the war from different vantage points. ANSWER, however, sees disunity in the antiwar movement as an “abrogati[on of] responsibility” and an indignation to “the victims of empire and war” (ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee, 2005, pp. 4–5). Because of its support for a wide array of radical causes, ANSWER is regularly singled out for attacks by conservative media outlets and grassroots organizations, especially Free Republic, the Protest Warriors, Rolling Thunder, and the Gathering of Eagles. UFPJ, for the most part, is spared from attacks by an organized countermovement.

The differences between ANSWER and UFPJ are nearly identical to the divisions between CSUSIME and NCPME during the Persian Gulf War in 1990–1991 (Becker, 2007; Cagan, 1998; Coles, 1999; Coy & Woehrle, 1996; Swank, 1997). CSUSIME was considered more radical, with NCMPE occupying more moderate ground (though it was still considered to be on the left of the political spectrum). CSUSIME was criticized for its unwillingness to condemn Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, while NCMPE argued that it was logically consistent to oppose violence both by the United States and Iraq, with other forms of pressure being

more appropriate responses than war. CSUSIME sought to place the Kuwait–Iraq–U.S. dispute within the broader context of Middle Eastern politics (especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), while NCMPE focused more narrowly on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and American plans to reverse it. Just as ANSWER received support from the IAC, CSUSIME was established with the support of the People’s Antiwar Mobilization (PAM), which also drew its financial backing from the Worker’s World Party (Coles, 1999; Elbaum, 2002, p. 264). In many ways, ANSWER and UFPJ directly reconstituted the political and personal disputes that had engulfed the 1990–1991 antiwar movement.

The moderate and radical flanks of the antiwar movement have varied over time in their willingness to work together. Despite their differences, UFPJ and ANSWER found enough common ground to work together on several occasions, including the October 25, 2003, rally in Washington, DC, and the March 20, 2004, rally in New York city (ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee, 2005). Nonetheless, the leaders of UFPJ initially decided not to work with ANSWER on the September 24, 2005, demonstration in Washington, DC, due to the multi-issue nature of ANSWER’s demands (including a focus on Israel–Palestine and Haiti) and difficulties the coalitions had in working together in the past (United for Peace and Justice, 2005b). Part of UFPJ’s initial decision was grounded in the concern that the presence of ANSWER might alienate some of its supporters, thus reducing attendance at the rally and shrinking its coalition.

UFPJ’s decision not to work with ANSWER – which had announced a demonstration in Washington on the same day – was highly controversial within the organization because some activists worried that two separate demonstrations would be confusing and would make the antiwar movement appear divided. Moreover, ANSWER undertook an aggressive e-mail campaign to pressure UFPJ into forming a unified front on September 24. In light of these developments, UFPJ agreed to allow U.S. Labor Against the War (USLAW) to arbitrate a discussion with ANSWER, which ultimately led to an agreement to form a grand coalition between the two groups (United for Peace and Justice, 2005c). UFPJ’s leadership was ultimately persuaded that the political impact of the demonstration would be greater if the two groups worked together.

UFPJ’s decision to coalesce with ANSWER remained controversial among rank-and-file activists, even as the planning for the September 24 demonstration was underway.⁵ For example, a heated discussion on this topic took place at a UFPJ-sponsored planning meeting on July 20, 2005, in

Winston Unity Hall in New York city. A typical exchange began with a middle-aged White male, who warned that:

I think the danger of working with other groups, particularly with ANSWER, is that the media could easily take their position and make it ours. And we don't want that.... It's very tricky, and I think that we have a lot more to lose than we have to gain....

Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair of UFPJ, responded that "The story on September 24 is gonna be the numbers. ... I think all of us in our minds know what the potential is to have a massive outpouring... ." A White male in his twenties chimed in that:

I really just think that ... trying to get as large and as united a demonstration possible is the most important thing.... ANSWER is a serious antiwar coalition. They have Arab and Muslim groups and immigrant groups who are part of their coalition. We have to take that seriously.... [applause].

No deliberative resolution of the disagreement was reached at the meeting, though planning for the joint rally went forward in any case.

On September 24, 2005, the antiwar movement united around the theme, "Stop the War on Iraq, Bring the Troops Home Now." Nonetheless, ANSWER and UFPJ relations remained tense, as the organizations traded charges and countercharges about what had (or had not) taken place and who was responsible for how things had transpired. The immediate disagreements between the two coalitions were largely logistical in nature, pertaining to the permit process, the intended starting time of the rally, and time given to speakers on the stage.⁶ However, the September 24 event was in many ways another chapter in a long history of disagreements between the groups that dated to the Persian Gulf War disputes between CSUSIME and NCPME. The coalitions sought unity for the antiwar movement, but found at the end that unity sometimes makes more sense in theory than in practice.

SURVEYS AT THREE DEMONSTRATIONS

The split between ANSWER and UFPJ occurred as we were in the midst of conducting a larger research project on the politics and mobilization of the antiwar movement (Heaney & Rojas, 2006, 2007). We fielded surveys of participants at three rallies in Washington, DC: (1) September 24, 2005 ($N = 448$), jointly sponsored by UFPJ and ANSWER; (2) January 27, 2007 ($N = 525$), sponsored by UFPJ only and organized on the theme, "Tell the New Congress: Act Now to End the War;" and (3) March 17, 2007

($N = 337$), sponsored by ANSWER only and organized on the themes, “March on the Pentagon: U.S. Out of Iraq Now; From Iraq to New Orleans, Fund People’s Needs Not the War Machine; End Colonial Occupation: Iraq, Palestine, Haiti, and Everywhere; Shut Down Guantanamo.” The March 17 rally encountered a sizeable counterprotest, numbering several thousand people, while the January 27 event met only a small counterprotest of a few hundred people. The pattern of these rallies fortuitously produces a quasi-experiment: we observed ANSWER and UFPJ working in coalition and then working separately. Given that only 48 days separated the January 27 and March 17 rallies and that they both began in the nation’s capital, we assume that the only major difference between them was in their sponsoring coalitions.⁷

The survey questions (reported in [Appendix A](#)) elicited basic demographic information (sex, age, race/ethnicity, income, education), attitudes toward political parties, organizational contacts, source of information about and distance traveled to the rally, history of involvement in the movement, and reasons for coming to the event. At each rally, we hired a team of 8–10 individuals that spanned out geographically across the crowds to conduct surveys. Each surveyor was instructed first to choose an individual from the crowd to serve as an “anchor.” The anchor was not approached by the surveyor or invited to participate in the study. Second, the surveyor counted five individuals in a line from the anchor and invited the fifth person to participate in the survey. If the person accepted the invitation, she or he was asked to complete the survey on the spot and return it to the surveyor. The surveyor then counted five persons from that individual and made another invitation. The surveyor allowed three persons to complete the surveys and then moved forward in the crowd to identify a new anchor.⁸ This method is similar to the sampling techniques employed by other scholars studying protests ([Fisher et al., 2005](#); [Goss, 2006](#); [Walgrave, 2007](#); [Walgrave & Rucht, 2007](#)).

We supplemented the data provided by respondents with information available on the Web about the organizations that contacted them (as indicated in survey question 10). We were able to locate Web pages (or other contact information) for 94.5% of the organizational contacts reported by our respondents.⁹ We used organizational mission statements or “about us” sections of the Web pages to code organizational missions in three dimensions: (1) issue or cause (such as nuclear weapons proliferation); (2) representation of a specific constituency (such as Latinos or Muslims); and (3) ideology (progressive or radical). Further, we noted the location of the organization’s headquarters and whether or not it held open in-person

meetings, as opposed to closed-door or on-line only meetings. We used complete-case imputation to estimate the values of missing observations (Wood, White, Hillsdon, & Carpenter, 2005).

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MESOMOBILIZATION

This section compares the relative ability of ANSWER and UFPJ to mobilize particular constituencies at the January 27, 2007, and March 17, 2007, demonstrations. We used probit regression to determine if the two rallies attracted significantly different types of participants. We estimated a model in which the dependent variable took the value of 1 if the respondent was observed at the UFPJ rally and 0 if the respondent was observed at the ANSWER rally. This setup assigns positive coefficients to factors making a respondent more likely to attend the UFPJ rally and negative coefficients to factors making a respondent more likely to attend the ANSWER rally. If the protest involves essentially the same group of individuals moving back and forth between demonstrations regardless of who is the sponsor, then the differences between the two events should not be statistically significant (the null hypothesis). However, if two coalitions mobilize different constituencies, then significantly different coefficients should result.

We expected to observe significant differences between participants in UFPJ and ANSWER events depending on how the organizations are framed. Organizational framings correspond with several demographic variables. Given the relative prominence of women as leaders in UFPJ (such as Leslie Cagan, National Coordinator; Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair; and George Friday, National Co-Chair), we expected that it would be more likely to attract women to participate than would ANSWER. Given that ANSWER explicitly frames its identity as attempting to “end racism,” we expected that individuals with non-White racial and ethnic backgrounds would be disproportionately drawn to ANSWER. Further, given the relatively radical orientation of ANSWER, we hypothesized that it would more greatly appeal to young people and the working class. In contrast, we expected UFPJ to appeal to individuals with higher incomes and college educations. Rank-and-file activists often articulated these hypotheses. One respondent told us, for example, that he thought that the March 17 ANSWER rally had drawn more minorities and young people than had the January 27 UFPJ rally. ANSWER leaders regularly celebrate their ability to attract youth to the movement.

Contrary to our expectations, the results of the survey (reported in Table 2) revealed no significant differences in the demographic characteristics of participants at the UFPJ and ANSWER rallies.¹⁰ Despite the stereotypes that many people have of the two coalitions, they are equally likely to attract the participation of women and men, Whites and non-Whites, the young and the old, those with and without college degrees, and people from various economic strata. Differences between the two coalitions flow more from the ways in which their members connect to the antiwar movement and to the political system as a whole.

We expected that the framings of UFPJ and ANSWER would appeal to constituents differently depending on their partisan leanings. UFPJ is considered to be closer to the Democratic Party, so we expected its rally to attract participants who express greater agreement with the Democrats and who are more likely to consider themselves to be members of the Democratic Party. Conversely, we expected ANSWER participants to be more closely tied to third parties or to be independent from a political party. Consistent with our expectation, we found that participants in the UFPJ rally did, indeed, register higher levels of agreement with the Democrats ($p = 0.028$). A one-unit increase in agreeing with the Democrats (e.g., moving from “sometimes” to “usually” agree with the Democratic Party) made it 5.7% more likely that we would observe the respondent at the UFPJ event than at the ANSWER event (with all other variables held at their means or modes). However, formal membership in the party was not as important as level of agreement in the multivariate analysis.¹¹ Contrary to our expectation, there was no statistically significant difference between UFPJ respondents and ANSWER respondents in their membership in third parties.¹²

We expected UFPJ and ANSWER’s framings to appeal to individuals with alternative sets of grievances. Since UFPJ is perceived as more of a pro-Democratic organization, we expected that individuals with specific anti-Bush or anti-Republican grievances would gravitate to it. UFPJ’s regular framing of “Support the Troops, Bring them Home” should appeal to military families and people who have lost loved ones in the war. Thus, we expected that UFPJ should be more likely to draw supporters with personal grievances. In contrast, we expected that ANSWER’s focus on a broad set of policy and political issues ought to resonate for people with these grievances. Consistent with our expectation, the results show that individuals who attend rallies for personal or family issues were 19.2% more likely to ally with UFPJ when all other variables are held at their means or modes ($p = 0.001$). Contrary to our predictions, respondents with

Table 2. Probit Regression on Attendance at UFPJ and ANSWER Demonstrations in 2007.

	dF/dX	Coefficient	Standard Error	Z Score	p-Value	Percent Imputed
<i>Demographics</i>						
Sex is female	0.013	0.033	0.097	0.343	0.732	0.0
<i>Race/ethnicity</i>						
White/Caucasian	-0.063	-0.172	0.176	-0.973	0.330	0.0
Black/African American	-0.081	-0.209	0.240	-0.872	0.383	0.0
Latino/Hispanic/Mexican	0.007	0.018	0.264	0.069	0.945	0.0
Asian	-0.058	-0.149	0.299	-0.499	0.618	0.0
Age (in years)	0.000	-0.001	0.004	-0.357	0.721	0.2
Educational attainment ^a	0.001	0.004	0.033	0.116	0.907	4.2
Annual income ^b	0.012	0.031	0.035	0.882	0.378	8.5
<i>Political parties</i>						
Agreement with Democrats ^c	0.057	0.150	0.068	2.194	0.028*	7.1
Member of Democratic Party	-0.008	-0.022	0.115	-0.190	0.850	0.3
Member of a third party	-0.005	-0.015	0.196	-0.074	0.941	0.3
<i>Grievances</i>						
Anti-Bush/anti-Republican	0.020	0.052	0.146	0.356	0.722	2.0
Personal or family issues	0.192	0.508	0.146	3.475	0.001*	2.0
Policy-specific	0.029	0.075	0.138	0.547	0.584	2.0
Politics/movement building	0.087	0.230	0.126	1.823	0.068	2.0
<i>Source of information about event</i>						
Mass media	0.190	0.502	0.180	2.782	0.005*	1.0
Personal networks/friends	0.153	0.404	0.146	2.767	0.006*	1.0
Contacted directly by organization	-0.074	-0.197	0.148	-1.333	0.182	1.0
Internet/e-mail	0.055	0.146	0.144	1.013	0.311	1.0
Flyers/posters	-0.046	-0.121	0.272	-0.446	0.655	1.0
<i>Network</i>						
Local vs. out-of-town activist (measured in thousands of miles traveled)	0.056	-0.149	0.076	-1.960	0.050*	1.3
<i>Experienced vs. new activists</i>						
Attended protest in past 5 years	-0.054	-0.144	0.110	-1.313	0.189	3.5
Civil disobedience in past 5 years	0.008	0.020	0.153	0.134	0.893	3.5
<i>Contacting organization's mission</i>						
Focused on an issue or cause ^d	0.083	0.220	0.160	1.374	0.169	5.5

Table 2. (Continued)

	dF/dX	Coefficient	Standard Error	Z Score	p-Value	Percent Imputed
Focused on representation ^d	-0.239	-0.633	0.176	-3.586	0.000*	5.5
Focused on progressive ideology ^d	0.174	0.461	0.199	2.311	0.021*	5.5
Focused on radical ideology ^d	-0.414	-1.097	0.235	-4.666	0.000*	5.5
Contacting organization has in-person meetings ^d	0.221	0.586	0.165	3.559	0.000*	5.5
Contacting organization in New York ^d	0.302	0.800	0.225	3.554	0.000*	4.8
Constant	0.000	-0.689	0.399	-1.73	0.084	
Sample size = 862				Log likelihood = -490.203		
Pseudo R ² = 0.150				LR χ^2 (df = 29) = 173.250		

Note: Dependent variable = 1 if respondent attended UFPJ event, = 0 if attended ANSWER event.

Source: Authors' surveys of participants in the march on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the march on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

* $p \leq 0.05$ in a two-tailed test.

^aSeven-point scale where 7 indicates "Graduate or professional degree".

^bSix-point scale where 6 indicates "\$75,001 or more per year".

^cFive-point scale where 5 indicates "Usually agree with Democratic Party".

^dThe number of organizations of this type which contacted the respondent to attend the march.

anti-Bush, policy-specific, or political grievances did not lean more toward ANSWER or UFPJ.¹³

We argue that competing coalitions do not necessarily have equal access to the mass media. Given UFPJ's more moderate posture and engagement with mainstream political institutions, it tends to receive relatively favorable coverage from the mass media. In contrast, ANSWER's more radical stance, outsider tactics, and opposition from the pro-war countermovement serve to limit coverage from the mainstream media. Thus, we expected that UFPJ would draw more supporters who learned about its event through the mass media, while ANSWER would depend more heavily on other sources of information. Consistent with our hypothesis, the results show that a person who learned about an event from the mass media was 19.0% more likely to attend the UFPJ rally than the ANSWER rally ($p = 0.005$), when all other variables are held at their means or modes. People who learned about the rally from their personal networks or friends were 15.3% more

likely to attend the UFPJ rally ($p = 0.006$, all other variables held at their means or modes), not the ANSWER rally, as we predicted. Both ANSWER and UFPJ appear to be equally adept at contacting supporters directly, communicating through the Internet, and distributing flyers.¹⁴

Perhaps the most important difference between two coalitions may be their access to networks that support the coalitions. If coalition leadership is unimportant, then activists and organizations should turn out to protest regardless of who leads them. However, if leadership is important, then participants should take sides, showing up when their team is at the helm and staying home when other groups issue the call to action. We argue that ANSWER and UFPJ have very different mobilizing networks, both at the individual level and the organizational level.

At the individual level, we hypothesize that ANSWER's activists exhibit a higher average degree of commitment than do UFPJ activists. Because of UFPJ's comparative moderation, we expected it to attract more new activists (those on the margins of participation), with ANSWER attracting more career activists. Given UFPJ's greater engagement in the lobbying arena, we expected its activists to have less experience with civil disobedience than ANSWER activists. Finally, we expected ANSWER to induce its activists to travel a greater geographic distance than UFPJ activists. Contrary to these expectations, we did not discover a difference between ANSWER and UFPJ activists in terms of whether they were attending their first post-9/11 protest or if they had engaged in civil disobedience in the last 5 years. Consistent with our hypothesis, ANSWER was more likely to draw participants from a long distance (the average was 462 miles traveled), than UFPJ (338 miles traveled, $p = 0.050$, all other variables held at their means or modes).¹⁵ Part of the reason for this difference may be that UFPJ was more successful in attracting local residents of the Washington, DC, metropolitan region to attend their rally than was ANSWER (despite the fact that ANSWER is headquartered in DC), which was reflected in the substantially larger crowd drawn by UFPJ than by ANSWER.¹⁶

At the organizational level, we expected UFPJ to be more capable of activating networks of organizations with missions dedicated to specific issues (such as peace) or to progressive ideologies. In contrast, we expected ANSWER to be more capable of activating networks of organizations with missions dedicated to representing communities (such as Arab Americans) or to radical ideologies. Further, because of its participatory ethos, we expected UFPJ to be able to activate networks of organizations that allow their supporters to attend in-person meetings, while we expected ANSWER to activate networks of organizations with fewer opportunities for personal

involvement. Finally, because UFPJ is headquartered in New York, we expected it to be more successful in activating other organizations headquartered in New York. The data largely supported these hypotheses.¹⁷ Organizations with progressive ideologies were 17.4% more likely to contact UFPJ respondents ($p = 0.021$), while organizations with radical ideologies were 41.4% more likely to contact ANSWER respondents ($p = 0.000$). ANSWER was 23.9% more likely to activate networks focused on representation ($p = 0.000$), though there was no statistically significant difference between ANSWER and UFPJ in their ability to activate networks of organizations focused on issues or causes. As predicted, UFPJ was more successful in attracting the support of organizations with open meetings (22.1%, $p = 0.000$) and those headquartered in New York (30.2%, $p = 0.000$).¹⁸

The overall picture that emerges from these data is of two coalitions that activated very different networks after their grand coalition dissolved. The differences do not necessarily correspond, however, with common preconceptions about the coalitions. Neither organization has an advantage in attracting youth, minorities, women, or other specific demographic constituencies. Nonetheless, perceptions about UFPJ being more closely aligned with the Democratic Party are sustained by the data, as is our prediction that UFPJ benefits more from the mass media in the mobilization process than does ANSWER. UFPJ is more effective at drawing participants that live in Washington, DC, or its surrounding area, while proportionately more of ANSWER's participants travel long distances to attend their events. The greatest contrast between the two coalitions pertains to the kinds of organizations that they are able to enlist to support the mobilization process. ANSWER benefits from the support of groups that represent specific constituencies (such as Palestinian solidarity groups) and organizations whose missions are based on radical ideologies. UFPJ, on the other hand, draws organizations whose missions espouse progressive ideologies, those that invite direct participation in their meetings, and those located in New York. These findings demonstrate that coalition leadership matters and that it is not the case that the same group of protesters shows up at every demonstration, regardless of the sponsor. In the next section, we consider the effect of these differences on the overall structure of the antiwar network.

THE DYNAMICS OF NETWORK STRUCTURE

The results of the previous analysis demonstrate that UFPJ and ANSWER are able to activate different networks of supporters. The question remains,

however, as to how exactly this difference affects the patterns of connections among activists and organizations. Did the UFPJ–ANSWER divide split the movement in half? Or did it merely rearrange cliques within the movement? Were the strategic positions of organizations altered in any way?

We examine patterns of connections among activists and organizations by following Diani's (2004) suggestion that the overlapping relationships among activists constitute the basis of relationships among organizations. This approach implies that two organizations are connected if they have ties to the same activists.¹⁹ For example, if a respondent indicates that she or he is contacted both by the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), then there is a tie between these organizations because they have common supporters. These ties open up channels of communication between these organizations that facilitate collective action.

Our analysis is based on a *sample* of activists, so the precise structures of the networks depend on the exact individuals that are selected for the survey. The implication is that the largest mobilizing organizations have relatively stable positions in the network (because they have the highest probabilities of being selected), but the positions of smaller mobilizing organizations vary relatively more (because their inclusion is more random). Thus, changes in the positions of prominent actors in the network are relatively more significant than changes in the positions of less prominent actors.

Using this approach, we examine the co-mobilization of activists – individuals who are encouraged to participate by multiple organizations – to evaluate the changing structure of the antiwar movement. This approach gives us a view of networks in action, rather than the longer-term processes of organizational-membership relations.

We begin by presenting the antiwar network as deduced from co-mobilization at the September 24, 2005, rally in Fig. 1 ($N = 448$). Two organizations are tied in this network if they contacted the same individual to attend the event; the thickness of the ties is proportional to the number of co-contacts. The diagram immediately reveals a polycephalous structure with three regions, corresponding to UFPJ, ANSWER, and MoveOn. Each of these three organizations brought with it a particular following that it helped to co-mobilize. Code Pink: Women for Peace occupies a central position between these three factional heads.

The immediate effect of the UFPJ–ANSWER split is revealed by the co-mobilization network for the January 27, 2007, rally in Fig. 2 ($N = 525$). The network retains its polycephalous organization, though ANSWER falls




Fig. 1. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the Joint UFPJ–ANSWER Rally in Washington, DC, September 24, 2005. *Notes:* Each node represents an organization that contacted people to attend the demonstration. A line between two organizations indicates that they contacted the same person. Thicker lines indicate more co-contacts. Only the main component of the network is presented here. The spring-embedding algorithm in Netdraw 2.046 was used to position organizations close to one another in the network if they have a similar pattern of contacts with activists (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2007). See Appendix C for the complete list of organization names corresponding to these abbreviations. *Source:* Authors’ surveys of 448 participants in the joint UFPJ–ANSWER rally on September 24, 2005.

out of the main component of the co-mobilization network.²⁰ UFPJ and MoveOn retain their prominent positions, each mobilizing a particular clique of supporters. CodePink continues to occupy a position between UFPJ and MoveOn, though the disappearance of ANSWER makes this ground appear less strategically useful.

When ANSWER organized the March on the Pentagon, UFPJ was pushed away from the center of the main component of the network, as indicated in Fig. 3 ($N = 337$). UFPJ remains in the main component




Fig. 2. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the UFPJ-Sponsored Rally in Washington, DC, January 27, 2007. Notes: See Notes of Fig. 1. Source: Authors’ surveys of 525 participants in the UFPJ-sponsored rally held on January 27, 2007.

because it listed ANSWER’s March on the Pentagon on its website and because it sent several e-mails to its supporters explaining why it was neither formally endorsing nor attempting to interfere with the ANSWER rally. These actions had the effect of promoting ANSWER’s rally. However, UFPJ did not co-mobilize the rally with its traditional network of allied organizations, leaving it on the margin of the network, connected only to ANSWER.

The newly established World Can’t Wait (WCW), founded in the summer of 2005, assumed a prominent position in the network and served as ANSWER’s most effective co-mobilizing partner. WCW campaigns to remove President Bush from office before his term expires in 2009 (because the “world can’t wait” to “drive out the Bush regime”). It receives backing from the Revolutionary Communist Party ([World Can’t Wait, 2007](#)).²¹ The nascent ANSWER–WCW relationship at this rally is one example of ANSWER’s efforts to establish new allies in the wake of its split with UFPJ.




Fig. 3. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the ANSWER-Sponsored March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007. Notes: See Notes of Fig. 1. Source: Authors' surveys of 337 participants in the ANSWER-sponsored rally held on March 17, 2007.

Comparison of Figs. 1, 2, and 3 makes clear that coalition leadership significantly influences the antiwar network. When ANSWER and UFPJ worked together in a grand coalition, the antiwar movement had three clear leaders (ANSWER, UFPJ, and MoveOn). When the grand coalition dissolved, the network was reduced to only two principal leaders at each rally. Beyond the turnout at any particular demonstration, however, the divide between UFPJ and ANSWER should influence the underlying structure of antiwar networks. What is the nature of this effect?

We explore the effect of the ANSWER–UFPJ split on the antiwar movement as a whole by merging the data from the separate UFPJ and ANSWER rallies as if they were one rally, representing a unified movement in 2007. This merger allows us to visualize “what if” we could observe both ANSWER and UFPJ simultaneously. Of course, we did not observe them

simultaneously – but at different events – so there are some limits to this analysis. First, UFPJ drew a substantially larger crowd of supporters on January 27 than did ANSWER on March 17. Crowd size estimates are notoriously imprecise, but most accounts estimated the UFPJ rally in the hundreds of thousands, roughly an order of magnitude higher than the ANSWER rally, estimated in the tens of thousands. Second, we collected a larger sample at the UFPJ rally (525 respondents) than at the ANSWER rally (337 participants). Both of these differences distort the degree to which the two networks can be combined seamlessly. Nonetheless, a cautious interpretation of the merged networks yields substantial insights on the dynamics of antiwar networks.

The merged networks are presented in Fig. 4 ($N = 862$) and are readily comparable to the network of the unified rally on September 24, 2005,




Fig. 4. Hypothetical Joint UFPJ–ANSWER Co-mobilization Network for 2007. Notes: See Notes of Fig. 1. Source: Authors’ surveys of 525 participants in the UFPJ-sponsored rally held on January 27, 2007 and 337 participants in the ANSWER-sponsored rally held on March 17, 2007.

presented in Fig. 1. The unified 2007 network retains a polycephalous structure similar to the 2005 network. ANSWER, UFPJ, and MoveOn continued to head factions of the network, while CodePink retained its central position and WCW moved between UFPJ and ANSWER. The substantial similarity between Figs. 1 and 4 suggests that the split between ANSWER and UFPJ did not fundamentally alter the structure of the underlying networks among antiwar activists, even if mesomobilization for individual rallies was notably different. Nonetheless, significant changes in the network are apparent. The degree of co-mobilization between MoveOn and ANSWER was substantially weaker in 2007 than in 2005, and the strength of the link between UFPJ and ANSWER was weakened as well.

Similarities and differences in these network structures are apparent from visual inspection of the graphs. Some additional insights can be gleaned, nonetheless, from numerical comparisons of centralization and network size. Rallies that are led either by ANSWER or by UFPJ are more centralized than the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally in 2005 or the hypothetical one in 2007. The main component of ANSWER's March 17, 2007, co-mobilization network is the most centralized of the set, at 90.48% centralized.²² In comparison, the main component of UFPJ's co-mobilization network on January 27, 2007, was 64.45% centralized. In comparison, the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally was 59.52% centralized, while the hypothetical 2007 joint rally was 66.75% centralized. This result belies the similarity between the joint networks in 2005 and 2007, while at the same time indicating that the core of the movement had become about 7% more centralized by 2007.²³

Conclusions about network size cannot be drawn directly from the graphs presented in Figs. 1-4 because they are each based on different sample sizes. The graph representing ANSWER's March 17, 2007, rally naturally appears the smallest because it is based on a sample of 337 respondents, which is substantially fewer than the 525 respondents at UFPJ's January 27, 2007. To address this problem, we randomly sampled 337 respondents from UFPJ's rally to make the networks genuinely comparable. When examining samples of equal size, we found that the main component of ANSWER's network contained 16 organizations, while UFPJ's contained 32 organizations. This finding suggests that UFPJ's core co-mobilization network is roughly double the size of ANSWER's, which may be part of the explanation for why UFPJ's January 27 rally drew substantially more participants than ANSWER's March 17, 2007, rally. A random sample of 337 respondents from the joint rally on September 24, 2005 contained 21 organizations in the main component. A random sample of 337 respondents

from the hypothetical 2007 joint rally yielded 24 organizations in the main component of the network. These findings suggest that UFPJ's concerns that its mobilization process would be less effective when partnering with ANSWER may be well grounded. UFPJ was able to build a stronger core to its network when it worked alone than when it partnered with ANSWER (either actually in 2005 or hypothetically in 2007). UFPJ's core network is demonstrably superior to ANSWER's, which suggests that calls for "unity" in the movement are distinctly to the organizational advantage of ANSWER and at the expense of UFPJ.

The rift between ANSWER and UFPJ provides opportunities for other organizations in the antiwar movement to move into strategic position. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, p. 26) define "brokerage" as a mechanism that links "two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another." An actor has more opportunities for brokerage when it stands between two other actors that are disconnected from one another. Thus, we assess opportunities for brokerage by ranking the betweenness scores (Freeman, 1979) of the leading organizations in each network in Table 3.²⁴

When UFPJ and ANSWER led their own demonstrations in 2007, they each occupied the position with the most betweenness, reflecting their brokerage of the events. However, when ANSWER and UFPJ are brought together (both in 2005 and 2007), their tense relationship creates brokerage opportunities for other organizations uninvolved in the conflict. Most notably, MoveOn plays the role of a silent partner within both coalitions

Table 3. Brokerage Potential of Leading Antiwar Organizations.

	September 24, 2005 (UFPJ-ANSWER)	January 27, 2007 (UFPJ)	March 17, 2007 (ANSWER)	All 2007 (UFPJ- ANSWER)
Betweenness	1. MoveOn	1. UFPJ	1. ANSWER	1. MoveOn
ranking	2. UFPJ	2. MoveOn	2. MoveOn	2. UFPJ
	3. ANSWER	3. CodePink	3. CodePink	3. CodePink
	4. CodePink	4. The Nation	4. WCW	4. ANSWER
	5. Prof. Staff Congress	5. NOW	5. PeaceAction	5. WCW

Notes: Betweenness was computed following Freeman (1979) in Ucinet 6.146 for Windows (Borgatti et al., 2007). See Appendix C for the complete list of organization names corresponding to these abbreviations.

Source: Authors' surveys of participants in the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally held on September 24, 2005, the march on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the march on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

and thus achieves the position of greatest betweenness in the antiwar movement as a whole. Since MoveOn stands between groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and UFPJ, it has more potential to broker connections within the antiwar movement than do other organizations. MoveOn is much more closely allied with the Democratic Party than either UFPJ or ANSWER and takes a more conservative approach to ending the war (Heaney & Rojas, 2007). Ironically, the clearest network effect of the dispute between UFPJ and ANSWER – during their tenuous coalition in 2005 and after its dissolution – is to augment the strategic position of MoveOn. CodePink (pictured in Fig. 5), which is willing to work inclusively with the radical, moderate, and conservative flanks of the movement, similarly gained ground after UFPJ and ANSWER split, even achieving a slightly more desirable position than ANSWER in the overall network.

The validity of these comparisons between the antiwar movement in September 2005 and January/March 2007 depends, in part, on whether these rallies took place at relatively comparable points in the protest cycle (Tarrow, 1993). It is difficult to have a fair and unbiased view of where the



Fig. 5. CodePink Activists Cross into Virginia to March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007. Source: Sam Freund.

antiwar movement is in the protest cycle as of this writing in December 2007. The movement may be nearing its end or may be sustained for another 5–10 years, depending on the unfolding of world events (such as whether the Bush Administration launches military strikes against Iran and the outcome of the 2008 presidential election). Our perspective at the moment is that both the September 2005 and January/March 2007 events were part of an “institutional” phase of the protest cycle (which was preceded by an “organizational” phase in 2001–2002, a “mass mobilization” phase in 2003–2004, and a “depressed” phase in late 2004 and early 2005). The institutional phase reflects an increased reliance by the movement on formal institutional processes, especially working with the Democrats in Congress. The institutional phase began in September 2005 with UFPJ’s first major lobby day and continued through early 2007 when UFPJ sponsored other major lobbying efforts. During this time, the only major “disruption” to the movement’s activities was the UFPJ–ANSWER schism. We believe that the movement began to enter a “civil disobedience” phase, characterized by “die-ins,” occupations of congressional offices, and disruptive actions on Capitol Hill, in May 2007 as it became clear that the new Democratic Congress would not end the war. While we cannot be certain, we believe that historians will look back on the late 2005–early 2007 period as a roughly unified period in the movement, making comparisons within this period reasonable.

MOVING BEYOND THE ANSWER–UFPJ SPLIT

The leading coalitions in the antiwar movement appeared to part ways even further in the months following the January/March 2007 events. ANSWER held another March on Washington on September 15, 2007, which attracted tens of thousands of supporters and ended in massive civil disobedience (a “die in”) on the steps of the U.S. Capitol Building that led to 189 arrests (Boorstein, Dion Haynes, & Klein, 2007). In a change of tactics, ANSWER endorsed lobbying and actions in the halls of Congress during the week of September 17–21.²⁵ In planning for these events, ANSWER reached out for coalition partners more broadly and cooperatively than it had in the recent past. Organizations such as CodePink, Grassroots America, and Iraq Veterans Against the War were visible throughout the week of action. The leadership role of CodePink (and its co-founder Medea Benjamin in particular) at the week’s final planning meeting (September 16) and at the People’s March Inside Congress (September 18)

highlighted how CodePink could put its advantageous position to use. CodePink exercised classic brokerage by passing on tactics to ANSWER that it had developed while working in conjunction with UFPJ (see also Olzak & Uhrig, 2001; Soule, 1997).

Rather than stage another march on Washington, UFPJ sponsored 11 regional demonstrations around the United States on October 27, 2007, in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Orlando, Jonesborough (TN), New Orleans, Chicago, Salt Lake City, Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego. This move was an attempt to capitalize on its expansive grassroots base and to capture the public's attention in new ways. An interesting development of these rallies was that local ANSWER affiliates partnered with UFPJ affiliates to mobilize supporters in several places, such as San Francisco and Chicago. This cooperation reflects the underlying tension in the relationship: the activists want to work together to oppose the war but routinely clash on ideological, tactical, and personal grounds.

The two coalitions, by self-consciously diverging from one another (at least at the national level), appear to be broadening the audiences that the movement as a whole is able to reach. For this reason, we conclude that there appears to be enough "room" in the antiwar movement for two major, competing coalitions. To some extent, ANSWER and UFPJ are vying for the attention, energies, and resources of the same supporters. But to a larger extent, both groups are more urgently attempting to reach out to a mass public that has remained largely quiescent throughout the entire U.S.–Iraq conflict.

The muted negative effects of the UFPJ–ANSWER split may partially be a function of the movement's expanded political opportunities coinciding with declining public support for President George W. Bush (cf. Kriesi, 2004). Public disapproval of the president's handling of the Iraq War rose modestly from 53% in September 2005 to 58% in March 2007 (*New York Times/CBS News*, 2007). If public opinion were trending in favor of the president, or even remaining stable, the conflict between ANSWER and UFPJ might have been more detrimental to the movement as its base of support shrank.

Beyond UFPJ and ANSWER, the effects of coalition dissolution on network dynamics are likely to depend, in part, on the nature of the underlying networks. If a coalition is formed among groups that are closely allied with one another, the effect of dissolution may become evident only gradually due to the persistence of multiple, overlapping relationships. If a coalition is formed among groups that are initially more disconnected, then the effect of dissolution may be a more immediate impact on networks, since

the coalition plays a critical role in sustaining these ties. Similarly, the consequences of coalition dissolution may depend on the longevity of the original coalition. If a short-term coalition dissolves, then the effects on the underlying networks may be minimal, since the coalition had little time to influence the structure of networks in the first place. If a long-term coalition dissolves, the effects may be more substantial, since the disappearance of the coalition is more likely to interrupt the day-to-day interactions in the network. We believe that the ANSWER–UFPJ break up more closely resembles the dissolution of a long-term coalition, since the two organizations had collaborated on a series of significant events over several years. Further empirical research on coalition dissolution would help to specify these conditions more precisely. If the history of social movements is any guide, there should continue to be plenty of future opportunities to observe coalitions as they dissolve.²⁶

CONCLUSION

Coalition politics are a vital component of social movement dynamics. While much is known about why coalitions form and dissolve, the consequences of coalition dissolution on movements previously have not been as well characterized. This study moves to fill this gap in knowledge by examining how dissolution of the coalition between ANSWER and UFPJ affected the mesomobilization and network structure of the contemporary American antiwar movement. We find that coalition leadership does make a difference in what kinds of supporters turn out at a demonstration, depending on coalitional framings, access to mass media, and organizational networks. The split between UFPJ and ANSWER did not radically restructure the antiwar network, which is cushioned by robust network ties among activists and organizations. The split, however, did allow groups with more flexible and ambiguous identities – notably MoveOn, CodePink, and WCW – to occupy more advantageous positions in the network. Divisions between the moderate and radical flanks of the movement thus expanded the ground available to the conservative flank of the movement, embodied by MoveOn. We expect this shift to have a path-dependent effect (Pierson, 2006) on the structure of the antiwar network as it evolves through continued opposition to the American occupation of Iraq.

The relationship between social movement coalitions, mobilization, and network dynamics merits further investigation. Our findings that a split between the two leading members of a grand coalition affects

mesomobilization and, thus, network structures, are suggestive of a wider range of dynamics between coalition organizers and individual activists. Coalition work affects how individual activists think about movements and their links with other activists, yet little is known about the mechanisms that shape these connections. Further, coalitions differ on whether they focus on staging street demonstrations (e.g., ANSWER), are more attuned to direct contacts with legislators (e.g., Win Without War), or attempt to do both (e.g., UFPJ). When multiple coalitions are working as part of the same movement, but in alternate venues, how, if at all, do they coordinate their work? Who are the brokers and how does their brokerage affect their activism? How do the tensions inherent in these processes lead to the formation of new coalitions and the rearrangement of alliances within existing ones? Investigations along these lines would do much to advance the understanding of the evolution of social movements.

NOTES

1. According to *The New York Times/CBS News (2007) Poll*, approval of President Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq stood at 35% in September 2005, lower than at any previous point in his presidency. This rating would continue to slide, reaching a trough of 21% in December 2006.

2. Beyond her role in various antiwar movements, Cagan was a leader in the nuclear disarmament movement of the 1980s and several progressive struggles, such as campaigns for women's rights and gay rights.

3. We attended the following UFPJ rallies: August 29, 2004, in New York, NY; March 19, 2005, in Fayetteville, NC; September 25, 2005, in Washington, DC; January 27, 2007, in Washington, DC; and October 27, 2007, in New York, NY, Chicago, IL, and San Francisco, CA. We participated in the following UFPJ lobby days in Washington, DC: September, 26, 2005; May 22, 2006; and January 29, 2007. We visited the following planning meetings: July 20, 2005, in New York, NY; September 25, 2005, in Washington, DC; May 21, 2006, in Washington, DC; January 28, 2007, in Washington, DC; and June 22–24, 2007, in Chicago, IL (the 3rd UFPJ National Assembly). We interviewed Sue Udry, National Legislative Coordinator, on January 11, 2006, in Washington, DC, and Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair, on June 29, 2007, in Atlanta, GA, at the United States Social Forum.

4. We attended the following ANSWER rallies in Washington, DC: October 26, 2002; January 18, 2003; March 15, 2003; January 20, 2005; September 24, 2005; March 17, 2007 (march from Washington, DC, to Virginia); and September 15, 2007. We visited an ANSWER planning meeting in Washington, DC on September 16, 2007. We participated in an ANSWER-sponsored lobby day on September 18, 2007. We interviewed Sarah Sloan, National Staff Director, by telephone on January 25, 2005; Peta Lindsay, National Youth and Student Coordinator, on March 18, 2005,

in Fayetteville, NC; and Eugene Puryear, National Student Organizer, on June 29, 2007, in Atlanta, GA, at the United States Social Forum.

5. The coalition between ANSWER and UFPJ was a hybrid of Tarrow's (2005, p. 167) two high-involvement coalition types: the "event coalition" and the "campaign coalition." Ostensibly, the two organizations formed an event coalition for the purpose of the September 24, 2005, event. However, this event was part of a series of events on which they had collaborated, leading their collaboration to resemble a campaign coalition. The implication of UFPJ's break from ANSWER was not to abort the September 24 event, but to rule out the continuation of the longer campaign.

6. For a thorough presentation of each coalition's position on the split, see ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee (2005) and United for Peace and Justice (2005d). We decline to present a point-for-point discussion of the charges and countercharges, or to take a position on which side is "right" or "wrong." Rather, we simply observe that the outcome of the conflict was that the two coalitions did not work together again for at least 2 years and instead organized separate demonstrations.

7. Ideally, we would have liked to have conducted surveys of two events on the same day in the same city on the same issue but sponsored by two different organizations. However, such a perfect natural experiment is a very rare occurrence. In the 48 days that separated the two rallies, there were no major combat developments in Iraq, no significant new policy announcements pertaining to Iraq by the White House or Congress, and no significant organizational developments in the antiwar movement. Moreover, since large antiwar rallies had been a regular occurrence in the nation's capital since 2001, we think it unlikely that the January rally directly affected the March rally in a way that would influence our survey results significantly. Given that ANSWER and UFPJ organized large protests on September 15, 2007, and October 27, 2007, respectively, we do not think that the protest cycle entered a fundamentally different stage between January and March 2007. In short, our comparison is not perfect, but it is as close as can reasonably be expected while conducting on-the-ground research on ongoing social movements.

8. An analysis of response and nonresponse to the survey is presented in Appendix B. Although there may be biases in our initial selection of the anchors because of the spatial grouping of activists, we expect that these biases are reduced substantially by selecting only individuals close to the anchors (rather than the anchors themselves) and by distributing the surveyors widely throughout the crowd. The response rate to the survey was a favorably high 86%, which did not differ significantly across the three events. African American individuals were about 9% less likely to respond to the survey than were whites and men were about 6% less likely to respond than women. However, because race and sex are insignificant variables in our analysis below (in Table 2), we do not believe that these differences bias our statistical results.

9. In a few cases, we were able to make e-mail or phone contact with representatives of organizations that did not have Web pages in order to obtain basic information.

10. These null findings hold up both in bivariate and multivariate analysis, so it is not the case that significant coefficients are washed away by multicollinearity. Further, we investigated the possibility that differences between ANSWER and

UFPJ may be evident in the shape of the distributions of variables. For example, it is possible that both groups have the same mean age, but that one group attracts largely middle-age persons and the other attracts college students and retirees. We did not find that such differences are masked by our analysis. The age variable, for example, is similarly bimodal for both UFPJ and ANSWER, with modes in the college years and in the late 50s.

11. The membership variable is insignificant due to multicollinearity with the agreement variable. UFPJ respondents register a significantly higher level of membership in the Democratic Party than ANSWER respondents in a bivariate analysis (54.1–46.9%, $p = 0.039$).

12. This conclusion is not sensitive to model specification and holds up both in the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

13. Multicollinearity affected the conclusion about coefficient on the policy-specific variable. In a bivariate analysis, we find that individuals with policy-specific grievances were more likely to attend the ANSWER event than the UFPJ event (71.8–64.6%, $p = 0.025$), consistent with our prediction.

14. In a bivariate analysis, ANSWER supporters were more likely to be contacted directly by a social movement organization than are UFPJ supporters (31.7–21.7%, $p = 0.001$), though there were no differences in using the Internet or flyers as sources of information.

15. These results are robust to the specification of the model and hold up in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

16. Estimates suggest that the UFPJ rally drew approximately 100,000 participants (Schreck, Khalil, & Streitfeld, 2007), while the crowd at ANSWER's march was estimated to be between 15,000 and 30,000 people (Vogel & Chandler, 2007).

17. All interpretations below assume that all remaining variables are held at their means or modes.

18. These findings are mostly robust to alternative specifications, with the only difference present in the organizational issue variable. It is statistically significant in a bivariate analysis (45.9% for UFPJ and 33.3% for ANSWER, $p = 0.009$), but is insignificant in the multivariate analysis due to multicollinearity.

19. This result derives from a simple conversion of two-mode data into one-mode data (Brieger, 1974). The networks are constructed from data obtained through Question 10 of the survey (Appendix A).

20. ANSWER remains in the network at the UFPJ event because it did encourage some participants to attend. ANSWER wanted to make sure that they had a contingent and a banner at the event, even though it was excluded from the planning process by UFPJ. Essentially, ANSWER mobilized some participants at the UFPJ event, but it did not co-mobilize with any organizations in the main component. Simply showing up at the event with a contingent and a banner is fairly easy for ANSWER to do because it is headquartered in Washington, DC. Doing so ensures that its organization maintains a presence in the antiwar movement. However, this activity is not the equivalent of co-organizing the event, as it did on September 24, 2005.

21. The Revolutionary Communist Party similarly backs other antiwar efforts, such as the organization Not in Our Name (Tierney, 2005).

22. Centralization was computed using Freeman's (1979) degree centralization measure (see also Borgatti et al., 2007).

23. When the whole network is taken into account, rather than only the main component, a similar pattern is evident. Centralization calculations for the whole network are as follows: (1) September 24, 2005 – 19.54%; (2) January 27, 2007 – 23.89%; (3) March 17, 2007 – 28.30%; and (4) Hypothetical joint 2007 rally – 23.89%. These centralization percentages are substantially lower than the main component figures because networks outside the main component represent less centralized, grassroots processes.

24. Freeman (1979) explains that betweenness is calculated in three steps. First, identify all of the geodesics in a given network. A *geodesic* is the shortest path between any two points in the graph. Second, for every pair of groups in the network, count the number of times each group is on the geodesic for that pair. The *betweenness proportion* is the percent of geodesics between any pair of groups that include the group in question. Third, *betweenness* is calculated as the sum of all the betweenness proportions for which the pairs of groups are unique. A more formal statement of this computation is given by Borgatti et al. (2007: help command): "Let b_{jk} be the proportion of all geodesics linking vertex j and vertex k which pass through vertex i . The betweenness of vertex i is the sum of all b_{jk} where $i, j,$ and k are distinct. Betweenness is therefore a measure of the number of times a vertex occurs on a geodesic."

25. Turnout at these ANSWER-sponsored events averaged about 40 people, which was substantially fewer than the 600–1,000 participants typically attending similar UFPJ events.

26. Most recently, the antiwar coalition in Chicago broke apart over the issue of whether to engage or not with Democratic politicians, such as U.S. Senators Richard Durbin and Barak Obama, both from Illinois (Barreto, 2007).

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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS

This appendix contains all the survey questions that were asked and used in the data analysis presented in this paper. Questions not included in the analysis are not reported here (as indicated by skipped numbers), but may be obtained from the authors upon request.

1. Circle your sex. (Male, Female)
2. What is your age?
3. What is your ZIP code? (If you don't live in the U.S., please tell us your city and nation.)
4. What is your race/ethnicity? Circle as many as apply: (White/Caucasian; Black/African American; Latino/Hispanic/Mexican; Asian; Other).
6. Do you consider yourself to be a member of a political party? (Yes, No) If "Yes," which political party are you a member of? (Examples: Republican Party/Democratic Party/Green Party/Reform Party/Socialist Party.)
9. How did you hear about this event today?
10. Were you contacted to attend today's event by any particular organization? (Yes, No) If "Yes," which organization? (List as many as contacted you.)
11. What are the most important reasons you came to this event?
13. In the past 5 years, which of the following kinds of events have you attended? Please check all that apply: (Anti-Iraq War Protests; Lobby Day on Capitol Hill; Antiwar Training Sessions, Films, etc.; Civil Disobedience; Other).
16. We are interested in knowing whether you tend to agree more with the Democratic Party or with the Republican Party. (Please check one.) (5: Usually agree with Democratic Party; 4: Sometimes agree with Democratic Party; 3: Rarely agree with either party; 2: Sometimes agree with Republican Party; 1: Usually agree with Republican Party; Don't know.)

20. Could you please tell us the highest level of formal education you have completed? (Please check one.) (1: Less than high school diploma; 2: High School diploma; 3: Some college; 4: Associate's degree or technical degree; 5: College degree; 6: Some graduate education; 7: Graduate or professional degree.)
21. Could you please tell us your level of annual income? (1: \$0 to \$15,000 per year; 2: \$15,001 to \$30,000 per year; 3: \$30,001 to \$45,000 per year; 4: \$45,001 to \$60,000 per year; 5: \$60,001 to \$75,000 per year; 6: \$75,001 or more per year.)

APPENDIX B. RESPONSE RATE BY EVENT, RACE, AND SEX

	Respondents	Nonrespondents	Response Rate	<i>t</i> Score
Event				
Joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally, September 24, 2005	448	70	86%	0.630
UFPJ-sponsored rally, January 27, 2007	525	97	84%	-0.719
ANSWER-sponsored rally, March 17, 2007	337	55	86%	0.282
Total	1,310	222	86%	
Race/ethnicity				
White/Caucasian	1,111	183	86%	0.255
Black/African American	71	21	77%	-3.621*
Hispanic/Latino/Mexican	52	8	87%	0.502
Asian	45	6	88%	1.167
Other	71	4	95%	4.887*
No answer	17	NA	NA	
Sex				
Male	578	128	82%	-2.374*
Female	731	94	88%	2.186*
Transgendered	1	NA	NA	
No answer	6	NA	NA	

Note: *denotes statistical significance at $p \leq 0.050$.

Source: Authors' surveys of participants in the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally held on September 24, 2005, the march on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the march on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

APPENDIX C. ORGANIZATIONS IN MAIN COMPONENTS OF CO-MOBILIZATION NETWORKS

Abbreviation	Organization's Full Name	Year Founded	Location of Headquarters
AbolitionNow	Abolition Now	2000	New York
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union	1917	New York
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee	1917	Pennsylvania
AirAmerica	Air America Radio	2004	New York
AmeriWay	People for the American Way	1981	Washington, DC
ANSWER	International ANSWER/ANSWER Coalition (Act Now to End War and Stop Racism)	2001	Washington, DC
Bates	Bates College	1855	Maine
BostonM	Boston Mobilization	1977	Massachusetts
CallAction	Call to Action	1976	Illinois
CFOW	Concerned Families of Westchester	2004	New York
ChurchWomen	Church Women United	1941	New York
CodePink	Code Pink: Women for Peace	2002	California
CPJ	Coalition for Peace and Justice	1982	New Jersey
CTUFPJ	Connecticut United for Peace and Justice		Connecticut
Dem4Amer	Democracy for America	2004	Vermont
Democrats	Democratic Party	1828	Washington, DC
DemRising	Democracy Rising	2001	Washington, DC
DemUnder	Democratic Underground	2001	Washington, DC
FCNL	Friends Committee on National Legislation	1943	Washington, DC
GRIM	Grassroots Impeachment Movement	2006	North Carolina
ImpeachBush	ImpeachBush.org	2000	Washington, DC
IPS	Institute for Policy Studies	1963	Washington, DC
JobsJust	Jobs with Justice	1987	Washington, DC
JustFP	Just Foreign Policy	2006	Washington, DC
LAMBDA	LAMBDA		Texas
LMFCT	Love Makes a Family of Connecticut	1999	Connecticut
LUCHA	Latin United Community Housing Association	1981	Illinois
MFSO	Military Families Speak Out	2002	Massachusetts
MGJ	Mobilization for Global Justice	1999	New York
MoveOn	MoveOn.org	1998	Washington, DC
Nation	<i>The Nation</i> Magazine	1865	New York
NCPJC	North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition	2004	North Carolina
Nicaragua	Nicaragua Solidarity Movement		
NJImpeach	North Jersey Impeach Group	2006	New Jersey

APPENDIX C. (Continued)

Abbreviation	Organization's Full Name	Year Founded	Location of Headquarters
Northwood	Northwood Peace		
NOW	National Organization for Women	1966	New York
NUJP	Neighbors United for Justice and Peace	2001	Virginia
PaxChristi	Pax Christi	1972	Pennsylvania
PDA	Progressive Democrats of America	2004	Arizona
PeaceAction	Peace Action	1957	Maryland
PeaceNow	Peace Now	1981	Washington, DC
PeaceTeam	Peace Team		
PJVote	Peace and Justice Voters	2004	Illinois
Plowshares	Plowshares	1974	California
ProgMajor	Progressive Majority	1999	Washington, DC
Quaker	The Religious Society of Friends	1660	London, England
Rochester	Rochesterians Against War		New York
SKJPAG	South Kingston Justice and Peace Action Group	2001	Rhode Island
StudEndWar	Students for Ending the War in Iraq		
Suffolk	Suffolk Peace Network		New York
TCC	TCC		
Tikkun	Network of Spiritual Progressives	1986	California
TroopsOutNow	Troops Out Now	2004	New York
Truemajority	True Majority	2001	Washington, DC
Truthout	Truthout.org	2001	California
UCC	United Church of Christ	1957	Ohio
UFPJ	United for Peace and Justice	2002	New York
Unitarian	Unitarian Universalist Church	1961	Massachusetts
UPFree	United for Peace and Freedom	2002	Pennsylvania
VAIW	Veterans Against the Iraq War	2002	New Jersey
VoteVets	Votevets.org	2006	New York
WCW	World Can't Wait	2005	New York
Wespac	WesPac – Securing America's Future	1977	New York
Workcircle	Workmen's Circle	1900	New York

Source: Organizational Web pages and correspondence with organizations.